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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland 2001, p. vii) of 
policymaking in crime and disorder control, and the ways in which sub national policy 
actors are able to adapt and exert influence more generally over national level policy 
decisions as well as resist such wider forces. This research contends that some rethinking 
is needed away from much existing criminological literature on shifts in crime control 
policy that has been dominated by the ‘grand narrative’ accounts of writers such as 
Garland (2001). These narratives have been concerned largely with the provision of 
general accounts of overall shifts in policymaking at the national and at times global 
levels.  As a result the local dimension to this process has been with a few notable 
exceptions neglected or downplayed. Instead the primary focus of much existing 
criminological literature has been upon the role of national policy elites, presenting 
policymaking as a top down experience that follows a relatively smooth trajectory. In 
contrast this study suggests that policymaking is instead a more unpredictable and 
messier process that can be affected by problems of implementation and resistance. In 
order to examine the role of the ‘local’ within policymaking, this research employed the 
use of a single ‘exemplifying case study’ of one English city and in turn it examined in 
depth one particular area of policymaking and implementation, namely the local 
management of Anti Social Behaviour (henceforth ASB). This sought to bring together 
documentary analysis and elite interviews in an effort to provide an empirically detailed 
account of anti social behaviour policy development. This study focused primarily on a 
series of semi-structured interviews, involving a range of key local policy actors. These 
were conducted over an extended period of time, which coincided with the rise of the 
national level ASB agenda. This extended period enabled observations to also be made 
about the ebb and flow of policy often as it emerged and caused local practitioners to 
have to develop and adapt policy responses. The resulting empirical findings provide an 
informed example of the messiness and contingency of public policymaking, whilst also 
providing a site in which other academic theories can be tested and applied. The intention 
of this study is to not only make a significant contribution to the field in which it is nested 
(ASB policy and practice), but also to enhance our understanding of the effects that 
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broader policy change and the impact that key national policy drivers can have upon the 
formulation of local level policy responses.  In brief the thesis suggests that through the 
interaction of key policy actors at both the national and local levels, policy formulation 
and implementation is realised. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Research aims 
 
The focus of this study is the local governance of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB). 
The overall aim is to explore the extent and nature of influences over key policy 
developments in one urban local authority area in England and Wales. In view of this, the 
key focus of this study has clearly been upon key elements of the policymaking process, 
as opposed to exploring policy outcomes. It is therefore not the intention of this study to 
consider in any depth the various aspects of policy implementation, including engaging 
with recipients of specific ASB measures, such as Anti Social Behaviour Orders 
(henceforth ASBOs) (on the latter see, inter alia, Squires, 2008, Burney, 2005) . Instead it 
has concentrated upon events further up the chain of policymaking.  
 
In terms of a timescale, the study was primarily focused upon the period between 1998 
and 2007, which coincided with the rise and consolidation of a national ASB policy 
agenda. As with crime policy more generally, the main focus of much existing 
commentary about shifts in crime policy focuses upon national level developments. There 
has been much less discussion of the sub-national, and local levels of the policy process, 
and the tensions between the local and the national are rather underplayed within broad 
sociological accounts of change (see, however, Hughes, 2007, Edwards and Hughes, 
2004, 2008). The concept of ‘governance’ suggests that there has been a movement away 
from ‘government’ with policy being increasingly framed and delivered by a range of 
policy ‘networks’, incorporating a range of state, community and commercial bodies 
operating at a number of different levels in the system. The growing complexity of the 
policy process has been particularly visible in the arena of crime and disorder control 
during the past two decades or so, which have witnessed a growing emphasis on multi-
agency ‘partnerships’. This suggests that the Government has developed a more hands-
off style of approach in managing its crime control responses, relinquishing control, at 
least to an extent, to locally based policy actors. An important objective of the current 
study is to assess how far this appears to be the case in the sphere of ASB policy.  
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Following the victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election, there was a rapid 
emergence of a national ASB agenda, beginning with the passing of the 1998 Crime and 
Disorder Act (henceforth CDA). The origins of this agenda were the growing 
politicisation of the issue by New Labour during the 1990s. They sought to harness what 
they perceived as a growing national mood, and attempted to outflank the Conservative 
Party by appealing to voters on a tough ‘law and order’ policy platform.  Following the 
election, they began to implement their ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ 
approach. Within the arena of ASB, this involved a raft of targeted ASB legislative 
measures, which are outlined in more detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. These were 
based on a broad definition of ASB and the categories of behaviours that it included. 
Alongside this was the development of a robust policy framework, designed to empower 
local level practitioners to take strong action against those who committed such 
behaviours.  Most attention focused on the use of interventions such as ‘Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders’, which would go onto become the ‘flagship’ element of the 
Government’s ASB agenda. These became a key focus of broader academic commentary 
and critique on the subject of ASB policy, resulting in a tendency to overlook the more 
adaptive and preventive initiatives being developed locally, in addition to or even instead 
of purely enforcement approaches. 
 
A further objective of this study is to provide some more detailed insights into the 
‘empirical particulars’ (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking at the local level. The basis 
of this was the exploration of how key policy actors at the sub national level initiate, 
resist and/or adapt national level policies. It is therefore a somewhat contrasting approach 
to broader sociological accounts of shifts in crime control policy, which sometimes 
present an overly ‘smooth’ account of the process of policy translation from the top 
down. Such accounts can neglect to consider the complex interrelations that take place 
within the policy process, including those between central policymakers and local 
implementers. The national, regional and local levels can become sites of power struggles 
and conflicts, which can occur both across and between the levels involved. In the case of 
ASB policy, there is evidence to support this disruption of policy translation and 
implementation at the local level, as variations in approach began to emerge at an early 
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stage across practitioner sites (Burney 2002, p. 475). Nonetheless there is a seemingly 
limited amount of empirical research that concentrates upon the more 'messier' and 
unpredictable elements of the policymaking process. There is too little attention paid to 
the role played by the 'local' element within policymaking, and its potential ability to 
influence and shape key policy developments. There are, of course, some exceptions to 
this. The work of writers such as Crawford (2009), Hughes (2007) and Burney (2009) has 
all acknowledged, in different ways, the significance of the role of the ‘local’ in this 
process both nationally and within a European context. Despite these acknowledgements, 
this remains an area of study that has been dominated by a focus upon the provision of 
grand narrative accounts of crime control. There are thus gaps in the existing academic 
literature that this study into the governance of ASB seeks to address. It is intended that 
this study will highlight the role of both national level policy talk and decisions, and the 
production of outcomes locally in relation to ASB. 
 
Designing the research 
 
In undertaking this study, the decision was taken to use an adaptive approach, which sits 
in between the extremes of both inductive and deductive theories. The main focus of this 
approach is “generating social theory in conjunction with ongoing empirical research” 
(Layder 1998, p. viii). The basis of this is that adaptive theory can be used as a means of 
ordering research data, whilst adapting this order to suit the empirical material that 
emerges (Layder 1998, p. viii). The main empirical element of this research was a case 
study of a single English city, in order to provide rich description of a local experience of 
formulating and delivering ASB policy over time.  The case study was driven by a set of 
specific research questions, which focused on issues relating to the ‘why’, ‘when’, ‘who’ 
and ‘how’ of the ASB policy process in this particular city.  
 
An analytical framework was also formulated for this study. The purpose of this was to 
enable the identification and assessment of the role of not just each linear stage within the 
policymaking process, but also across the levels involved often simultaneously. In doing 
so, it was decided to use the work of Pollitt (2001), and his conceptual structure regarding 
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policy convergence in public administration. Pollitt argues that there are three key 
‘levels’ of policy. These consist of policy talk, decisions and actions, each of which 
represents an analytically distinct dimension of policy. In Pollitt’s study, policy talk is the 
political rhetoric or broad statements of intent that support any key political 
developments. The resulting policy decisions are the manifestation of this talk into 
tangible legislative measures and policy statements. Finally policy action is concerned 
with policy implementation locally, in essence charging practitioners with the delivery of 
policy outcomes.  
 
In the application of Pollitt’s concepts to this study, the discussion of both policy talk and 
decisions are focused upon the national level. The talk concerned the rhetoric that 
accompanied the emergence of a broader ASB agenda. Initially this surrounded the lead 
up to Labour’s success at the 1997 General Election, as the background to these shifts 
illustrated a broader evolution of the Party. The prominence given to the issue of ASB 
therefore marked a movement towards a stronger stance being adopted in tackling crime 
and problems of low-level disorder. It was a stance developed as key Party actors 
absorbed a range of influences. These included those emanating from the American 
approach that had been developed in tackling problems of disorder, including the ‘zero 
tolerance’ approach adopted in parts of the USA. The key influence upon this had been 
drawn from Kelling and Wilson's (1982) ‘Broken Windows’ theory, elements of which 
would also become a feature of policy talk and decisions in the UK. In this country these 
would manifest itself in policy changes and modifications to policing practices. The 
resulting policy decisions formed a key part of Labour policy during three distinct 
periods of their time in government. The remaining element of policy action is concerned 
with the delivery of policy outcomes at the local level. In some cases this resulted in the 
reformulation of national policy directives, as these were interpreted and implemented by 
practitioners locally.  
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Research methodology 
 
The overall approach was adaptive in its appreciation of the interplay of existing theory 
and empirical research and their feedback loops. It was an approach that was adopted, as 
ASB became a growth area of policy activity in the particular city under consideration 
developing in real time alongside this particular piece of research. The methods used 
were primarily qualitative, although where available, secondary sources of quantitative 
data were utilized  (for example, national statistics primarily concerned with the use of 
particular ASB interventions such as the ASBO). Material of this nature was of particular 
significance in providing a broader context for the study. It was also used to inform the 
selection of an appropriate case study city, in conjunction with the use of additional 
locally based quantitative information.  
 
The case study itself mainly consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews, which 
were conducted during the fieldwork, which spanned five years. These participants were 
made up of a cross section of key practitioners in the city selected for case study, in an 
effort to enhance the understanding of the local policymaking process. The accounts that 
were provided during these interviews also offered an insight into the establishment and 
impact of local level working practices. These resulted from local policy actors seeking to 
provide a local response to key national level shifts and policy decisions in respect to 
ASB policy. The main aim of these interviews was to gain the informants’ perspectives 
on these key developments locally. The participants were also asked to identify what they 
believed to have been the main driving forces behind the emergence of this particular 
policy, and other key external influences. In addition, a significant amount of secondary 
documentary material was also compiled and analysed during the course of this study. 
The archive of material also included media reports of ASB locally, which although not 
in the event forming a central part of the thesis, did provide some helpful background 
context to local debates surrounding ASB policy. The review of key strategy and policy 
documents in relation to the case study city were used to chart the development of local 
level ASB policy at crucial junctures, and a source of crosschecking with the accounts 
provided in the interviews.  
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Thesis structure 
 
The next chapter reviews the key themes of the existing literature that informed the 
theoretical framework for this study. It discusses the grand narrative accounts of crime 
control policies of writers such as Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) and illustrates the 
emphasis that these accounts have placed upon national and in some cases global shifts in 
crime control policies. These accounts also suggest a movement away from previous 
models of penal welfarism towards increased punitiveness. These accounts tend to 
underplay the ways in which these broader shifts play themselves out in the form of local 
level developments, and perhaps overlook the important influence that local actors and, 
more broadly, local ‘geo-histories’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2005) can have upon the 
policymaking process. It is this gap that writers such as Burney (2009), Hughes (2007) 
and Crawford (2009) have pointed to in their work on ASB policy, which has recognised 
the role of the local in this process.   
 
To demonstrate growing focus on the complexity of the policy process, the accounts of 
Rhodes (1981), Cope (2001) and Edwards & Benyon (2001) are used to explore the 
emergence of a policy network approach. This forms part of a broader discussion of a 
more recent movement towards governance and its impact upon the ways in which policy 
is delivered on the ground, a key feature of the later findings chapters of this thesis. The 
chapter concludes with a series of ‘theoretical propositions’ derived from the existing 
literature, which formed a framework with which to interrogate the empirical findings.  
 
Following this, Chapter Three sets out the main elements of the national policy context 
that emerged around the issue of ASB during the New Labour era. This provides an 
account of the development of the ASB policy framework at the national level during 
three distinct periods of Labour government, and applies some of the key elements of 
Pollitt’s distinctions between policy talk and decisions at the national level. These 
developments are analysed across key milestones in the history of New Labour’s time in 
government.  
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Chapter Four provides a discussion and justification of the research design and 
methodology that was adopted by this study. It applies the themes that were identified in 
the earlier literature review, and the distinctions within the policymaking process, to an 
emerging research strategy. In considering the design of this study, this chapter also 
outlines the key research questions. The remainder of the chapter discusses the particular 
methods adopted within the case study approach. It considers city selection, sampling 
rationale of interview participants and the interview style adopted. There is also an 
account of the approach to analysis and the ethical issues raised by the study, and how 
these were addressed.  
 
The focus of the next two chapters is the presentation of the results of the data analysis. 
The first of these chapters focuses on a detailed account of the ‘who’, the ‘what’ and the 
‘when’. This includes discussion of the key policy actors in local ASB policymaking, as 
revealed by the data analysis, the key dimensions of policy change in the case study city, 
and when these occurred. The second of the findings chapters addresses the complexities 
of the local policy process via exploring the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ questions. In what way 
did the policy changes come about in the case study city, how far were they resisted and 
reshaped at the local level, how did relationships between policy actors develop, and with 
what results in terms of policy outcomes?  And in what ways did the identification of 
such relationships and processes, confirm as well as at times challenge existing 
theoretical interpretations of the politics of ASB management in the wider criminological 
literature? Where relevant in these two chapters, the theoretical propositions outlined at 
the end of Chapter Two are revisited, and considered in light of the empirical findings of 
the study.  
 
In Chapter Seven, the conclusion of the thesis presents an overview of the key findings of 
this study, and relates them to the wider issues identified in the existing literature. It 
reflects on the conceptual framework that was utilised, considering the extent to which 
and the ways in which the empirical findings suggested that the theoretical propositions 
needed adapting. The chapter also includes a critical evaluation of the research design 
and methods.  At the same time it also highlights the contribution of a study of this nature 
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to the existing body of work in the field. The chapter looks towards the emergence of 
similar studies that recognise the need to apply and test the theories of crime control that 
focus primarily upon change at the national and global level in terms of the necessary 
interplay of national, global and local processes.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main themes of the research 
literature that has informed this thesis. The key objectives are to place the current study in 
the context of a wider body of research, to begin to establish the study’s particular 
research questions, and to set out the theoretical framework that guided the research 
design. The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first considers sociological 
accounts of shifts in crime control in Western societies. Some of these accounts can be 
considered as ‘grand narratives’ in so far as they are primarily focused upon globalised 
shifts in crime control and broader structural and cultural patterns that have shaped policy 
developments in recent years (see for example; Garland 2001; Crawford 2009; Simon 
2007). Because of their broad and general focus, however, these accounts inevitably 
avoid detailed engagement with empirical evidence about how policy is formed, 
delivered and interpreted at various levels in the system. Other writers such as Burney 
(2009), Jones and Newburn (2007) and Hughes (2007) have sought to address this gap 
and provide more specific, empirically informed accounts of policy change in particular 
spheres of policy.  The current study also aims to contribute to this latter body of work. 
The second section of the chapter explores the research literature relating to the nature of 
‘policy’ and the policymaking process. An important element of this discussion is the 
noted movement away from ‘government’ towards ‘governance’ over recent decades, 
with a growth in the number of non-state actors who are engaged in the process of 
governing. 
 
Explaining shifts in crime and disorder control 
 
‘Grand narrative’ accounts of change in crime control 
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Garland’s ‘Culture of Control’  
Garland (2001) provides a detailed analysis of key developments in crime control over 
the last 30 years. He is concerned with both the national and global levels of this process, 
and the advent of what he describes as the period of ‘late modernity’. Garland seeks to 
identify how and why shifts in the approach to crime control have occurred. He also 
discusses their apparent divergence away from the traditional approach of ‘penal 
welfarism’, which dominated US and UK approaches to criminal justice and crime 
control during the second half of the twentieth century. A range of shifts has signalled the 
new era of policymaking with which Garland is concerned. These represent a specific 
phase of the modernisation process (Zedner 2002, p. 346). They have been impacted 
upon by a broader series of changes, as institutions have been reassessed and reworked. 
The purpose of which has been to accommodate the need to maintain order within 
society. In addition to incapacitating those who have the potential to disrupt it: ‘today’s 
reconfigured field of crime control is the result of political choices and administrative 
decisions – but these choices and decisions are grounded in a new structure of social 
relations and coloured by a new pattern of cultural sensibilities’ (Garland 2001, p. 6). 
 
Garland’s account of these more recent changes focuses upon charting emerging trends 
and patterns within the criminal justice system on both sides of the Atlantic (although he 
is keen to stress that this is by no means intended as a comprehensive comparative study 
of developments in both of these countries). In doing so, he puts both crime and crime 
control policies centre stage in his analysis of these policy trajectories in both the UK and 
the USA. Garland argues that each country has adopted broadly similar crime control 
strategies in response to changing social, economic and cultural shifts (although he 
accepts that there remain important differences between the two countries). It is with this 
in mind that Garland draws upon examples from both the British and American 
experiences in his argument. He concludes that a ‘reconfigured field of crime control and 
criminal justice’ has emerged (2001, p. 23). The result may eventually be the replication 
of these identified trends in other late modern societies, despite significant differences in 
both their cultural and political responses to crime management.  
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Developments of late modernity 
 
Garland’s account attempts to provide a general explanation and overview of policy 
change, as he assesses the reconfiguration of the crime control field. His initial analysis 
concentrates upon the key structural and cultural shifts that have occurred, as he seeks to 
identify potential areas of convergence. These are mainly in relation to the penal, policing 
and crime preventative policies of these two countries. In addition he also explores some 
of what he considers to be the broader ‘problems’ facing government during the latter 
stages of the twentieth century, including those that are considered to be the more 
significant catalysts for transformation. For Garland these primarily encompass twelve 
indices of change (2001, p.20). These include the movement away from the emphasis 
previously placed upon rehabilitation and penal welfarism, towards the re-emergence of 
punitive, retributive punishments. It is a shift that has given rise to the idea that prison 
works on both sides of the Atlantic, which has helped to shape the more sweeping 
changes that have occurred in relation to the traditional penal model. There has also been 
a renewed emphasis placed upon risk management in which protection of the public has 
become of paramount concern. As a result, a more managerial response has been adopted 
in crime control, including the growth of multi-agency partnerships, and an enhanced 
focus on the measurement of performance of the agencies involved (2001, p.18). At the 
same time, and by contrast, crime control has been increasingly characterised by a more 
emotional and punitive political debate at the national level. There has been a notable 
politicization of the crime victim, as policymaking becomes more influenced by populist 
appeal (2001, p.13). This has led to the use of tough political rhetoric, which is designed 
to illustrate the mood of the public. All of which has culminated in an expansion of the 
infrastructure of crime and disorder policies, increasing the number of non-state actors 
who are involved in the process.  
 
These developments have resulted in the former ‘penal-welfare’ based criminal justice 
system being somewhat undermined by the raft of changes it has experienced. The 
culture of uncertainty that this has created, has led to wider questions being raised about 
its ability to respond effectively to the problem of crime. The system is volatile and 
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unpredictable, and appears to be premised upon making the most popular choices, which 
are designed to suit the mood of the time: 
 
The programmes and ideas that are thus selected are those that fit with 
field’s dominant structures and the specific cultures that they support. 
They are the ones that mesh with the most powerful institutions, 
allocate blame in popular ways, and empower groups that currently 
command authority, esteem and resources. Crime control strategies 
and criminological ideas are not adopted because they are known to 
solve problems. The evidence runs out well before their effects can be 
known with any certainty. They are adopted and they succeed because 
they characterize problems and identify solutions in ways that fit with 
the dominant culture and the power structure upon which it rests. 
(Garland 2001, p. 26) 
 
A number of political, social and cultural changes have occurred on both sides of the 
Atlantic, with the paradoxical and simultaneous promotion of individual economic 
freedom alongside an increasingly punitive penal apparatus. The media have also had 
their part to play in these changes. They have helped to heighten people’s awareness of 
not just other groups within society, but also in highlighting the disparities between social 
groups as wealth has improved. In both countries, there has been growing division 
between the ‘have’ and ‘have nots’, and both have seen concerns about the emergence of 
a perceived ‘underclass’ associated with welfare dependency and criminal behaviour. At 
the same time, these changes have been used to legitimise the use of increasingly harsh 
criminal punishments, which all too often have targeted the poorer sections of society. As 
a result, perceptions of the poor began to centre upon them being seen as both ‘deviant’ 
and ‘different’ and a sector of the population from which the majority needed to be 
protected. These changes have been used as a means of reinforcing ‘the retributive 
sentiments that increasingly inform penal legislation’ (2001, p. 143).  
 
Crime as a ‘normal social fact’ 
 
These changes resulted in a drastic increase of aggregate crime rates. All of these factors 
conspired to reduce situational crime prevention and informal social controls, as 
communities became more fragmented. At the same time as the opportunities for people 
to be able to commit crime increased. It also appeared that there were specific groups 
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being targeted, and criminals were increasingly viewed as needing to be punished rather 
than reformed (Deflem et al. 2010), as the shift away from the rehabilitative ideal 
continued. Garland suggests that what these various structural changes culminated in was 
the eventual collapse of the previous model of penal welfarism. This led to the experience 
of high crime rates as having become gradually normalized, in what Garland suggests 
was a ‘new criminology of everyday life’. However, these rises in crime rates are claims 
that writers such as Zedner have found difficult to accept, given the decreases in crime 
rates that have been recorded in recent years in both the United Kingdom and America 
(2002, p. 350). For Garland though, despite these more recent downturns, crime rates 
remain persistently higher when compared to those of the 1950s and 1960s. They have 
also been accompanied by a surge in people’s fear of crime, contributing to the 
perception amongst the general public that crime remains on the increase. These changes 
in perception have continued to shape the adaptations of the crime control field in 
response to these issues, giving rise to the emergence of a new kind of criminal justice 
system: 
 
Leaving aside for a moment the national experience that distinguished 
the American experience from that of Britain, one can summarise the 
impact of these developments as follows: The first set of forces – the 
coming of late modernity – transformed some of the social and 
political conditions upon which the modern crime control field 
relied…The second set of forces – the politics of post welfarism – 
produced a new set of class and race relations and a dominant political 
block that defined itself in opposition to old style ‘welfarism’ and the 
social and cultural ideas on which it is based.  (Garland 2001, p. 75) 
 
Two kinds of crime control response 
 
Garland argues that crime control policy during recent decades has come to be 
characterised by the contrasting approaches of ‘adaptation’ and ‘denial’. These became 
the two main categories of response, representing a paradox of policy in terms of the 
development of nationally led crime control strategies. The concept of denial results from 
those at the national level disregarding the evidence that supports the idea that crime is 
not effectively tackled by using punitively based measures. The outcome of which has 
been the implementation of a range of measures premised upon tougher sentencing and 
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the introduction of a broader range of police powers. In promoting the use of these 
measures, those who are leading the development of the relevant crime control strategies 
are denying the limitations of these systems and processes on the basis of ‘sovereign 
command’ (Garland 2001, p. 132). These policies are intended to reassure the voting 
public that something is being done to tackle issues of crime. In contrast to this, 
‘adaptation’ has also been a key feature of crime control responses in late modern 
society. These responses have taken a pragmatic and instrumental approach to crime, 
seeing it as an inevitable feature of contemporary society that must be managed in the 
most cost-effective way possible, rather than eliminated altogether. Thus, in contrast to 
the punitive and emotional political responses of ‘denial’, these approaches acknowledge 
the limitations of the criminal justice system. At the heart of this strategy is a greater 
emphasis upon prevention and the delivery of crime control through the development of 
local partnership working.  
 
Garland identifies six types of adaptation that have emerged in late modern society. 
These include the rationalisation of justice; the commercialization of justice; defining 
deviance down; redefining success; concentrating upon consequences; and 
‘responsibilisation’ (redistributing responsibility for crime control amongst a range of 
state, commercial and community actors) (2001, p. 113). These adaptations have seen a 
movement towards managerial accountability, a reduction in the scope of offences to be 
criminalised and a growth in multi-agency working. The result has been a broader shift in 
approach, with the focus now placed upon managing the consequences of crime rather 
than trying to deal with its fundamental causes. In shifting the emphasis in this way, it has 
further contributed to the growth of ‘victim policy’, and the development of a response 
aimed at acting in the victim’s best interests. In the development of these adaptive 
responses, what has also emerged has been the gradual decentring by those in 
government, following the recognition that they no longer have ‘a monopoly of crime 
control’. The result has been to significantly increase the number of policy actors who are 
involved in the management of crime control responses, as the state tries to renegotiate its 
role in this process (Garland 1996, p. 5): 
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The primary objective is to spread responsibility for crime control 
onto agencies, organizations and individuals that operate outside the 
criminal justice state and to persuade them to act appropriately. 
(Garland 2001, p. 125)  
 
The responsibilisation of other actors in crime control, or the promotion of new sites of 
governance, should not be viewed necessarily as the state looking to lighten its load in 
terms of the functions that it performs. Instead, it represents a new form of ‘governance-
at-a-distance’ (1996, p. 6), which has its own set of accompanying processes and 
supporting apparatus. There has also been an increased emphasis placed upon the role of 
the community in administering criminal justice policy, and in partnership working, for 
example in connection with the introduction of community policing. Non-state actors 
have become actively involved both with each other and the police in aligning their 
activities in targeting crime control. It was therefore the development of multi agency and 
partnership working locally, which was a key part of the emergence of a 
‘responsibilisation strategy’.  
 
The multi agency approach 
 
In its identification of those agencies that are deemed to be competent in addressing 
crime control, the state has reinforced its decentring approach. As a result they have 
continued to move away from the idea of them being solely responsible for addressing 
this issue. In doing so it is developing a new role, in which it is now responsible for both 
expanding and enhancing the role of these local level agencies in the management of 
crime control. It has also enabled more preventative strategies to emerge, which can be 
seen in the growth in local level projects, which are locally administered by inter agency 
partnerships. For Garland this strand to tackling crime control is one that requires a more 
innovative approach to be developed by local level agencies, as they seek to reduce the 
opportunities for crime to occur. A new wave of strategies that are aimed at enhancing 
situational crime controls have begun to emerge, which increasingly concentrate upon 
diverting potential offenders away from criminal situations. This leads to a shift in focus 
toward community safety and away from law enforcement.  
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However, the increased empowerment of local actors in the crime control process has 
also enabled groups at this level to become dominant. Owing to the minimal support that 
their schemes often require, they can at times operate virtually unchecked within the 
fringes of the criminal justice system. It is a particularly evident trend where 
policymakers have been left to adopt their own hierarchy in an attempt to both develop 
partnership working, and to drive forward particular policy agendas. The devolution of 
powers can also prompt the emergence of new social movements. These can operate as 
sites of governance in their own right, developing their own concepts around the nature 
of crime (Stenson 2001). They are also able to act as potential sites for opposition and 
resistance to the common approach. Garland argues that this is where the hope lies for a 
return to more progressive and less punitive criminal justice policies. He suggests that 
this will be achieved through an awakening of communities, who have apparently failed 
to notice the increased movement away from the more cooperative policies, and the penal 
welfarism that existed during the latter part of the twentieth century, up until as recently 
as the 1970s (2001, p. 204).  
 
The opening section of this chapter has highlighted the key themes in Garland’s work. 
These include a broader shift away from penal welfarism, which has resulted in an 
apparent normalisation of crime and the emergence of various new responses to tackling 
crime control. There has been greater emphasis placed upon the adoption of a more 
managerial approach, which has been accompanied by general shifts at both the national 
and local levels. Such developments have included a greater emphasis being placed upon 
risk management. There has also been a more general shift in people’s perceptions of 
crime, as this has become more associated with particular social groups. These factors 
have given rise to the growing politicisation of the victim, which has increasingly been 
used to legitimise tough law and order policies. The next section of the chapter will begin 
to shift its focus toward another general account of crime control, this time in relation to 
the penal field, which has been put forward by Feeley and Simon (1992), who have also 
posited a general transformation away from traditional approaches of crime control. The 
result has been a shift in focus away from the importance of the individual, towards a 
system that divides certain offending sectors of the population into groups based upon 
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their risk profiles, in an effort to manage crime control more effectively. Their notion of a 
‘new penology’ chimes with some of the ideas of Garland, as they seek to offer an 
account that sees crime as an everyday hazard to be managed in the most effective way 
possible. Thus, a growing emphasis has been placed upon the development of a more 
systems based approach in the management of crime control issues. In some cases this 
has also led to the redefinition of the roles of supporting agencies, as new mechanisms 
are developed that are designed to maintain control and therefore reassure and protect the 
public. 
 
Risk-based crime control: The ‘New Penology’ 
 
In their account of the emergence of a ‘new penology’, Feeley and Simon (1992) also 
focus upon the identification and explanation of broader patterns rather than detailed 
empirical analysis of particular national or local contexts. Feeley and Simon suggest a 
growing domination of ‘actuarial justice’ in criminal justice administration. This is a form 
of justice that is based upon the statistical calculation of risks, enabling predictions to be 
made about the future behaviour of particular population groups. The focus is upon 
developing effective indicators of risk as a basis for the cost effective management of 
particular groups. Even though a growing preoccupation with ‘risk’ has been a noted 
trend in other arenas (Beck 1992) it has taken time to gradually permeate legal discourse 
in relation to criminal justice. For Feeley and Simon, this shift in penal policy, which 
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s and saw a more conservative stance being adopted, 
was just a part of a broader movement towards the development of a ‘new penology’. 
From this a new kind of language, new crime management techniques and penal 
objectives emerged in response to a shift in focus toward attempts to place offenders (and 
potential offenders) into clearly defined risk categories. These are factors that have 
culminated, despite having different origins, in strategic changes being made in the penal 
field. Feeley and Simon’s argument regarding the emergence of a new penology includes 
three key elements. The first of these is a new discourse of crime control, with terms and 
concepts borrowed from business management (relating to systems analysis and 
organisational theory for example) and also an actuarial language of probability and 
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statistical prediction. The second element is a set of new objectives for systems of crime 
control, with inward-looking performance related objectives replacing the more 
ambitious social objectives of previous eras. The final element consists of a whole set of 
new techniques and methods, encompassing statistical risk prediction, the importation of 
business management techniques into the penal system, and a range of other activities.  
 
In terms of the emergence of a new penology discourse, to accompany these national 
shifts, Feeley and Simon suggest that this is no longer focused upon dealing with either 
individual offenders or the broader issues of criminality. Instead the system has 
undergone a process of inevitable rationalization. The focus has now become the broader 
issue of risk management, which considers the criminal justice system as a whole. It is 
based upon the classification of offending groups into low and high-risk categories, as 
this new strategy concentrates upon the management of the offending population as a 
collective. It therefore shifts the emphasis away from imprisonment being the only form 
of punishment. There has been an emergence of new sanctions, such as those that are 
more community based. These can also serve as an additional mechanism of control, and 
as a means of risk managing the population, which is the core aim of this overall 
approach: 
 
The new penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating 
individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is 
concerned with the rationality not of individual behaviour or even 
community organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is not 
to eliminate crime but to make it tolerable through systematic 
coordination. (Feeley and Simon 1992, p. 455) 
 
In support of this managerial approach, the system not only recognises that deviance is a 
given in any society, but it has also lowered the expectations of the criminal justice 
system to be able to tackle and rehabilitate offenders effectively. For Feeley and Simon 
this has meant that the correctional arm of the criminal justice system is increasingly 
being used as a means of applying systems management, rather than punishment or 
reform. This has led to a change in overall objectives of criminal justice systems, away 
from ambitious social goals (connected with tackling the root causes of offending for 
example), and towards narrower and more achievable organisational goals (such as 
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improving detection rates) that are more amenable to control (1992, p. 456). Those who 
do reoffend and are returned to the criminal justice system are no longer used as an 
indicator of penal failure. Instead those in the probationary field use them as examples of 
where measures of control have worked, and as a way of illustrating the system’s 
effectiveness of identifying and punishing those that fall into this category. For Feeley 
and Simon, the emphasis is now clearly placed upon the management and quantification 
of risk groups within society (1992, p. 455), including those who persist in returning to 
the criminal justice system.  
 
The crime management techniques now being used to delineate and manage these 
offending sectors of the population are similarly risk based. They concentrate upon the 
prediction of ‘dangerousness’, which according to writers such as Zedner (2002), whilst 
historically linked to individual offenders has since been expanded both in terms of its 
scope and its definition. In the treatment of these categories, there has for Feeley and 
Simon been a growth in the application of ‘selective incapacitation’ (1992, p. 458). At its 
core is the idea that through the means of detention you can delay an individual’s 
resumption of their criminal activities. It therefore seeks to address crime and disorder 
issues within communities via the ‘distribution of offenders in society’ (1992, p. 458), 
suggesting that by minimising their numbers you can correspondingly lessen their impact. 
In terms of the techniques that have emerged to accompany the application of this theory, 
at the one end of the spectrum, for those deemed to be high risk, there is the long-term 
detention option within prisons that offer maximum security. Whereas parole and 
probation officers can supervise those classified as being low risk offenders, who it is 
believed can be better managed locally within communities, under a programme that 
involves minimal surveillance. In between these two extremes for Feeley and Simon, 
what has emerged has been a range of intermediary techniques. These include the use of 
electronic monitoring and the introduction of custodial centres as a more cost effective 
means of punishment. Examples such as these are not only representative of new forms of 
control, but they are also techniques that no longer focus upon rehabilitating or 
reintegrating the offender back into their communities. And correspondingly in shifting 
the emphasis away from the individual, there has been a further movement, this time 
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away from a traditional sociological and penal approach to crime that seeks to establish 
the contributory factors to an individual’s criminal behaviour. It was this approach that 
had originally sought mechanisms of control in both families and the workplace, as a 
means of preventing behaviour of this nature from occurring. Instead, the new penology 
focuses its attention upon the relationship between certain sectors of society, with the 
emergence of an underclass, and the criminal justice system as a whole, whilst models 
designed to manage public safety and provide reassurance are developed (1992, p. 466). 
Therefore following on from Garland’s observation of a shift away from the traditional 
penal model during this period of late modernity: 
 
At one extreme the prison provides maximum security at a high cost 
for those who pose the greatest risks, and at the other probation 
provides low-cost surveillance for low-risk offenders. In between 
stretches a growing range of intermediate supervisory and surveillance 
techniques. The management concerns of the new penology - in 
contrast to the transformative concerns of the old - are displayed 
especially clearly in justifications for various new intermediate 
sanctions. (Feeley and Simon 1992, p. 459) 
 
Feeley and Simon’s study of the new penology highlights similar broad changes in the 
penal field to that of Garland’s Culture of Control thesis. There are similarities between 
the arguments regarding the prevalence of a more managerial stance in tackling issues of 
crime control and on the increasing emphasis placed upon risk management. These are 
changes that have occurred as national level shifts mark a departure away from the 
rehabilitative ideals of the traditional penal model. However, as with Garland’s thesis, 
what this perspective does not do is consider in empirical detail the evidence for and 
implications of such changes at the local, sub-national level. There is no recognition of 
the possibility of local resistance to this reconceptualisation of crime control and its 
delivery. This reflects a more general limitation of these ‘grand narratives’ approaches to 
understanding changes in crime control. These often explore global and national shifts at 
a very broad level of generalisation, at the expense of considering the ‘local’ element and 
its role in these broader shifts.  
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Governing through crime  
Another very influential account that shares some characteristics of a ‘grand narrative’ 
approach is Simon’s (2007) study examining the emergence of new models of 
governance of crime in the USA in recent decades. Simon offers a broad sociological 
narrative of shifts in crime control and his thesis of a new punitive culture of ‘governing 
through crime’ (and anti-social behaviour) has been widely deployed by ‘critical’ 
scholars trying to make sense of developments in the UK (see, for example, Crawford, 
2009, Coleman et al, 2009). For Simon, the collapse of the American New Deal from the 
late 1960s onwards prompted the so called ‘War on Crime’ that has gathered pace during 
the last 30 years or so. Simon concentrates upon how policy developments in crime 
control are intimately connected to more general approaches to governing at the national 
level. He highlights the ways in which local institutions - including schools, communities 
and even workplaces - have become increasingly permeated by and governed through the 
lens of crime control (rather than through the lens of social welfare).  
During most of the twentieth century, disadvantaged populations were governed 
primarily via the state’s welfare system, but the emphasis shifted away from this owing to 
broader shifts in governing strategies. Increasingly, governments look to the criminal 
justice system as the primary means of dealing with problematic populations. Simon 
illustrates this movement toward considerations of crime control as a focus of governance 
more broadly, by considering some of the main changes that have occurred. The growth 
of gated communities – a particular feature in some parts of the USA – shows how 
residential planning and organization is increasingly governed by considerations of crime 
and insecurity. These estates are often subjected to surveillance technologies, with their 
security managed by private firms.  
Changes have been seen in the US education systems, whereby schools are increasingly 
influenced by the crime control agenda. In many inner city schools, children have 
become treated as potential suspects as opposed to pupils, as disruptive behaviour is met 
with a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to discipline, mirroring the broader American stance on 
crime control. It is a trend that has also emerged across workplaces, resulting in staff 
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being made the subject of pre employment testing, whilst surveillance techniques have 
become prevalent in working environments as a means of monitoring staff behaviour. For 
Simon this signifies a return to the workplace as a site of social control.  
Simon’s influential analysis provides a broad notion of general cultural and political 
shifts in approaches to crime control and governance that suggests shifts in national level 
policy have permeated and shaped policy responses regionally and locally. In relation to 
anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy, Simon suggests that this is increasingly 
being used as an ‘organizing’ principle. As a result it has become critical to the exercising 
of authority measures nationally. In using policy in this manner, in Simon’s opinion it has 
enabled the activities of those at the national level to encompass a wide range of 
institutions. The same can be said of the local level, where increasingly a variety of 
organizations have been encouraged to take action in relation to this particular agenda. 
For Simon ASB policy has also become crucial in ensuring that society is governed by 
considerations of crime and disorder control. In contrast with elements of Garland’s 
account – which suggests at least in part the state has accepted its diminished role in 
crime control - Simon’s account points to growing state power through its intrusion into a 
wide range of organizations and across all levels of society, as crime control 
considerations have become a dominant force. Whilst Simon’s arguments are primarily 
applied to the USA, similar analyses have also been used in relation to the 
‘criminalisation of social policy’ in the UK (Rodger 2008), and more broadly, the 
‘governing through security’ (Loader 2002) in the European Union. All of these analyses, 
in slightly different ways, argue that issues of crime, disorder and security invade and 
colonise other areas of social and political life, almost always with negative consequences 
for society.  
The limitations of ‘grand narrative’ accounts 
These ‘grand narrative’ accounts of crime control have been extremely influential in 
mapping out the broader social, political and cultural shifts in crime control policies 
across many Western nations. They have identified some important global shifts, as well 
as highlighting some dangers of the current policy directions. However, as explanations 
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of why crime (and disorder) control policy comes to be shaped the way that it is, these 
approaches do have some limitations. The most notable of these, particularly in relation 
to the current study, is that they underplay some important variations that have emerged 
in cultures of control, both between and within nations (Jones and Newburn 2007, 
Edwards and Hughes, 2005). These broader accounts focus primarily upon global shifts 
that impact upon the national level of policymaking. In doing so, they can overstate 
global convergence, whilst lacking any detailed analysis of what can occur in relation to 
this process both regionally and locally. These accounts present policy formation and 
delivery as a ‘top down’ experience, driven by inexorable global forces, as opposed to 
being an unpredictable and complex process and one that can be influenced by policy 
actors at different levels of the system. Empirical studies of policy development have 
shown that policy can be initiated and advanced at the local and regional levels, and 
filtered back up to those at the national level (Edwards and Stenson 2004). These broad 
‘grand narrative’ studies also underestimate the role that political agency plays in policy 
development. At the same time it neglects to consider the levels of influence that both 
contrasting political and legal institutions can have, along with individual national and 
local political cultures (Jones and Newburn 2007). In overlooking the role of the ‘local’ 
in this way, ‘grand narrative’ writers are also neglecting to test out their own theories in 
relation to these national level shifts.  
 
Jones and Newburn argue that these broad generalising theories have a tendency, albeit 
perhaps unintentional, to present a rather deterministic view of the policymaking process. 
The lack of empirical detail presents an overly ‘smooth’ picture of policy shifts, and does 
not take into account that often this is a process that is both contested and unpredictable. 
It has also led to those who favour a convergence approach, presenting the view that ‘the 
direction of policy is both inevitable and irreversible’ in its nature (2007, p. 7). It is a 
concern that is echoed by Zedner (2002) in her critique of Garland’s ‘Culture of Control’ 
thesis. She argues that grand narratives such as that produced by Garland, not only offer a 
description of the events that are occurring in relation to policy developments, but 
suggest that the direction and nature of change is almost inevitable in its progress. The 
danger of this is that it will discourage penal theorists from holding to their ‘duty to 
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resist’ such developments (Zedner 2002, cited in Jones and Newburn 2007, p. 13). 
 
Young (2002) has also produced a detailed critique of the ‘Culture of Control’. It begins 
by assessing the comparative nature of Garland’s study, and its attempts to identify 
apparent similarities between the British and American approaches to crime control. For 
Young, in adopting this approach Garland has neglected to also acknowledge the 
corresponding differences between the two, which are somewhat marked. The main issue 
for Young is the fact that there is such a fundamentally wide variation in crime rates 
between these two countries. So much so that this is as significant as some of the other 
more recognised variables that exist in studies of this nature. These include ethnicity, age, 
class and gender. In terms of the actual disparity between the two, this can be highlighted 
by a simple comparison of prison population rates. For example, during the mid point of 
the nineties the total prison population of Western Europe was no more than 200,000, 
whilst in the USA it stood at 1.6 million, which is a staggering eight times higher (Zedner 
2002, p. 354).  
 
Zedner (2002) also suggests that there is potentially more to consider than just these two 
countries responses to crime control, with other significant players also having been 
identified. Indeed, by Garland’s own admission countries such as Canada and Norway 
have also had a role to play, along with other European countries when it came to the 
development of alternative approaches to crime control (2002, p. 353). However, given 
Garland’s focus upon these two countries, Young also suggests that due consideration 
should have been given to their differing social and economic conditions. These include 
the persistent racial segregation that has been apparent in the United States. By Garland’s 
own admission this formed part of the transition into late modernity, with the increased 
mobilisation of different sectors of the population. The United States have also 
demonstrated a market society, which has been affected by a culture of violence that has 
advocated the idea that violence is the right way to resolve disputes, precipitating high 
rates of gun ownership. According to Young, in looking for so many similarities, Garland 
has potentially ignored or paid little attention to the significance of the variables 
involved. Most crucially, for current purposes, the criticism here is that the very broad 
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level of comparison overlooks the existence of (and possible explanations for) important 
differences between nations, regions and localities (2002, p. 232).  
 
Whilst Garland acknowledges some of the contributory factors, such as the increase in 
opportunities for crime and the corresponding decline in informal social controls, he fails 
to address some of the wider issues. These include society’s portrayal of equality whilst 
the reality for most is unequal living on many levels, resulting for Young in the linkages 
between inequality and crime being somewhat lacking in Garland’s thesis. These are 
factors that for Young remain underdeveloped, with Garland only having offered an 
acknowledgment to the work of writers such as Marx and Hobsbawn rather than having 
incorporated them into the analysis. It would appear that instead, Garland has drawn upon 
the more situational approaches of Felson, Clarke and others (see for example, Felson 
1987; Clarke and Felson 1993). Young argues that in his use of these criminologies 
Garland has failed to also acknowledge the significance of the rise of other competing 
theories. Most importantly for Young, this includes the rise in feminism, during the time 
period with which Garland’s study is concerned. In terms of Garland’s discussion of 
crime control responses during late modernity, key to this has been the adaptive response 
that has emerged in relation to cultural and political changes, with the state’s gradual 
acknowledgment that it is no longer able to control crime. Instead what is required is a 
wider partnership at the lower levels of the process, involving a range of policy actors. 
For Young however, these tendencies would appear to be at odds in British society with 
the crime control policies of New Labour specifically, who although keen to establish 
partnership working retained a clear belief that the state can have an impact upon high 
crime rates. Young also casts doubt over Garland’s decentring approach, key to which is 
the suggestion that what is needed is simply a movement away from the ‘central to the 
local’. For Young this does not represent a significant enough move if a substantial 
challenge to existing crime control methods is to be made, as changes will also need to be 
made at a structural level.   
 
In contrast to the more general sociological accounts such as that of Garland, some 
studies aim to offer a more detailed policy history of policy developments in crime and 
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ASB control. These often highlight the influence that local policy actors can have by 
resisting, reshaping and at times initiating new policy developments (Jones and Newburn 
2007, p. 7). However, it is necessary to consider these local developments with reference 
to the broader structural patterns and the influences that globalised changes can have 
upon the policymaking process. The most significant of these is their ability to contribute 
to the shaping of the political cultures that form a backdrop to more localised responses 
to crime control. The next section of this chapter will therefore consider some existing 
academic literature that focuses upon the formulation of local level ASB policy responses 
within a British context. 
Exploring divergence: Complexity and change in policy development 
UK perspectives: Governing through ASB 
In the last three decades a number of UK criminologists have drawn increasingly on ideas 
associated with governance studies in political theory (see Johnston and Shearing, 2003, 
Edwards and Hughes, 2012, Hughes, 2007, Jones, 2012, for overviews of this body of 
work).  All of these works share an interest in examining changing responses to crime 
and its control as a lens for exploring shifts in the nature of governance more generally. 
One of the leading exponents of this tendency is associated with the work of Crawford 
(1997, 2009).  Let us examine the work of Crawford as a useful exemplar of attempts to 
draw critically on the work of Garland and Simon by grounding their grand theses in the 
empirical specificities of British developments in the new ‘governance of incivilities’.  
In his article, ‘Governing through antisocial behaviour’, Crawford (2009) focuses upon 
the governance of ASB in a purely British context. In doing so, he develops some of 
Simon’s key themes in focusing upon the governance of ASB. These include the 
suggestion that the concept of ASB is primarily being used as an organizing principle in 
shaping social policy responses in a range of fields. However, unlike some of the 
accounts previously discussed, Crawford also highlights the important role of the ‘local’ 
in the policymaking process, as he considers the impact of ASB measures upon the 
individual. At the national level, Crawford suggests that policymakers have become more 
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risk adverse. As a result they have attempted to use a national ASB agenda and its 
accompanying measures, as a means of governing the future. The response has been to 
increasingly treat people on the basis of what they might do in the future, as what they 
have actually done in the past becomes of secondary concern in terms of the use of 
regulative measures (2009, p. 819). This sentiment is echoed by other writers such as 
Zedner, who suggest that increasingly ‘[p]eople are judged in terms of what they might 
do. Anticipating and forestalling potential harm constitutes a form of temporal and 
conceptual ‘pre-crime’ implied in quests for security’ (Zedner 2007 cited in Crawford 
2011, p. 504). Other writers have also highlighted the shift toward preventive, 
anticipatory policy interventions, against the traditional retrospective focus of criminal 
justice and punishment: 
ASB is identified as the first step in a developmental trajectory (for 
both individuals and communities), which leads to more serious 
offending, flagging the need for early intervention: to ‘nip it in the 
bud’ in relation to individual criminal careers; and to avert a ‘tipping 
point’ in relation to spirals of community decline propelled by a nexus 
of disorder, fear and crime. Hence, references to Wilson and Kelling’s 
(1982) ‘broken windows’ thesis litter British policy documentation on 
urban governance (Innes and Jones 2006).      
Crawford uses the Government’s introduction of a dedicated ASB agenda, as an example 
of how those at the national level have increasingly sought to legitimize more state based 
interventions. In Crawford’s opinion, these have largely been designed to match their 
desire to influence the manner in which practitioners should tackle this issue locally. For 
Crawford a range of regulatory powers has accompanied these initiatives, as those in 
government have embarked upon a frantic period of change in respect of this particular 
element of their crime and disorder agenda. The result has been a blurring of the lines 
between crime and disorder, with a range of responses having been generated that offer 
the use of both informal and formal interventions, with the ever-present threat of a 
criminal sanction used as a means of securing success. All of this has led Crawford to 
suggest that: 
[R]egulatory ideas are deployed in ways that (either intentionally or 
inadvertently) can frequently serve to lower the threshold of 
intervention, formalize previous informal responses, intensify forms 
of intervention and hasten punishment. (Crawford 2009, p. 812)  
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In addition to the introduction of more punitively based measures, either as a tool of first 
or last response, Crawford argues that the Government’s ASB agenda sees an attempt by 
those at the national level to both re-emphasize their role as a risk manager, and to regain 
the sovereign control that in his thesis Garland suggested the Government had moved 
away from. As those in power recognized not only the limitations of the late modern 
criminal justice system, but also the need for the adoption of a more responsibilised, 
preventative stance, in delivering responses to issues such as ASB. New Labour sought to 
provide direct reassurance to the voting public of their ability to address people’s 
concerns, about the problems of crime and low-level disorder. However, the reality of 
this was the introduction of a range of measures that whilst seemingly performing this 
function, they have achieved little in effecting ‘meaningful behavioural change’ in the 
perpetrators of this behaviour (2009, p. 810). The reason for this is that the 
implementation of this agenda has been accompanied by a national level political 
discourse that presents an overly simplified picture of what ASB constitutes. The result 
has been that this has become a policy area that is more concerned with political rhetoric 
than actual policy implementation, notwithstanding the introduction of increased numbers 
of rules and regulations. These are mainly concerned with individual behaviour and 
personal lifestyle choices, as those in government have attempted to micro manage 
specific elements of the population in an effort to address people’s perceptions and fear 
of crime. Those operating at the national level have used the ASB measures that have 
been introduced, as a means of circumventing established due process principles. 
Increasingly order maintenance involves the use of summary justice, as other actors 
including the police and other accredited personnel have the power to issue punishments 
(such as ‘fixed penalty notices’) that do not require the accused to be tried in a court of 
law. Thus, in increasing numbers of cases traditional criminal justice routes are being 
bypassed, as punishment is no longer exclusively the domain of the courts. It is in these 
emerging sites of governance that young people in particular have become the targets of 
these sanctions. We have seen the emergence of ‘novel technologies of control’, and the 
development of accompanying ‘intensive and earlier interventions’ (2009, p. 810). Those 
in government have sought to provide practitioners with a toolkit of measures designed to 
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address issues of problematic behaviour, which has been accompanied by the emergence 
of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ (2009, p. 824).  
The pyramid structure of punishment exists as a hierarchical model. It is based upon the 
assumption that the majority of the measures used to tackle ASB initially, will be located 
at the bottom of this scale, with criminal sanctions positioned nearer the top. In reality 
this may reflect a wider held belief that the use of measures such as Anti Social 
Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) are a tool of last resort, only to be enacted when 
all other means of regulation have been exhausted. For Crawford the toolbox is a means 
of individualizing control, using a form of regulation that appeals both to broader 
concerns and individual circumstances. However, in practice there is little in the way of 
rational progression through the scale of seriousness as is suggested by the use of tools 
from the pyramid. Those who move through it are likely to also be similarly moving 
through different elements of the criminal justice system. It is this increasingly complex 
model of punishment that practitioners must navigate as, in their attempts to provide the 
most appropriate response to issues of ASB, attempts are made to achieve a balance 
between enforcement and prevention/support. This opens the space for important local – 
and sub-local - variations in approach to emerge. Thus, national policy – even when 
characterized by a plethora of new regulations and interventions – does not provide a 
monolithic straightjacket from which local practitioners cannot break out. The system 
does provide space for the modification and potential resistance to national level policy 
by those who are charged with its implementation. 
Interestingly from Crawford’s perspective, the use of this range of measures, both 
informal and formal, has been developed in the apparent absence of any evidence-based 
practice at the national level. It is a gap in government evaluation that has been 
exacerbated by both the pace and scale of change that has occurred as a result of the 
rollout of the Government’s ASB agenda. For Crawford this belies the undertaking of a 
more interventionist approach by those in government. It can result in perpetrators of 
ASB being excluded from their communities, as divisions emerge between the ‘law-
abiding’ majority and the ‘disorderly’ minority. This leads to the promotion of the use of 
measures that almost demand individuals to ‘self regulate or else…!’ (2009, p. 821). 
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Increasingly, individuals are required to comply with behaviours that in another guise 
would not necessarily be considered as anti-social, let alone criminal.  
In attempting to highlight the role of the ‘local’ in the policymaking process, Crawford 
cites the work of Burney (2009). He is primarily concerned with her identification of the 
emergence of ‘divergent cultures of control’ both nationally and within local Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs), based upon empirical evidence. In 
an attempt to further explore the different levels of policymaking the work of both 
Burney (2009) and Hughes (2007) will be considered in the next section. In different 
ways both of these writers have attempted to incorporate an empirical element into their 
accounts of the new governance of ASB. Whilst the aim of these studies (unlike the 
current research) was not to undertake primary empirical research in particular areas, they 
have identified very clearly the gaps in existing literature in understanding the nature and 
sources of local variations in policies to deal with ASB.  
Local variations in crime and disorder control 
In contrast to the writers that focus on identifying and explaining similar developments in 
crime control policies across a range of jurisdictions, other work has highlighted the 
importance of divergence in policies, and in particular, the specific features of regional 
and local policymaking. For example, Tonry (1999; 2001) points to enduring differences 
in penal policies between countries with contrasting historical and cultural traditions. As 
he argues: ‘The world increasingly may be a global community…but explanations of 
penal policy remain curiously local’ (2001, p. 518). Similarly, Melossi (2001) has noted 
the striking contrasts over time between penal systems in the US and in Italy, and argued 
that ‘(p)unishment is deeply embedded in the national/cultural specificity of the 
environment which produces it’ (2001, p. 407). Whilst these writers focus upon penal 
policies regarding sentencing and imprisonment, similar arguments can be applied to 
crime control policy more generally, as well as policy developments in dealing with 
related areas such as ‘disorder’ or ASB. 
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Indeed, the work of writers such as Burney (2009) and Hughes (2007) has offered this 
type of analysis of ASB policymaking, albeit in the case of Hughes, as part of a wider 
debate about the politics of crime and control and its various guises. In attempting to fill a 
gap in what is acknowledged as having been an ‘under-researched area’ (Gray 2006, p. 
393), Burney has concentrated her efforts upon the development of the ASBO framework 
in Britain under successive New Labour administrations. Her account charts the 
emergence of ASB as a political concept, and its legitimisation as a result of specific 
policy developments in Britain. By contrast Hughes focuses upon ASB policy as being 
one strand of a range of seemingly new problems that are now being governed by a 
broader institutional infrastructure of community safety. Both accounts suggest that ASB 
covers a range of categories of behaviour, following the introduction of a broad definition 
by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and is difficult to define in any 
precise way. Indeed, it has become seen as something that ‘means whatever the victim 
says it means’ (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 313), reflecting the emphasis that is 
now placed upon public perceptions of behaviour. The ASB agenda has in some cases 
been used as a mechanism to exclude certain groups from their communities. Hughes 
shows how the particular focus on young people, and concerns about demonization and 
stigmatization, have been recurrent themes in policy debates surrounding ASB in Britain. 
Burney sees this as a distinguishing feature of the British approach. The result being that 
‘(w)ithin this context, ‘youths hanging about’ have become the almost universal symbol 
of disorder and more and more, menace.’ (Burney 2004, p. 473).  
 
Burney, like Crawford, suggests that the raft of ASB interventions demonstrate a renewed 
desire on the part of government to regulate individual behaviours. However, as 
acknowledged by Hughes (2007), this is an element of crime control that has a much 
longer history than politicians at the national level have been willing to acknowledge. 
According to Burney and Crawford, because of perceived failings of the existing criminal 
justice system, those in government have sought to adopt an increasingly interventionist 
stance in terms of regulating behaviour outside of the framework of the criminal law. 
Those in government have encouraged the use of a more enforcement-based approach in 
tackling ASB, using national campaigns such as ‘Together’ and ‘Respect’ (see Chapter 
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Three) to prompt coordinated action from local practitioners. These were introduced 
following the Government’s initial disappointment at the lack of response being shown 
by some authorities to this issue following the 1998 CDA (Burney 2005, p. 133). 
However, for Burney the emphasis placed upon the use of measures such as ASBOs only 
served to ‘drown out’ competing messages regarding the use of a holistic approach in 
developing long term solutions to problems of disorder. According to Hughes, it was the 
persistence of regional and local differences in policy interventions regarding ASB that 
led those in government to try to narrow the opportunities for local level resistance to 
national policy objectives. Thus, in the work of both Burney and Hughes, the contested 
responses to ASB formed a key theme of the analysis, highlighting the persisting 
importance of the ‘local’ in the policymaking process. This kind of research shows that 
policymaking and implementation rarely follows a smooth trajectory between policy 
ideas, decisions and actions. Rather, it is a process that in reality is shaped by a range of 
contradictions, uncertainties and local contingencies (Hughes 2007; Edwards and 
Hughes, 2005). As Burney notes, ‘(g)iven the lack of consensus as to what the term 
‘antisocial behaviour’ means in practice, it comes down to local responses to local 
problems’ (Burney 2005, p. 140).  
 
In Burney’s exploration of practitioner responses to ASB in both Milton Keynes and 
Nottingham, she argued that there was little evidence of a homogenous ‘one size fits all’ 
approach emerging on the ground (Burney 2005, p. 167). Instead, what could be seen in 
the contrasting approaches of these two cities was the emergence of variations in 
approach depending on local factors. In Nottingham, practitioners fully embraced the 
enforcement aspect of the Government’s ASB agenda. In contrast in Milton Keynes, 
practitioner efforts were instead concentrated upon the use of restorative justice measures 
as a means of tackling this issue. This is not to say that enforcement measures were 
rejected out of hand, but rather were combined with a wider raft of informally based and 
preventive interventions. The empirical evidence contained in this study suggests that 
practitioners remained able to tailor ASB solutions to fit local needs. This is perhaps not 
surprising, as Hughes (2007) argues, given the priority that has been placed upon the 
‘responsibilisation’ of local policy actors in the broader crime control framework. The 
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development of local solutions to a national agenda such as this is also a means by which 
practitioners can seek to minimise the ‘unintended consequences’ of attempting to import 
policy into their localities. Hughes also highlights the importance of unpredictability in 
the local policymaking process in relation to ASB. Both Hughes and Burney highlight the 
‘standout’ case of Manchester, where the local authority embraced the enforcement 
aspect of the ASBO both in terms of punitive rhetoric and the numbers of ASBOs issued. 
This city accounted for a sixth of all ASBOs taken out in England and Wales between 
1999 and 2004 (Hughes 2007, p. 121). Burney (2005) suggests that the reason for this 
was most likely to have been a combination of keen local authority officers and police 
officers in senior positions within the local force, which could direct the local policy 
response. In Manchester, the seeds of this approach can be identified as early as 1996, 
when the Housing Act brought with it new powers for council landlords. In response to 
these measures, practitioners quickly set about creating a Neighbourhood Nuisance 
Strategy Team. It made full use of the ability to bring injunctions against unruly tenants, 
reflecting the willingness of practitioners to fully embrace both policy and legislative 
developments (Burney 2005, p.123).  
 
Burney also interviewed European practitioners involved in this particular policy field. 
The aim of this was to highlight the importance of difference in comparing the 
approaches of Holland and Sweden. Burney conducted interviews with various 
practitioners and civil servants from both of these countries, the purpose of which was to 
assess their perceptions and treatment of the issue of ASB (Burney 2005, p. 14). Burney 
identified that the main difference between the UK and other European countries is the 
emphasis placed upon individual control, an element of the Government’s response that 
was also highlighted by Crawford (2009). Burney seemingly shares Crawford’s views 
regarding the emphasis that has been placed upon the use of contracts of behaviour, and 
the increasing need for self-regulation. For Burney, this is exemplified by the use of the 
ASBO and has contributed to it becoming a unique feature of Britain’s approach. It has 
been accompanied by exclusionary political rhetoric, with the term ‘anti-social’ being 
used to single out certain individuals as not being worthy of a place within their 
communities. Even the process for securing interventions such as an ASBO can 
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exacerbate this perception. The perpetrators often have to appear at a civil court, which 
can be a ‘dehumanising process,’ particularly for young people (Shami Chakrabarti and 
Jago Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 312). This has meant a shift in attention away from the 
underlying causes of bad behaviour, as these are rarely identified and treated:  
 
The people (children and adults) whose behaviour needs controlling 
are equally part of the syndrome and part of the community. Policies 
that fail to recognise these connections cannot provide any long-term 
answers. (Burney 2005, p. 170) 
Thus it can be seen that in contrast to the broader sociological analysis of crime control 
responses, the sphere of ASB control has been the focus of important research that 
acknowledges the enduring role of the ‘local’ in the policymaking process. Whilst the 
more globalised theories of crime control provide an important background to these 
policy shifts, this does not remove the need for more detailed empirical evidence about 
how policies come to be the way they are in particular localities. This is not to say that 
one viewpoint is more important than the other. As Garland states, the different emphases 
of the ‘grand narrative’ and ‘local study’ approaches relate to the ‘unavoidable tension 
between broad generalization and the specification of ‘empirical particulars’ (2001, p. 
vii). The position of this study is that both approaches have much to gain from a more 
detailed empirical consideration of both the idea of ‘policy’ and more particularly, the 
processes through which it comes about. The next section of the chapter is therefore 
concerned with providing a framework for the focus on ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland 
2001, p. vii) in this particular area of policymaking.  
Exploring the local policy process  
Understanding ‘policy’ 
 
It has been argued that many criminological studies have tended to take the notion of 
‘policy’ for granted in that empirical research has concentrated on its impacts rather than 
its origins (Jones and Newburn 2004). At the same time, political scientists, whilst having 
a more sophisticated notion of policy and policymaking have tended to focus upon areas 
other than crime control (Jones and Newburn 2004, p.59). By contrast, they have 
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produced a large body of research on the policymaking process in a range of other policy 
domains such as health, education, agriculture, economic policy, and environmental 
regulation. We still know relatively little about how and why crime and disorder control 
policy changes in the UK.  As argued by Tonry (2001), there is relatively little in the way 
of empirical evidence upon which to base claims about what shapes crime control and 
penal policy. For Tonry, what is required is ‘more, fuller, and nuanced policy histories for 
individual countries and their component sub-jurisdictions’ (2001, p. 531). It is therefore 
important to be clearer about what we take to mean by ‘policy’ and how it comes to take 
the shape that it does. 
 
Public policy is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Any study of policymaking must 
draw distinctions between the two dimensions of policy – that concerned with the 
‘process’ of policymaking and that with the ‘substance’ of policy respectively. To begin 
with the first of these, it is important to recognise that formal ‘policy’ represents the 
outcome of a set of processes. Research by political scientists has analysed policymaking 
by dividing it up into distinct analytical stages, and undertaking detailed examinations of 
each (Easton 1965). In this view, policy is seen as arising from a distinct set of problem-
solving processes: problem definition, formulation of alternative solutions, and 
considerations of implications of alternatives to experimentation with the preferred 
choice. Whilst recognising the analytical importance of identifying such stages, a number 
of authors have pointed out that such an approach runs the risk of implying an overly 
‘rational’ picture of the policymaking process (Hill 1997). Policymaking in practice 
rarely looks like the textbook discussions of the ‘policy cycle’. The content of policies is 
not determined at the decision-making stage, but is negotiated continuously in the 
problem definition, legislation, regulation and court decisions, and again in the decisions 
made by practitioners on the ground. Nevertheless, breaking the policymaking cycle into 
distinct stages has provided political scientists with a useful analytical tool for empirical 
exploration of the processes involved (see for example Kingdon 1995). The growth in 
partnership working has further complicated the policymaking process. The noted shift 
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (see below) has transformed the role of central 
government away from a ‘command and control’ approach and towards more of an active 
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negotiator and shaper of networks. Policy cannot, therefore, be viewed in a 
straightforward or deterministic way, given the complexities of the policy process. 
Rather, it should be seen as a ‘series of intentions’ around which negotiation takes place, 
as each set of actors becomes involved in the process (Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
 
Turning to the second dimension, whilst ‘policy’ should be viewed as an ongoing set of 
processes rather than an ‘event’ in itself, at any point in time it may also be broken down 
into a number of distinct ‘levels’. Studies of policymaking have usually focused upon the 
more concrete levels, such as written policy statements or legislation. However, others 
have suggested that this presents an oversimplified view of policy. Bennett (1991), for 
example, identifies a number of distinct elements of policy including: policy content 
(statutes, administrative rules and regulations), policy instruments (institutional tools to 
achieve goals such as regulatory, administrative, judicial tools) and policy style (overall 
nature of process – consensual, confrontational or incremental). In particular, a key 
distinction can be drawn between policy symbols and rhetoric on the one hand, and the 
more concrete forms of policy in terms of actual policy content and instruments on the 
other. Pollitt (2001) also presents a useful analysis of the different substantive ‘levels’ of 
policy, premised upon Brunsson’s (1989) classification of distinctions between different 
elements of policy. Pollitt argues that there are three key elements of policy: policy ‘talk’, 
policy ‘decisions’ and policy ‘action’. This provides a very helpful guide to any study 
wishing to research in detail the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland 2001, p. vii) of 
policymaking in a particular sphere. In developing Brunsson’s initial concept, Pollitt 
provides a conceptual framework that can be used to not only distinguish between these 
different aspects of the process, but also as a means of highlighting the complexities that 
are involved: 
  
Talk, decisions and products are mutually independent instruments 
used by the political organization in winning legitimacy and support 
from the environment. (Brunsson 1989, p. 27) 
 
For Pollitt, policy ‘talk’ is illustrated by the use of political rhetoric and symbolism. Both 
of these can be used by those at the national or local level to legitimise policy concepts, 
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and as a means of securing support for ideas. Policy ‘decisions’ are the more concrete 
manifestations of formal policy, and include legislation, written policy statements and 
national level initiatives. Both ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ should be distinguished from policy 
‘action’ which is concerned with actual policy implementation and the delivery of policy 
outcomes, particularly by local level practitioners. 
  
Given the complex nature of both the process and substance of policy, it becomes clear 
that public policymaking is best viewed as a messy and unpredictable process, 
characterised by uncertainty, variation and unintended consequences. As Barrett and 
Fudge have argued: ‘it is appropriate to consider implementation as a policy/action 
continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time, 
between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends’ 
(Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 25). The notion of formal policy being resisted or re-worked 
by practitioners or other policy actors is not a new one. There is a significant literature on 
the idea of ‘implementation gaps’ (Dunsire 1978, p. 18), which starts from the position 
that ‘policy does not implement itself’ (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 9). More recently, 
youth justice scholars have noted that ‘there is always a space to be exploited between 
written and implemented policy’ (Muncie 2004, p. 175).  
Governance and the emergence of policy networks  
The shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ is now a standard feature of discussions of 
policymaking. In the UK, this work has been most widely associated with Rhodes’s 
(1997) critique of the ‘Westminster model’. Rhodes (1997) argued that governing power 
now operates via central attempts to steer ‘self-organizing inter-organizational networks’ 
rather than ‘command and control’ by state institutions. These changes are linked to 
developments associated with a raft of governmental reforms such as privatization, 
contracting-out, multi-agency partnership work (of the kind already discussed) and the 
creation of semi-autonomous service delivery agencies. These changes have reduced the 
central state’s direct control over the implementation of policy and encouraged the 
development of policy. Governments seek to steer a growing number of bodies in a 
particular direction, whilst continuing to promote their own policy interests.  
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In his exploration of the origins of the concept of policy networks, Jordan (1990) 
emphasises the significance of the literature of American political scientists. The work of 
this group led Jordan to suggest that the idea of a policy network first emerged in 
America during the 1950s and 1960s. The focus of these initial network studies was the 
interrelations between individuals who operated within interest groups, government and 
agencies. Since then the policy networks approach has been further developed to take 
account of the variances in policymaking processes across sectors (Cope 2001). For 
writers such as Rhodes (1981), policy networks have become a defining feature of the 
policy process in the UK. Rhodes uses a ‘power dependence’ model to explain how these 
networks develop and operate. All of the members of a particular policy network are 
dependent upon each other for resources of different types. These resources can be 
financial, but also symbolic, legal, or administrative, and the ability to be able to 
exchange resources across organisations is pivotal. It requires those involved to engage in 
a ‘bargaining’ process for these resources, whilst ensuring that they do not become too 
dependent upon the other actors in the network (Rhodes 1981, pp. 97-133).  
 
Within the sphere of crime control and related areas, much discussion has focused on the 
key policy actors of local authorities and the police service, especially since the CDA 
1998 (Edwards and Benyon 2001). With regard to Rhodes’ power dependence model, it 
is the local authorities that have acquired the greater level of resources needed to be more 
influential within policy networks that have emerged since the early 1990s (Rhodes 
1981): 
 
As a consequence they hold the balance of organisational power over 
law enforcement agencies in the local policy response to crime and 
disorder. (Edwards and Benyon 2001, p. 162) 
 
The power dependence model as developed by Rhodes, offers a basis upon which policy 
networks can be analysed as the actors involved in these resource exchanges gradually 
become more connected. It can also assist in aiding our understanding as to why the 
development of crime and disorder control policy here in the UK demonstrates 
differences between localities. In Rhodes’ opinion this is explained by the varying 
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degrees of resource dependency that has emerged, which can impact upon both the 
inclination and capacity of local government to be able to govern. It can lead to 
communities being governed in such a way that the expression of a variety of opinions is 
tolerated. However, those in local government can also choose to lead in a more 
corporate manner. It is this latter style of leadership that can result in a greater local 
compliance with national policies and the role of the local practitioner in simply 
delivering its outcomes, as opposed to attempting to resist or rework this process 
(Edwards and Benyon 2001).  
 
Policy network analysis can be used to identify the key political actors in the 
policymaking process, and to assess their ability to influence the groups in which they are 
involved. It is also a method that can be used to examine the ways in which some groups 
are able to become more powerful and dominant than others. There are of course other 
factors that can impinge upon this assessment, including such considerations as to size of 
the network, and the power dependence relations that exist within it. All of these can lead 
to both individuals and organisations having greater influence, although not determining 
policy outcomes within this forum (Rhodes 1997, p. 29).  
 
Rhodes (1981) identified five different types of policy network. At one end of this 
spectrum there are ‘policy communities’. These rely upon a select membership of 
representatives that originate from organisations that all have access to resources (thus 
enabling these to be exchanged in the interests of developing public policy, as they are 
often dominated by either those at the national level or by the interests of the 
communities that they serve).  The communities are characterised both by continuity and 
the overall maintenance of a balance of power between the parties involved. At the other 
end of the scale there are ‘issue networks’. These tend to develop as a consequence of a 
specific high profile issue. Rhodes argues that this type of network has ‘limited vertical 
interdependence’ (1997, p. 38). It can therefore be prone to inner conflict causing a 
consequent imbalance between those involved, particularly in terms of available 
resources. It can lead to an unequal distribution of power and a fairly open approach 
being taken to the membership of the group. In short:  
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[A] policy community represents a relatively closed, consensual and 
tightly knit network of policy actors. An issue network embraces a 
relatively open network of actors loosely bound together by their 
(often competing and conflicting) interests being affected by a 
particular policy. (Cope 2001, p. 9)  
 
In between these two extremes exists ‘professional networks’. These are both stable with 
restricted membership and are therefore similar to policy communities. These networks 
are based upon serving the interests of a particular profession, retaining significant 
vertical interdependence. However, they are often keen to isolate themselves from other 
networks. There is also the presence of ‘intergovernmental networks’ within the 
policymaking process, whose membership comprises of representatives from local 
authorities. The aim is to be representative of the full range of services that this local 
agency provides. As a result of their membership, Rhodes suggests that these particular 
networks can also gain access to a number of other policy networks. The final 
classification of network offered by Rhodes is the ‘producer network’, which is 
dominated by its economic interests. These are often characterised by their fluctuating 
membership. 
Limitations of the policy network approach 
It should be acknowledged that the policy networks approach is not without its critics. 
Some of these have suggested that whilst this is a concept that can aid in our 
understanding as to how policy is made, it cannot necessarily explain the reason why. 
The policy network models are also unable to contribute to our understanding of policy 
change or political processes, developing no further than a metaphor in analysing policy 
processes (Dowding 1995, p. 136). In terms of the European application of the policy 
networks approach as a new mode of governance, what it appears to lack is both 
accountability and legitimacy. Even though it has a potential ability to undermine 
democratic process, as they can ‘expose the policy making process to uncontrollable and 
particularistic power games’ (Besussi 2006, p. 9). All of this culminates in the suggestion 
that the policy networks model is better at describing the process of policymaking, rather 
than offering explanations of why certain policy decisions are made. It can also struggle 
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to account for why certain policy actors are able to dominate this process. The large body 
of work on networks still struggles to answer key questions: ‘How do policy networks 
form, how do policy networks work and how do policy networks change?’ (Cope 2001, 
pp. 14-17).  
Cope (2001, pp. 1- 24) argues that the early literature on policy networks had key 
limitations. In their explanation of policy networks, early writers tended to neglect any 
discussion of their origins, assuming that they were already present across contemporary 
society. In response to this, Cope suggests that rather than undermining the whole 
approach, this should instead be viewed as an oversight on the part of these early writers. 
The initial literature also failed to consider the dynamics of policy networks. Instead they 
emphasised the interdependencies between the actors involved in the individual 
networks. Even though later accounts of this model have tried to rectify this, writers on 
the subject do still tend to concentrate their analysis on the ‘meso level’ of policymaking. 
In doing so, they fail to fully explore why individual actors make certain decisions, and 
how available resources are used to ensure that the agenda of their particular network is 
able to dominate. The resulting lack of discussion about the dynamics of policy networks 
means that there is little consideration given to how policy can change direction. It is in 
this way that the approach offers little recognition of or account for policy resistance, and 
how variations in approach are able to emerge locally.  
Despite this Cope (2001, pp.1 – 24) maintains that as an approach, the concept of policy 
networks is an important analytical tool in assessing the complexities of the policymaking 
process. It can also enable an examination of the relationship between those different 
levels of the process. In addition, the more recent accounts on this subject have sought to 
not only refine the approach but to also ensure that it becomes a more robust theory that 
can withstand further criticism. For Cope, this has meant that the approach has 
experienced a shift from the descriptive to the explanatory, making it a useful contributor 
to the empirical research concerned with policymaking: 
 
[T]he policy networks approach is a very useful antidote to the belief 
that governance is government; more often government is only part of 
governance, and sometimes governance is ‘governing without 
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Government’ (Rhodes 1997, p. 47). The policy networks approach 
challenges and indeed rejects the simplistic and misplaced belief that 
governments govern. (Cope 2001, p. 19) 
 
For Cope any further contributions made to the existing body of policy network literature 
will only assist in strengthening this concept. A key aim of the current study is to 
contribute to the discussions regarding the application of policy networks to a local 
setting. The empirical element of the study, will attempt to explore some of the key 
themes that have been identified in relation to the policy networks approach. These 
include whether there is evidence of policy networks emerging locally, and if so what 
types are there and how do they influence the policymaking process. These ideas will be 
considered in terms of how the issue of ASB is governed locally. In addition, the policy 
network approach is helpful in gaining an understanding of how local policy actors have 
mobilised resources in response to national level calls for action on this agenda.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the key bodies of scholarly literature that have informed the 
current study. The broader context is the highly influential sociological accounts that 
have contributed to our understanding of the changes that have occurred in ‘late modern’ 
crime control. These studies have been undertaken at a broad level of generalization, 
looking to identify and explain trends at the national and supra-national level. Whilst 
such studies have been hugely important, they inevitably risk over-simplifying the picture 
of policy change, both between different countries (and regions/localities within those 
countries), and across different elements of crime control policy. The chapter discussed 
how the field of ASB policy has already been the focus of studies that have emphasised 
the variations of policy response that have occurred in different parts of the country, even 
within the constraints of an increasingly directive national agenda. Such studies fit within 
a wider range of research literature that emphasises the enduring importance of the role of 
the ‘local’ in policymaking. It is largely based upon empirical studies of this process, an 
element that is lacking in the grand narrative accounts discussed in the first part of this 
chapter. One of the aims of this research is to follow Tonry’s (2001) argument outlined 
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earlier, and respond to the call for more locally focused empirical studies of the 
policymaking process. It is indeed these nuances that the work of writers such as Garland 
(2001) and Feeley and Simon (1992) tend to miss, precisely because of their broader 
focus. Whilst the insights of such a focus are important, they risk presenting an overly 
simplified account of a supra-national and national driven policy agenda that has 
determined the direction of policy on the ground.  
 
The second part of the chapter discussed the literature on policy and policymaking that 
highlights the various other levels that are involved in this process, and their potential to 
influence policy outcomes. Policy consists of both a complex set of processes, and a 
number of different levels of ‘substance’. It is also shaped by increasingly complex 
‘networks’ of policy actors, who operate at various levels in the system. It is through the 
undertaking of a case study designed to explore the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland, 
2001, p. vii) of policymaking that some of these themes can be addressed. An important 
aim of the current study is therefore to identify key policy actors in a given locality and 
explore their influence upon shaping and delivering policy outcomes. It will also seek to 
examine the relationships between the national and local levels of policymaking, 
exploring both the extent to which national policy agendas and their resources may be 
crucial in setting the frameworks and parameters against which local practice is 
configured and the possibilities for ‘bottom-up’, local influences on national policy 
agendas are realised over time.  
 
One of the objectives of this chapter was to draw upon existing literature in order to 
formulate some ‘theoretical propositions’ that could then be explored and adapted in the 
empirical phase of the research (for fuller discussion see Chapter Four). The work 
reviewed here gives rise to four such propositions in relation to the development of ASB 
policy in a particular city: 
 
TP1: Following Garland (2001), ASB policies in Southern City reflect the ‘reconfigured’ 
characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined by fundamental social, 
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economic and cultural forces – and will thus not vary significantly from the national 
policy trajectories on ASB 
 
TP2: ASB policies in Southern City display a ‘schizoid’ tension between ‘adaptive’ 
elements on the one hand, driven by instrumental, managerial concerns (emphasising 
such concepts as ‘responsibilisation’ and partnership), AND more emotive, politicized 
‘expressive’ elements on the other (Garland 2001).  
 
TP3:  ASB policies in Southern City reflect a preoccupation with ‘risk’ that has been 
observed in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such that it is 
focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly populations, rather than 
upon the punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley and Simon 1994). Policy 
development also displays a tendency to colonise other areas of social policy locally such 
that other policy areas – such as health and education - become configured around and 
driven by the issues of crime and ASB.  
 
TP4: ASB policy in Southern City is shaped by policy networks of different kinds, 
including relatively stable and continuous ‘policy communities’, and ‘intergovernmental 
networks’ comprising of participants from national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 
1997). 
 
The ways in which these theoretical propositions were used in the study are explained in 
more detail in the discussion of the research design and methods used in this study as 
discussed in Chapter Four. Before this, however, it is important to set out the particular 
context within which this study took place. The following chapter thus presents a detailed 
overview of the development of ASB policy in Britain during the past decade or so.  
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Chapter Three: Governing anti-social behaviour - The national policy context 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the emergence of anti-social 
behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy in England and Wales. It focuses upon key 
milestones that have occurred during the past decade or so, most notably under New 
Labour administrations. The discussion is informed by the different ‘levels’ of the 
policymaking process based upon Pollitt’s (2001) distinctions between policy talk, 
decisions and actions. For the purposes of this analysis, policy ‘talk’ takes the form of 
political rhetoric, exhortation, and general statements of intent. More concrete 
manifestations of policy in the form of legislation, written policies and specific ASB 
initiatives have constituted actual policy ‘decisions’ made during New Labour’s time in 
power.  Pollitt’s (2001) third level in this process, policy ‘action’, will be discussed in the 
later findings chapters of the thesis.  
 
The chapter is divided into three main sections, each corresponding to a distinct period in 
the development of ASB policy. The first examines developments prior to New Labour 
taking office in 1997, and in particular the emergence of distinct forms of policy ‘talk’ 
about ASB and related concepts. The second section examines the first period of ASB 
policy development under New Labour governments, 1997-2003. The third main section 
explores the growing complexity of ASB policy that characterised policy developments 
between 2003 and Tony Blair’s resignation as Prime Minister in 2007. A key objective is 
to situate the local area study that formed the empirical focus of the research within a 
broader national framework of legislation and policy development. A further important 
objective is to provide a baseline against which TP1 (see Chapter Two) can be explored. 
This requires a detailed overview of the national policy trajectory in order to compare it 
(and assess its relationship to) the playing out of policy developments at the ‘local’ level 
of Southern City.  
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Developments prior to 1997 
 
The emergence of a dedicated ASB agenda at the national level is inextricably bound up 
with the Labour administrations of 1998-2010. Indeed, the period of primary interest for 
the current study concerns the development of ASB policy during the years 1998-2007. 
However, the origins of ASB policies can be found prior to Labour’s 1997 General 
Election victory. These were mainly in the form of legislative measures introduced under 
the previous Conservative government. Amongst these was the 1996 Housing Act, which 
incorporated provisions that were designed to enable social landlords to better tackle 
problems of nuisance behaviour within their housing stock. It was anticipated that this 
would be achieved through the introduction of ‘behavioural regulations’, which could be 
used in tenancy agreements for social housing in particular (Crawford 2009, p. 824). In 
addition, there was also the earlier 1986 Public Order Act, which for the first time not 
only recognised the problems that could result from disorderly behaviour, but also sought 
to introduce measures designed to combat them (Millie 2009, p. 5).  
 
Of course, behaviours associated with notions of incivility and disorder stretch back 
much further than this. However, in Opposition New Labour identified an opportunity to 
focus on ASB as part of its broader self-reinvention as a Party that would not be 
outflanked by the Conservatives on law and order issues. However, it was almost 
certainly more than crude electoral opportunism that attracted Labour politicians to this 
area. Indeed, they felt that they were responding to a growing national mood on this 
subject (Burney 2005, p.16). There were reports that constituency members perceived 
that ASB was a key concern within their communities, and local Labour MPs noted 
growing numbers of complaints relating to ASB. Arguments began to emerge that 
suggested the criminal justice system was ineffective in being able to resolve the low-
level disorder problems that were being experienced.  
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The origins of the ASB policy agenda  
 
The emergence of ASB policy responses must be seen as part of the wider ‘get tough’ 
crime control agenda that has formed a central part of the reinvention of the Labour Party 
during the 1990s. In Opposition, of course, New Labour was restricted exclusively to 
‘policy talk’ in terms of rhetoric and campaign statements. The mid-1990s saw an 
increasingly punitive discourse deployed by senior Labour figures such as Tony Blair and 
Jack Straw, as they attempted to outflank the Conservative Party on ‘law and order’ 
matters.  
 
Prior to the 1997 General Election, there were several key turning points that affected the 
positioning of New Labour on the issue of crime and disorder. In 1992, when on a visit to 
the USA with Gordon Brown, the then Shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair and a number 
of senior Labour strategists worked closely with senior members of the US Democratic 
Party who had contributed to refashioning the Party as the ‘New Democrats’, a key part 
of which was a tougher approach on crime and punishment issues (Burney 2005, p.17). 
The electoral success of the US President Bill Clinton demonstrated the political appeal 
of a tough rhetoric regarding crime and disorder. The work of the US writers Kelling and 
Wilson (1982), whose ‘Broken Windows’ thesis had become increasingly influential 
within US debates about crime and policing, argued that allowing minor disorder in a 
community to grow unchecked could lead to rising serious crime levels, along with the 
withdrawal of neighbourly behaviour and social bonds. These ideas had a major effect 
upon New Labour thinking about crime and disorder policy, both in Opposition and later 
when in government. In particular, this work became associated with those promoting a 
‘zero tolerance’ policing approach towards crime and disorder1. Although in terms of 
concrete policy decisions and actions, zero tolerance policing appeared to have little 
impact in the UK, these ideas have loomed large in crime policy ‘talk’ (Jones and 
Newburn 2005, p.58). More generally, politicians have drawn upon the Broken Windows 
                                                 
1 Of course, there have been a number of criticisms levelled at this thesis in subsequent years. These 
included the vague and politically constructed nature of the concept of ‘disorder’, the invalid assumption of 
causation from the correlation between crime and disorder, and the potentially negative results of using the 
aggressive policing tactics promoted by these ideas (see Harcourt 2001). 
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approach in an effort to highlight the importance of so called ‘quality of life issues’, 
including ASB. The underpinnings of the approach also chimed with Tony Blair’s 
broadly Christian Socialist and communitarian beliefs (which prioritise the needs of the 
community and wider society over those of the individual) (Burney 2005, p.18). 
  
The second key turning point for Labour was Tony Blair’s succession into the role of 
Leader of the Opposition in 1994, following the sudden death of their previous leader 
John Smith. As a result, Tony Blair was now able to exert greater influence over the 
Party’s direction and its stance in relation to key issues. Blair, and his chosen successor to 
the post of Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw were now better placed to transform the 
Party’s traditional softer stance on crime and disorder, which was seen as having 
damaged the Party’s reputation in the eyes of the voting public (Burney 2005, p.19). In 
their opinion it had culminated in the Party’s defeat at the 1992 General Election by the 
Conservative Party, despite earlier predictions of a hung parliament. In an effort to try to 
avoid a repeat of this, Blair and his followers within the Party encouraged the 
strengthening of their position on the issue of crime and disorder. They therefore 
highlighted key community policies, which were focused upon tackling prevalent 
problems, such as ASB, as a key theme within the broader phase of modernisation for the 
Party. This included what was a newly politicised concept of ASB, which required new 
responses, as a means of breaking with past traditions (Crawford 2009, p. 815). These 
developments coincided with the peak in BCS measures of both crime and ASB. At this 
point the Party published a consultation document, the opening section of which included 
what has since been described as a ‘rallying cry’ to the voting public (Burney 2005): 
 
Every citizen, every family, has the right to a quiet life – a right to go 
about their lawful business without harassment, interference or 
criminal behaviour by their neighbours. But across Britain there are 
thousands of people whose lives are made miserable by the people 
next door, down the street or on the floor above or below. Their 
behaviour may not be just unneighbourly, but intolerable and 
outrageous. (A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours, 
Labour Party 1995, cited in Burney 2005, p. 20) 
 
The consultation document also outlined policy proposals for the introduction of 
‘Community Safety Orders (CSO)’. These would go on to form the basis of the Anti 
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Social Behaviour Order (henceforth ASBO), the cornerstone of the Government’s 
broader agenda on this issue. The proposal for the CSO had been developed by Jack 
Straw during his time as Home Secretary, and had been heavily influenced by housing 
professionals (the group which had initially identified a gap in the civil powers available 
to tackle problems of low-level disorder). The early stages of ASB policy saw ‘nuisance 
behaviour’ (as it was originally known) primarily as a social housing issue (Scott and 
Parkey 1998, cited in Flint 2009, p. 417):  
 
By comparison with residents of other tenures, social renters are more 
likely to regard anti-social behaviour as a problem in their 
neighbourhood, and to be the subject of measures such as Anti-social 
Behaviour Orders. (Flint 2006, cited in Flint 2009, p. 417) 
 
In 1995, the recognition of the imperative to tackle behaviour of this nature, primarily 
within the housing sector had prompted the establishment of the Social Landlords Crime 
and Nuisance Group (SLCNG). As a pressure group, Chief Housing Officers, who had 
been involved in the failed 1995 Coventry City Council v. Finnie case, initially attended 
meetings of this group. The case had seen injunctions overturned that had initially been 
granted against the perpetrators of both low-level crime and ASB. As a result, the 
SLCNG sought to lobby the Government into developing tougher policy proposals. It was 
anticipated that these would assist them in tackling what at the time, was described as the 
emerging ‘phenomenon of anti-social behaviour’ (SLCNG Online 2008). They were 
therefore not only seeking the development of a more joined up approach in tackling this 
issue, but perhaps more importantly, they wanted more stringent civil powers to be 
introduced to tackle low-level disorder (Burney 2005, p. 21). It was the proposals for the 
CSO that filled this gap. These had been designed as an injunction in the form of a new 
civil order, aimed at tackling low-level disorder and nuisance behaviour with the 
responsibilities of local agencies reflected in a press release from the Home Office 
Minister Alun Michael: 
 
What we will do is place a new joint responsibility on the police 
services and local authorities to develop statutory partnerships to 
prevent crime and enhance community safety by means of 
Community Safety Orders. We recognise how plagued many 
neighbourhoods are by continual anti-social behaviour by individuals 
or groups of individuals. (cited in Gilling 1999, p. 9) 
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It was suggested that a CSO would be obtained on the basis of civil evidence, with a view 
to placing exclusions and restraints upon an individual’s behaviour or activities. Any 
breach of an order was to be treated as a criminal offence, punishable by a custodial 
sentence of up to seven years (Gilling 1999, p. 9).  It was therefore these proposals, 
which had received little amendment during the intervening time that would three years 
later provide a basis for the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and the 
introduction of the ASBO. This was a civil order that originally became available for use 
by the police and local authorities in April 1999, who could only make an application for 
an order after having first consulted with the other (Campbell 2002, p. 2). The scope of 
those agencies involved who were considered to be ‘relevant authorities’ in terms of 
making ASBO applications, was later extended to include the British Transport Police, 
Registered Social Landlords, County Councils and Housing Action Trusts. This was as a 
result of the introduction of further legislative provisions (NACRO 2005, p. 2). An 
ASBO can be imposed upon anyone over the age of 10 who is deemed to have acted in an 
anti-social manner, in line with the definition contained within the 1998 CDA: 
 
[T]hat the person has acted, since the commencement date, in an anti-
social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the 
same household as himself. (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 
1(1)a) 
 
According to the Home Office, most types of ASB fall into one of three categories ‘street 
problems, nuisance neighbours or environmental crime’. In terms of specific behaviours, 
it can include vandalism, begging, anti-social drinking and the dealing and purchasing of 
drugs on the street (Home Office Online 2009). In terms of the details of an individual 
ASBO, these typically contain a range of prohibitions, stipulating what the offender 
cannot do in an effort to protect ASB victims and the wider community ‘from further 
anti-social acts of the same kind by the defendant’ (Campbell 2002, p. 3). For example an 
ASBO can include explicit clauses such as exclusions from specific areas at certain times, 
and also more general conditions around not inciting ASB nor encouraging others to do 
so (Home Office 2006, p. 29). Should a breach of an ASBO be recorded and proven, this 
can result in criminal proceedings and associated penalties being brought against the 
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identified perpetrator, which could include the possibility of the imposition of a custodial 
sentence (Campbell 2002, p. 8).  
 
In an effort to gain support for the introduction and use of the ASBO during this time, 
leading Labour Party figures also used public speeches as an opportunity to highlight the 
problems of low-level disorder as experienced by core Labour voters. The claim was that 
it was ‘Labour voters in poor areas who bore the brunt of crime and anti-social 
behaviour’ (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 26). At the same time, BCS statistics 
suggested that whilst crime victimisation rates were generally falling following the peak 
that was identified during the mid 1990’s, people’s perceptions of ASB in local areas 
continued to increase up until 2002/03 (Jansson 2007, p. 26).   
 
By the time of the 1997 General Election, it was clear that a tougher approach to crime 
and disorder was going to form a central part of Labour’s campaign. As expected, there 
was great emphasis on crime and disorder proposals in their election manifesto document. 
Crime was one of the Party’s ‘five pledges’ to the voting public. Labour’s approach was 
encapsulated by the famous sound bite, first used by Tony Blair in the mid-1990s, ‘tough 
on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (Labour Party, New Labour: Because Britain 
Deserves Better, April 1997). Other examples of tough ‘policy talk’ included the 
assertion that were to be ‘no excuses for crime’, in that individuals should be held 
responsible for their actions under New Labour’s policy proposals (Crawford 2009, p. 
814).  Labour’s proposals drew heavily on the ‘Broken Windows’ ideas as previously 
discussed, giving the appearance of an ‘Americanised’ approach towards the tackling of 
low-level disorder problems: 
 
We will tackle the unacceptable level of anti-social behaviour and 
crime on our streets. Our 'zero tolerance' approach will ensure that 
petty criminality among young offenders is seriously addressed. 
Community safety orders will deal with threatening and disruptive 
criminal neighbours. (Labour Party 1997) 
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The proposals put forward by New Labour before they entered government thus provided 
some key examples of policy ‘talk’ – in terms of rhetoric or policy proposals – which 
provided an important basis for later concrete policy decisions.  
 
The core period of New Labour’s ASB drive – 1997-2003 
 
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
 
As New Labour took office following their landslide victory at the 1997 General Election 
(which marked the end of eighteen years spent in Opposition) they began to put some of 
the policy ‘talk’ outlined above into the form of more concrete policy ‘decisions’ in 
tackling ASB. They sought to maintain the tough stance of their election manifesto in 
relation to the broader issue of crime and disorder, and placed an early emphasis upon the 
use of enforcement-based tools in response to ASB. These policy decisions were mainly 
in the form of legislation, as they entered a period of sustained legislative activity in the 
tackling of crime and ASB. The focus began to shift away from the traditional 
associations between issues of nuisance behaviour and social housing provisions, as the 
scope of agencies involved in ASB management began to grow. This would lead to an 
increased emphasis on the importance of relations between housing officers, the police 
and local authority practitioners (Crawford 2009, p. 823). These partnership approaches 
formed a central part of the first major set of ‘policy decisions’ in the field of ASB, the 
1998 CDA.  
 
The CDA represented a significant departure away from the previously Conservative led 
crime and disorder agenda. It also emerged as the 1990s saw the development of a 
broader political culture that was seemingly going in a more punitive direction (Hughes 
2007, p. 119). It was in this manner that New Labour could be seen to be responding to 
the previously cited national mood of the time, whereby in tackling ASB ‘enforcement is 
an easier concept for people to grasp than negotiated solutions’ (Burney 2005, p. 122). 
Therefore, what the CDA represented was the provision of a fast track response to 
punishment, advocating a tough enforcement-based approach to low-level forms of 
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disorder, borne out of the Party’s pre-election promises to tackle issues such as ASB. In 
its use of the terminology of ‘disorder’, the legislation also drew heavily upon American 
influences, the origins of which could potentially be found in the arguments of senior 
Labour figures when in Opposition: 
 
When he announced the Bill, Home Secretary Jack Straw said he 
wanted new laws to help build safer communities. His aim was to 
target persistent troublemakers and to allow their law-abiding 
neighbours freedom from fear and harassment. (The Guardian Online 
January 2009b) 
 
For Jack Straw, the 1998 Act (over which he was personally very influential), was a 
‘triumph of community politics over detached metropolitan elites’ (quoted in Hughes 
2007, p. 77) that was designed to assist local agencies in providing a targeted response to 
ASB. However, in order to fully achieve their goals of turning policy decisions into 
action on the ground, national level policymakers also needed to enlist the support of 
local level practitioners. Prior to 1997, addressing issues of problematic and nuisance 
behaviour was a field dominated, albeit at times reluctantly, by professionals within the 
local housing sector, and practitioners from other fields had little or only sporadic 
involvement. In an effort to try and resolve these divisions, the CDA sought to improve 
partnership working at the local level. The Act placed a statutory duty upon local 
government and police forces to cooperate in the development of targeted crime and 
disorder strategies for their areas. These were to be based upon the results of thorough 
crime and disorder audits to be undertaken of cities nationwide. For the first time, 
‘disorder’ as explicitly articulated in legislation - alongside the more widely understood 
concept of ‘crime’ – was a key focus of public policy action. 
 
Partnership working at the local level 
 
An important strand within this formalisation of partnership working was the creation of 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs). These were statutory 
local partnerships, of which 376 were established across England and Wales by 2006 
(Hughes 2007, p. 121). These structures incorporated a range of partners with 
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responsibility for tackling issues of crime and ASB reduction. These were introduced at a 
time when those at the national level had begun to realise the significance of the potential 
role of local authorities in maintaining law and order across their communities. The CDA 
embraced a model of community safety first set out in the Morgan Report (1991), which 
had recommended that local authorities be given statutory responsibility as the lead 
agency in coordinating community safety policies at the local level. This offered local 
authorities a clear role in responding to the issues of crime and disorder for the first time 
(Hughes 2007, p. 63). However, its central proposal was rejected by the Conservative led 
government of the time, as they did not wish to give local authorities a greater role in 
crime prevention. The impact of this new approach would largely depend upon the 
responses of the agencies involved, as the local authority in particular sought to maintain 
a central role in this process. It followed the development of their expertise in this 
particular aspect of local level governance, in the form of community safety, which had 
been developed during the intervening time since the report’s initial publication: 
 
This provision indicated national government recognition of the 
central role of local authorities in reducing crime and restoring order 
at the district level in England and Wales. It was the culmination of a 
long campaign, fought by local authorities since the mid 1980s, to 
stake a claim as a principal actor in the policy response to local crime 
and disorder. (Edwards and Benyon 2001, p. 151)  
  
The adoption of this style of multi agency approach thus saw local authorities emerging 
as key collaborators, along with the police, in developing the ASB aspect of the 
Government’s broader crime control agenda (Hughes 2007, p. 105). The police also tried 
to maintain a leadership role within this context, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, 
as was evidenced by their interaction with other local level organisations. In terms of 
local level partnerships, structures such as the newly formed CDRPs would also later 
become dominated by an emerging duopoly of control between these two groups of 
practitioners. It was a pattern that would be repeated across a number of localities during 
the 1990s (Hughes 2007, p. 103), influencing the local approach toward policymaking. 
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Young people and ASB 
 
The 1998 CDA also established an overarching Youth Justice Board, which had 
responsibility for overseeing the performance of the youth justice system, providing both 
advice and feedback to the Home Secretary (Youth Justice Board [no date], p. 4). The 
1998 CDA also led to the creation of multi-agency ‘youth offending teams’ (YOTs), 
which were designed to replace the previous social services youth justice teams. 
According to the legislation a YOT was to be established in every area by April 2000 
(Williams 1999, p. 1). As a result a total of 157 were established covering all local 
authorities, having become agencies in April 2000 (HM Inspectorate of Probation [no 
date], p. 3). Based upon the provisions contained within the 1998 CDA, YOTs were 
required to not only coordinate the provision of youth justice services within their local 
authority area, but also to perform the duties assigned to them in their local youth justice 
plan as developed by local authorities (1998 Crime and Disorder Act Online). In terms of 
their representation, all YOTs were ‘to include a police officer, a probation officer, a 
social worker, and representatives of education and health services’ (Williams 1999, p. 
2). These teams were also to become an integral part of the partnership structure created 
in response to tackling ASB, as they became the focal point for the referral of young 
people, and were granted powers under the emerging government legislation: 
 
The Yot also has a role in administering a number of measures to 
prevent and stop further anti-social behaviour. They have the power to 
work with families on a voluntary basis, enter into parenting contracts, 
and apply to the court for Parenting Orders. They can also play a 
valuable role in supporting an application for a Child Safety Order or 
ASBO. (Home Office 2005, p. 9) 
 
These teams were also tasked with working alongside young people and their families in 
an effort to prevent reoffending. For those who had been convicted they also assisted in 
the supervision of community-based sentences (National Audit Office 2010, p. 3). It was 
a role that would prove particularly significant as links between this aspect of the 
Government’s crime and disorder agenda, and young people, were established at an early 
stage: 
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Anti-social behaviour is an unpleasant fact of many people’s everyday 
life, regardless of whether they live in leafy, rural villages or deprived 
inner-city estates. Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) were 
designed to combat such behaviour. Before ASBOs, the use of 
injunctions and evictions went some way to dealing with problem 
behaviour. But many individuals – and most importantly juveniles, 
who are commonly considered to be the cause of much anti-social 
behaviour – slipped through the net. (Campbell 2002, p. 1) 
 
The 1998 CDA also introduced the use of curfews as an additional measure in tackling 
ASB, as those at the national level suggested that by preventing groups from 
congregating beyond a certain time, their ability to engage in acts of ASB could be 
reduced. The local child curfews that were subsequently introduced, which originated 
from government consultation papers on the subject, saw local authorities being able, 
following consultation with the police and with the agreement of the Home Secretary, to 
introduce bans on children of specified ages (under ten) in particular places for a period 
of up to 90 days. However, following the granting of this power, no applications were 
actually made by local authorities (Crawford and Lister 2007, p. 4). In an effort to 
encourage their use, the Government sought to extend these original provisions through 
the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act, which increased the age for the imposition of a 
curfew to under sixteen year olds. It also extended the ability of both local authorities and 
the police to impose curfews upon an area, not just an individual. It was anticipated that 
local police chiefs would be more willing to enact this provision, owing to their narrower 
remit when it came to the maintenance of law and order. As opposed to local authorities, 
which have a greater range of factors to consider when taking action, not least of all 
public opinion, owing to their levels of democratic accountability (Walsh 2002, p. 71).  
 
Despite these amendments, the use of curfews in tackling ASB never became an accepted 
part of the Government’s broader ASB agenda. Although as a concept, curfews could be 
seen as having been reintroduced as escort powers, alongside the creation of dispersal 
orders (Crawford 2009, p. 826). These came as a result of the Government’s later 2003 
Anti Social Behaviour Act, and were designed to regulate places and the people who 
frequent them (Crawford 2009, p. 820). 
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The emergence of the ASBO 
 
The ASBO as introduced by the 1998 CDA was to prove to be New Labour’s flagship 
response to problems of low-level disorder. It was also set to become a lasting emblem of 
their broader ASB policy, as its use was promoted in relation to the tackling of a wide 
category of behaviours. A civil order if breached it could result in up to five years 
imprisonment for adults, an element of this provision that was to attract significant 
criticism from commentators and campaigners alike. Concerns were also expressed about 
the level of evidence required, with civil rights commentators suggesting that ‘ASBOs 
can be obtained on the basis of gossip and rumours that the defendant cannot interrogate’ 
(Chakrabarti and Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 314). The ASBO was also accused of being 
exclusionary, and having the potential to demonise young people. Concerns were also 
raised about the criminalisation of non-criminal, ‘anti-social’ activities. ASB as defined 
by the 1998 CDA regarding ASBO applications, was built upon the three pillars of 
‘harassment, alarm and distress’, which were also key themes of the Conservatives’ 
previous Public Order legislation (Millie 2009, p. 5). 
 
The ASBO was designed to sit at the top of the Government’s regulatory pyramid, based 
upon the toolkit of ASB measures that were gradually being introduced. In positioning 
ASBOs in this manner, it was anticipated that they could also be used as a deterrent to 
those considering engaging in these types of behaviour. Where an ASBO was used, the 
Government suggested that it would ensure that individual perpetrators were held 
accountable, a key pre-election promise of New Labour.  
 
Following the CDA, however, concerns emerged from those in government that there 
appeared to be little evidence of the adoption of a coordinated approach being delivered 
by practitioners at the local level. Home Office ASBO usage figures suggested that their 
use was becoming concentrated in a few areas, most significantly Manchester, where the 
implementation of these measures had coincided with the development of local practices 
around tackling problematic council tenants (Burney 2005, p. 123). Manchester City 
Council’s embracing of the Government’s enforcement led approach and the emphasis 
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that they placed upon the use of formal measures such as the ASBO, eventually resulted 
in them accounting for a sixth of all the ASBOs taken out between 1999 and 2004 
(Hughes 2007, p. 121). By December 2007, the Manchester City Council CDRP area had 
issued a total of 1642 ASBOs (Home Office 2007). Other CDRPs had embraced a less 
enforcement-oriented approach in addressing issues of ASB. Alternative approaches saw 
an escalation of response through a series of mechanisms including informal and 
diversionary measures, such as warning letters and informal contracts. In some areas, 
therefore, an ASBO was seen as a tool of last resort, to be imposed only when other less 
punitive interventions had failed (Hughes 2007, p. 122).  
 
Government concern about the lack of decisive local action on ASB prompted the then 
Home Secretary Jack Straw to write to all local authorities on 15th October 1999, six 
months after the ASBO became available for use, insisting that they did not necessarily 
need to exhaust all other options before resorting to the use of this particular intervention 
(cited in Burney 2005, p. 34). A move that was further supported by a speech given by 
Straw to the Local Government Association in which he not only urged that action be 
taken on this issue but that ASBOs “should be used swiftly where circumstances demand 
it, not just against the very hard cases of unacceptable behaviour” (Cited in Chambers 
2010, p. 20). It followed the Government’s estimate that 5000 ASBOs a year would be 
issued proved to be ‘wildly optimistic’, with only five having been applied at the time of 
Jack Straw’s October letter (Burney 2005, p. 34). The reality being that it would take five 
years for this initial goal of 5000 ASBOs having been issued to be reached (Chambers 
2010, p. 20). This support for a tough approach to ASB was echoed in Labour’s 
Manifesto for the General Election of June 2001. It maintained New Labour’s 
commitment to the tackling of crime and its causes, pledging to increase police numbers 
in support of this aim.  
 
Key policy decisions post 2001 
 
During the period that followed their success at the 2001 General Election, crime and 
disorder remained a key element of New Labour’s agenda, as they began their second 
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term in government and sought to encourage local practitioners to utilise the full range of 
ASB interventions available to them. Continuing their momentum on this issue, upon 
their return to power the Government passed the 2002 Police Reform Act. The Act 
enhanced the previous ASB measures that had been introduced, and was intended to 
make it easier for local authorities to obtain interventions such as ASBOs. It also sought 
to address practitioner concerns regarding time delays, associated costs and the level of 
resources required in order to obtain them (Campbell 2002). This took place within a 
broader commitment to expand police numbers across local communities, which 
signalled the Government’s commitment to ideas relating to ‘reassurance policing’ here 
in the UK (Innes 2004). Despite the declining rates of actual crime levels (as recorded by 
the BCS) since its previous peak of 1995, measures of the public’s ‘fear of crime’ 
continued to grow (Jansson 2007, p. 17). It was this correlation that has since led 
academics and practitioners alike to identify a ‘reassurance gap’. This gap exists between 
levels of police activity and the perceived ability of them to do their job, as people’s 
perceptions of crime continued to demonstrate relatively high levels of insecurity (Millie 
2004, p. 1).  
 
In an attempt to address these concerns, the Police Reform Act created the role of the 
Police Community Support Officer (PCSO). This was a new grade of police staff, with 
more limited training and powers than full police officers, which made them a less 
expensive resource to employ. PCSOs offered the possibility of expanded visible patrols 
at a cheaper cost, and it was hoped that communities would be reassured by this greater 
police presence on the streets. The Government hoped that their presence in communities 
would restore public confidence in the police as a whole, whilst one of their main 
functions was also to tackle ASB. It was also intended that they would address quality of 
life issues more generally, illustrating the Government’s community focus through their 
provision of a direct response to those issues that had been raised through surveys such as 
the BCS2.  
 
                                                 
2 However, the introduction of the PCSO was not entirely welcomed by the existing policing community, 
with Fred Broughton of the Police Federation commenting at the time that ‘Modernization cannot be an 
excuse for policing on the cheap.’ (The Guardian, 19/01/09) 
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In addition to offering support in the direct tackling of ASB, the Act also looked to 
strengthen the ASB interventions already available. These mainly resulted from last 
minute changes made to the Act by the Home Secretary David Blunkett. These 
amendments provided ‘the means for ASBO lift-off’, following the previously minimal 
activity that had been seen in relation to this particular provision (Burney 2005, p. 138). 
These changes provided for post conviction ASBOs, which could be attached to criminal 
convictions passed by the courts, if a court felt that the imposition of an ASBO would 
prevent a convicted offender from engaging in any further nuisance behaviour. The most 
critical element of this was that the ASB did not need to be directly linked to the offence 
with which the individual has been convicted, nor did it require consultation with any 
other agency in order to secure the Order (Burney 2005, p. 139). It has since been argued 
that it was the introduction of the post conviction ASBO that prompted a significant 
subsequent rise in the use of ASBOs, contributing to the fact that 43% of those issued 
between December 2002 and March 2004 were post conviction (Burney 2005, p. 130). A 
further provision aimed at improving ASB management resulting from the 2002 Act was 
the interim ASBO. These were short-term measures, which could be implemented prior 
to a full hearing, with the aim of curtailing an individual’s behaviour immediately if the 
implementation proved to be successful.  
 
Another key set of policy ‘decisions’ were contained in the Anti Social Behaviour Act 
2003. This was aimed more at local level practitioners and communities, as the 
Government sought to broaden the scope of partnership working to tackle ASB. The 
precursor to the Act was the Government’s White Paper entitled ‘Respect and 
Responsibility – Taking a stand against anti-social behaviour’ (Home Office 2003b). In 
setting out its proposals for the way in which the Government sought to tackle ASB, the 
publication of this document not only marked the emergence of a more authoritative tone, 
but it also set in motion the passing of the subsequent legislation. In doing so, it 
advocated that communities should ‘take a stand against what is unacceptable’ (Home 
Office 2003b, p. 3). The overriding aim of the legislation was the renewed strengthening 
of both the tools and powers available to practitioners dealing with ASB, with a view to 
them developing a more flexible approach in tackling this issue. Not only did this 
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legislation hone the targets of the Government’s continuing ASB campaign, but it also 
sought to ensure that measures such as ASBOs became both quicker and easier to use, a 
renewed government commitment following a resurgence in earlier criticisms. Both of 
these had in the past contributed to local authorities favouring the use of faster and less 
expensive interventions, such as the Acceptable Behaviour Contract (Home Office; 
Campbell 2002). Practitioners in the London Borough of Islington initially pioneered 
these in 1999, before their use was rolled out nationally from 2000 onwards.  
 
The scheme is not designed to replace the ASBO but to complement 
it. Evidence collected for the purposes of ABCs would also be used 
for the purpose of ASBOs if necessary. This means that there is no 
duplication of effort or resources if an ASBO was later applied for, 
and has the benefit that if an ABC is successful the costs are minimal. 
Breach of an ABC can also be used as evidence in an ASBO 
application. (Bullock and Jones 2004, p. 15) 
 
As well as introducing additional measures for use by local level practitioners, such as 
crackhouse closures, the Act also tried to ensure that the broader responsibility for 
tackling this issue had been clearly defined. For example in relation to landlords, the Act 
was used as an opportunity to reaffirm their role in addressing ASB (Home Office 2008, 
p. 1), with amendments to existing Housing legislation having also been introduced. The 
2003 Act also aimed to tackle the dual issues of parental responsibility and young people, 
with the introduction of tools such as parenting orders and contracts. These were 
designed to provide training for people to become better parents, as increasingly those in 
government tried to widen the scope of those required to take an active role in the 
regulation process (Crawford 2009, p. 822). They similarly broadened the range of those 
practitioners who are able to issue measures of this nature. Children deemed to have 
acted in an anti-social manner were to be targeted by youth offending teams who, as a 
result of the Act, were given the power to apply for an ASBO for children who had not 
appeared in court (Burney 2005). The Government also encouraged the formulation of a 
joined up approach locally, as agencies were empowered to act. The result was a clear 
devolution of powers from those at the national level, marking a potential shift away 
from government towards governance: 
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We are determined to help these communities – for more than a year 
the Government has been working hard to tackle anti-social behaviour 
and I recognise the tremendous amount of good work already being 
done across the country. But the Government cannot do everything on 
its own. We have delivered the powers people on the front-line 
wanted, they must now be used for the benefit of everyone. (Home 
Office Press Release 023/2004) 
 
The Government continued its focus on this area of policy by ordering a national one-day 
count of ASB. It was intended that this would provide a snapshot of this issue at the local 
level. The count took place on 10th September 2003, and involved an extensive range of 
local organisations taking a count of the number of reports received from members of the 
public on a range of topics. These were based upon Home Office categories of behaviour, 
and for which ASBOs had been imposed. These ranged from noise and verbal abuse to 
prostitution and arson (Campbell 2002). Following the count, the Home Office published 
a summary of the information collated on the day. The figures related not just to the 
number of recorded incidents, but also to their anticipated costs for the agencies 
concerned:  
 
Between midnight on Tuesday and midnight on Wednesday, 66,107 
reports of anti-social behaviour were made to participating agencies. 
This equates to more than one report every 2 seconds or around 16.5 
million reports every year. Anti-social behaviour recorded on the day 
of the count cost agencies in England and Wales at least £13.5m; this 
equates to around £3.4bn a year. (Home Office 2003c, p. 2) 
 
The figures quoted by the Home Office understandably became the focus of significant 
media attention. It was both the scope of the issue based upon reporting levels, and the 
costs incurred by the agencies involved, which provided politicians with valuable 
evidence on which to premise the Anti Social Behaviour Act (Hughes 2007, p. 120). 
Even though there were potential inaccuracies in the data, these statistics, along with the 
increased levels of political rhetoric undoubtedly provided the Act with a degree of 
momentum.  
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 
A targeted ASB strategy 
 
The 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act was to be accompanied by a dedicated ASB Action 
Plan. The Plan was to be implemented under the banner of the Government’s 2003 
national ‘Together’ campaign. It set out Home Office plans to tackle the issue of ASB in 
a coordinated manner. In doing so, it also detailed the practical support available to local 
councils and agencies. It was to be the first nationally run campaign designed by those in 
government to mobilise both resources and efforts at the local level in support of tackling 
ASB. The key focus of these initiatives was the empowerment of local communities, 
supported by political rhetoric that emphasised the need to place communities at the top 
of the priority list. From this point they would be representative of a collective of 
potential victims of ASB.  
 
The Government’s ‘Together’ initiative was an overtly enforcement led campaign, and 
resulted in a further upward trend in the use of ASBOs. The rise in ASBO usage was not 
only demonstrated in Home Office publicised figures, but also in a report that sought to 
review the campaign’s impact after 12 months. The report suggested that as a result of 
government encouragement, 85% of CDRPs had increased their usage of ASBOs since 
the launch of the campaign in October 2003 (Home Office 2004d, p. 39). The increased 
use of more formal enforcement-based ASB interventions may have also resulted from 
the promotion of renewed partnership working locally, particularly between agencies and 
affected areas. However, it should be acknowledged that this increase in enforcement 
activity was occurring against a backdrop of contrasting rhetoric at the local level. The 
policy talk at this level seemed to be in stark contrast with the stance that had been 
adopted by those nationally, as practitioners suggested that ASBOs in particular were 
viewed as being a tool of last resort. This was a view supported by a report into the use of 
ASBOs and young people. The evidence for which was based upon interview data 
gathered from representatives from ten youth offending team areas, where ASBO usage 
ranged from low to high. It concluded that in addressing problems of ASB there had been 
significant use made of ‘tiered’ approaches, as can be seen from the below excerpt: 
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[A]gencies expressed a commitment to a ‘tiered’ approach in which 
young people might expect to receive a number of interventions 
before being made the subject of an Asbo … But in either event, in 
areas where the influence of YOTs was strongest, the use of 
diversionary measures was more pronounced and there was a 
consequent reduction in the use of enforcement. (Bateman 2007, p. 
20) 
 
The use of ASBOs was also considered by some practitioners to be an indicator of wider 
failings in the system, as was supported by the detail contained in a report that was 
conducted by the Policy Exchange into the use of ASBOs. The report included interviews 
with a number of ASB Coordinators from a range of local areas, many of who suggested 
that they regarded it ‘as a failure to use enforcement powers (particularly the more 
serious ones) because it signifies that they have been unable to resolve problems earlier 
on – perhaps through mediation, supportive measures or referrals to other services.’ 
(Chambers 2010, p. 22). As a result, this would see CDRPs increasingly aiming to put in 
place a range of informally based interventions, designed to divert the individual away 
from engaging in acts of ASB. 
 
The coordination of policy delivery 
 
In order to further strengthen the rollout of ASB policy set out in national legislation and 
initiatives, in 2003 the Government established the Home Office Anti Social Behaviour 
Unit (henceforth ASBU). A key aim was to address the uneven use of the measures that 
had so far been introduced to tackle ASB. The Unit was to be given responsibility for the 
centralised coordination of the Government’s ASB agenda. It was anticipated that by 
engaging with local practitioners, the Unit would be able to ensure that there was a 
coordinated approach being undertaken nationally. The Home Secretary David Blunkett, 
who had taken up this post following the Party’s success at the 2001 election, was 
responsible for determining the Unit’s direction. In his approach, Blunkett again drew 
influences from Kelling and Wilson’s (1982) ‘Broken Windows’ thesis. In the UK, 
Blunkett was keen to adopt its ideas in emphasising the potential impact of low-level 
disorder. This became a strong theme within the Government’s emerging legislation and 
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accompanying initiatives, but also in the speeches being delivered by Blunkett and the 
Prime Minister Tony Blair:  
 
[T]he Home Secretary in 2003, David Blunkett, portrayed anti-social 
behaviour in distinctly apocalyptic terms, claiming that ‘Britain has 
never been at a more insecure moment…Anti-social behaviour is 
actually at the foundation and root of insecurity.’ (Hughes 2007, p. 
120) 
 
The Government’s overtly enforcement led stance on this issue, as reflected in their 
policy decisions during the core period of their time in government, has since led to the 
tone of New Labour’s message on ASB having been described as being almost 
evangelical (Burney 2005). The message and the tough stance of the Party overall, was 
further illustrated by Blair and Blunkett’s suggestion that those officials who failed to 
fully utilise the range of ASB tools ‘should be sacked’. This included police officers that 
were threatened with the same outcome by the Home Secretary, if they failed to make 
more use of the enforcement powers that had been made available to them (Chambers 
2010, p. 5). According to Burney, these two key players began to rely upon ‘scaring 
people into the right kind of behaviour, and punishing them if necessary.’ (Burney 2005, 
pp. 31-32). 
 
The ASBU was also to develop new policies and actions, as set out in the Government’s 
previously published ‘Together’ Action Plan. As a result, it received funding for the 
coordination and implementation of ASB policy at the local level. The aim was to 
reinforce the message from government of their preferred enforcement led stance on this 
issue. It was also felt that, to achieve the rollout of a coordinated programme of activity, 
the Unit would also need to oversee the creation of the necessary supporting mechanisms. 
This placed the focus upon those at the local level, as the Government sought the smooth 
implementation of this policy.  
 
They utilised both the Unit and a network of Regional Government Offices (henceforth 
RGOs), as a means of influencing policy implementation at the local level. To increase 
practitioner levels in support of this, the Unit also provided funding for a network of ASB 
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coordinators to be appointed in each of the local CDRPs. ASB coordinators were also 
given a role to play not just in policy implementation, but in developing the necessary 
tools to tackle ASB. The Unit was also to provide support to practitioners, as a result of 
targeted work being undertaken by those in government, in the form of the nationally led 
initiatives. The result was the identification of ten ‘Trailblazer’ local authorities.  
 
These areas were to receive support from the Unit in managing different elements of ASB 
related problems, from nuisance neighbours to begging. As part of this, specialist panels 
of professionals were created with a view to encouraging joined up working across the 
agencies concerned. However, this approach was not met with support in all of the areas, 
as practitioners expressed concern at seeing the Government playing politics with the 
implementation of some of the measures aimed at tackling these issues (BBC Online 
2003). Nonetheless, this remained an aspect of the Unit’s continuing role in the 
management of delivering a coordinated approach to tackling ASB. It was an approach 
that would be furthered in the next stages of New Labour’s period of office. Following 
this core period of legislative and policy activity the Unit would be realigned alongside a 
dedicated Taskforce, as nationally policymakers began to re-evaluate their approach in 
tackling ASB.  
 
A moderated approach - New Labour 2003-7 
 
Legislative activity  
 
The Government’s ASB agenda was introduced as a means of circumventing the 
traditional criminal justice system. However, this growth of regulation of people’s 
behaviour outside of the criminal justice system did not stop a simultaneous expansion in 
criminal law (Crawford 2009, p. 826). As a result, by the latter stages of New Labour’s 
time in government, Opposition parties (and some on the Government benches) were also 
becoming more critical of their approach. This included Liberal Democrat home affairs 
spokesman Chris Huhne, who likened the plethora of new laws introduced by New 
Labour under Tony Blair as 'legislative diarrhea' (as quoted in the Mail Online September 
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2008). This apparent increase in the number of punishable criminal offences is indeed 
something that has also been commented upon by academics in this field. It has been 
noted that during their time in government, New Labour created 3200 criminal offences, 
of which 1000 were a result of Acts of Parliament. It was an approach that was largely 
underpinned by the Government’s drive to increase regulation, offering new and faster 
routes into the criminal justice system (Crawford 2009, p. 826).  
 
It appeared that New Labour had an almost insatiable desire for introducing criminal 
justice legislation (Burney 2005, p. 129). It seemed that a new piece of legislation 
emerged every time a new social problem was identified (Burney 2005). This high level 
of legislative activity also led some to question both the Party’s rationale on the subject, 
and more broadly its importance in Tony Blair’s leadership. Concerns were raised about 
the Government’s granting of ‘summary powers’ to a range of organisations, specifically 
local authorities and the police (for example, powers for police officers to issue ‘fixed 
penalty notices’, which increased the numbers of convictions that did not require a court 
appearance) (Chakrabarti and Russell in Squires 2008a, p. 307). The sustained increase in 
both general policies and legislative activities was to prove an enduring characteristic of 
New Labour’s response to this issue. It continued into the latter stages of their time in 
power, as a number of Acts were rushed through Parliament during the later stages of 
2004-2005, both during the lead up to and following their victory at the 2005 General 
Election: 
 
Yet more anti-social behaviour related measures were introduced in 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, the Police and 
Justice Act 2006, the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, the Welfare 
Reform Act 2007 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
And so it goes on. (Burney 2005, p. 129) 
 
The majority of ASB related provisions contained within these Acts reflected the 
Government’s growing trend towards what some have termed ‘conditionality’ (Burney 
2005, p. 128). This placed the emphasis upon the requirement of good behaviour in return 
for entitlement. The Government’s introduction of alternative kinds of ASB intervention 
supported this movement. These provisions included the reduction or withdrawal of 
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housing benefits in response to anti-social conduct, eviction of unruly tenants and the use 
of ASB injunctions. However, the negative impact of this was that the housing sector in 
particular was becoming a site of regulatory ‘overload’, as it provided a focus for the use 
of a range of ASB measures (Crawford 2009, p. 824). The shaping of these alternative 
responses could also be seen in other pieces of targeted ASB legislation developed during 
this later period, including the 2005 Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act. It not 
only aimed to enforce the rules around disorder issues, but it also widened the scope of 
the powers available in relation to ASB management (Burney 2005). It was anticipated 
that the Act would enable local practitioners to tackle poor environmental quality being 
caused as a result of this behaviour, including graffiti, noise, litter and waste. These 
measures continued to reflect the enforcement strand of the Government’s stance on this 
issue. It also offered a change in focus towards the provision of sustainable communities, 
as those in government recognised the impact of this behaviour upon the built 
environment. These enforcement powers were also extended to the Government’s 
programme entitled ‘Cleaner, Safer, Greener’. The aim of this was to enable practitioners 
to address issues of community safety, including tackling ASB (National Community 
Safety Network 2007, p. 20).  
 
The Government’s 2006 Police and Justice Act focused upon the reform of UK police 
forces. The Act also led to the creation of the National Policing Improvement Agency, 
with the provision of powers to enable the Home Secretary to tackle directly 
‘underperforming’ forces. It also enhanced existing ASB management provisions, 
amending the earlier 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act. It increased the number of bodies 
able to enter into parenting contracts and those who could apply for parenting orders 
(National Community Safety Network 2007, p. 21), illustrating the Government’s slight 
change in focus. They now looked increasingly to families and their role in contributing 
to, and addressing ASB. In addition to the 2005 legislation, this Act saw a renewed 
broadening in the scope of the Government’s ASB agenda. It used this reform of police 
forces as an opportunity to also strengthen the position of local communities. In doing so, 
it sought to make the agencies concerned with maintaining order more accountable to the 
general public. The Government also began to move away from their previously 
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enforcement-focused approach. The low usage of formal interventions such as the ASBO 
appeared to force a reassessment of their position on this issue. They also began to 
recognise the need for earlier interventions that would address the underlying causes of 
the behaviour, as opposed to retaining a focus upon its consequences. It was a change in 
approach that would be reflected in Tony Blair’s unveiling of his ‘Respect’ agenda. 
Incorporated within this was the taking of a more preventative stance, which represented 
an evolution of New Labour’s earlier ASB policies. 
 
Further evolution: The ‘Respect’ Campaign 
 
The ‘Respect’ campaign was to be a key element of Labour’s General Election campaign 
in 2005. The accompanying political rhetoric focused upon the notion of the law abiding 
majority taking control of their local communities, which was an important strand in their 
social policy (BBC Online 2006). It was also representative of the continuing attempts 
being made by those at the national level to directly influence the manner in which 
practitioners tackled ASB. The Government continued to use an interventionist strategy, 
despite the emergence of an approach that seemingly favoured governing at a distance. 
As a form of ‘community governance’ began to develop amongst central policymakers, 
they continued to offer local policy actors the opportunity to influence policy responses. 
These included those policies that were being developed in response to tackling issues 
such as ASB (Edwards and Benyon 2001). 
 
The launch of this second national campaign was to be accompanied by a ‘Respect’ 
Action Plan. It was a similar style of delivery to that of the earlier targeted ASB initiative 
‘Together’. The ‘Respect’ Taskforce, following the rebranding of the Government’s 
original ASBU, further supported its delivery. The Taskforce assumed responsibility for 
coordinating both the implementation and the work of the ‘Respect’ agenda, including 
the delivery of the Action Plan. Following David Blunkett’s resignation in 2004, 
responsibility for the leadership of the renamed ASBU passed to the former 
‘Homelessness Tsar’, Louise Casey3. Not only did Casey become a fervent ASB 
                                                 
3 This title reflected the time she had spent as the head of the Government’s ‘Rough Sleepers Unit’. 
 70 
 
 
campaigner, but she also embodied a new type of national level non civil servant policy 
advisor. As a result, her views on tackling ASB provided Tony Blair with a new ally 
following Blunkett’s departure. 
 
The tone of the ‘Respect’ Action Plan was similar to that of the other legislation that had 
been passed during these later stages of New Labour’s time in government. It saw both 
their policy talk and decisions around this agenda become more wide ranging than had 
previously been seen in their initial responses to tackling ASB. It was with this in mind 
that New Labour used ‘Respect’ as a means of combining condemnation with 
enforcement in addressing these types of behaviour (Burney 2005, p. 46). The strategy 
was intended to ‘go broader, deeper and further’ than before (Home Office 2006c). They 
therefore introduced renewed legislative powers designed to tackle ASB. However, this 
did not prevent the Government from using the Action Plan as an opportunity to reiterate 
the existing wide range of ASB tools available to practitioners. It therefore reserved its 
tone of condemnation for perceived perpetrators of this behaviour. There was also an 
apparent recognition of the need to act early in addressing the underlying causes of ASB. 
In reprimanding perpetrators it proposed to offer support, both to individuals and their 
families, representing the Government’s new focus in tackling this agenda. As a result, 
they increasingly turned their attention towards parents and families as a means of 
developing a culture of respect. It was a movement that was echoed in their more recent 
legislative decisions: 
 
The emphasis in the ‘Respect’ agenda was on the ‘responsibilisation’ 
of parents – a theme which right up to the present has been of growing 
importance. Families and upbringing have become the prism through 
which youthful wrongdoing is viewed, and remedial action is largely 
aimed at these targets, even where there is no direct link with 
children’s delinquent behaviour. (Burney as cited in Millie 2009, p. 
47)     
 
In support of their focus on this sector, the Government also provided local practitioners 
with additional funding to support youth targeted activities, complimenting the rollout of 
parenting classes. The basis for this was the promotion of ‘pro social’ behaviour, in the 
hope of instilling this sentiment in affected families. Further initiatives included a 
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network of Family Support Projects, which were designed to work with the more 
‘challenging’ families. At the national level this reflected the adoption of a more holistic 
approach, whilst also attempting to improve local authorities commissioning of parenting 
services. These developments should also be seen in conjunction with the renewed focus 
placed upon the role of education services in this process. In the rollout of a renewed 
multi agency approach to tackling ASB in its latest guise as ‘Respect’, this also impacted 
upon the range of practitioners and agencies involved locally. 
 
However, the use of enforcement persisted as a trend in New Labour’s strategy, 
particularly when tackling those who they described as being the ‘non compliant’.  It was 
an element of their approach that was possibly more muted than it had been previously, 
particularly when considering the overtly enforcement stance encouraged by the 
‘Together’ campaign. For some it was illustrated by the way in which New Labour still 
sought to improve the behaviour of a perceived anti-social minority, as opposed to 
fostering a culture whereby through their engagement with ‘difference’, communities are 
able to develop their tolerance levels. As a result they are then in a better position to be 
able to empathise with individuals, causing this to become ‘the mark of true mutual 
respect, of true civility’ (Millie 2009, p. 275): 
 
Everyone can change [but] if people who need help will not take it, we 
will make them. If we are to achieve the vision of the Britain that we 
all want, then there is no room for cynicism. We need to take 
responsibility for ourselves, our children and our families, support 
those who want to do the same – and challenge those who do not. 
(Respect Taskforce 2006, p. 1 cited in Millie 2009, p. 268) 
 
The actual delivery of this agenda, marked an evolution of New Labour’s initial ASB 
policies, and was an initiative that was particularly Blair influenced. In seeking to tackle 
‘disrespect’ across society, he and the Party sought to develop a cross departmental 
agenda. They once again encouraged a joined up approach to tackling this issue, with a 
continuing emphasis placed upon communities to take an active role in this process. The 
role of communities had been an enduring feature of the Government’s ASB policies. As 
a result, the implementation of formal interventions such as the ASBO had become 
somewhat reliant upon active community participation, with those in government seeking 
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community cooperation in the policing and monitoring of these measures. This approach 
was premised upon the ‘naming and shaming’ of perpetrators, in an effort to provide 
communities with the detail needed to be active participants in this process. This element 
of the implementation of ASB measures has led to the erosion of ‘the principle of 
anonymity’, as practitioners both locally and nationally ‘seek to tap into and enlist 
networks of surveillance and parochial webs of affiliation’ (Crawford 2009, p. 822). In 
their delivery of this later initiative, New Labour had sought to further develop the 
abilities of communities to participate in this via the earlier Police and Justice Act. The 
aim was to strengthen communities so that they were better able to support the 
implementation of ‘Respect’.   
 
The origins of this later ‘Respect’ campaign can clearly be seen in New Labour’s early 
ASB policies. These were concerned with capitalising upon the politicisation of ASB and 
offering a more coordinated local response. In contrast the later ‘Respect’ agenda focused 
upon the encouragement of respect amongst both individuals and their institutions. It was 
an initiative that was associated in particular with Tony Blair, demonstrated by his 
continuing deployment of policy talk that emphasised issues of ‘self respect’, 
‘responsibilities’ and ‘rights’ (Burney 2005). Blair aimed to maintain influence over the 
development of this campaign, following the departure of David Blunkett. The former 
Home Secretary David Blunkett had been a keen ally of Blair, but his replacement 
Charles Clarke, favoured a return to a softer approach, in tackling both ASB and crime 
issues generally. It was to be reflected in the promotion of a more preventative stance, 
which began to permeate the Government’s policy decisions whilst also being reflected in 
the delivery of policy outcomes locally. An overall softer tone in the Party’s 
communications accompanied this shift. The ‘ASB agenda’ was also moved to form part 
of the remit of the Department of Children and Family Services. This compounded the 
shift away from the previously ‘shrill tone’ of the Government’s ASB agenda. In addition 
New Labour had also made a loud appraisal of the severity of the situation nationwide, as 
a result of the problem of ASB (Hughes 2007, p.120).  
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In retrospect, the ‘Respect’ campaign also marked a significant landmark in the dedicated 
ASB policies developed and rolled out under Tony Blair’s leadership. As ‘Respect’ 
became the last significant development in the Government’s agenda on this issue that he 
would oversee. Blair resigned as Prime Minister in June 2007, marking the conclusion of 
a period of relative consistency both in terms of leadership and the delivery of the 
Government’s ASB agenda. Following Blair’s departure, there was seemingly less 
emphasis placed upon the delivery of this element of the Government’s crime and 
disorder agenda. The new Prime Minister, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown, chose instead to concentrate his efforts upon other issues. These included 
economic problems, immigration and internationally managing the country’s role in 
conflicts that had emerged during Blair’s time in power. As the driving force nationally 
behind tackling this issue from the late 1990s onwards, Blair’s resignation marked a 
significant turning point. It was after all with Blair that the origins of the ASB agenda and 
the provision of a coordinated response could be traced. Following the change in 
leadership, there was a broader shift in the political direction concerning ASB policy. The 
new Prime Minister sought to break away from Blair’s approach, abolishing the 
‘Respect’ Taskforce and replacing it with one that was more youth orientated. There was 
also a growing focus placed upon the positive engagement of young people, in an effort 
to combat ASB. Overall, the issue of youth ASB received less prominence in the 
Government’s policy programme under Brown, at least initially. It was accompanied by 
the movement of some of the Party’s key personnel, who had previously been vocal both 
in their support of Blair’s approach and the methods advocated. One such person was the 
Government’s former ‘Respect Tsar’ Louise Casey, who had proven to be an ASB policy 
entrepreneur. As part of a government reshuffle, Casey was moved from the Home Office 
to the Cabinet Office. At the same time it was suggested that ‘it was becoming clear that 
the ASBO was being quietly dropped and would no longer be aggressively promoted and 
publicized by Ministers’ (Chambers 2010, p. 21). 
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Conclusion 
 
The assessment of these key national level policy milestones and shifts has tried to 
highlight the complexities of the policymaking process, and the contributory factors that 
are involved. In relation to this element of New Labour’s crime and disorder agenda, this 
included the emergence and positioning of key personalities nationally, whilst locally the 
role of communities became increasingly prominent. The Party sought to refocus its 
efforts in their direction, enabling local citizens to influence policy development (Hughes 
2009, p. 120). As we have seen, the national trajectory of ASB policy development began 
with a period during the first part of the 1990s when the Labour Opposition began to 
reinvent their position on issues such as crime and welfare, and in particular adopted an 
increasingly strident rhetoric around such notions as ‘incivilities’ and ASB. During the 
early stages of their time in government New Labour quickly introduced legislation that 
attempted to move from this ‘policy talk’ in Opposition, to a concrete set of policy 
‘decisions’ in the form of primary legislation and other policy instruments. The 
deployment of tough policy ‘rhetoric’ by Labour politicians did not end when they 
entered government. The first period of office continued to be dominated by a highly 
expressive form of ‘ASB politics’ by which the Prime Minister and some other leading 
government politicians continued to deploy strident language to convey an image of 
decisiveness and action. This was matched by the frenetic period of legislative activity, 
and attempts to encourage local authorities to use the full range of new ASB ‘tools’ that 
the government had provided. However, as the government moved into its second term of 
office, a more nuanced and moderated approach began to emerge. The emphasis on 
enforcement and condemnation of ASB remained, but this was now supplemented with a 
range of other measures aimed at the prevention and management of ASB. Part of this 
related to a broader trend towards ‘conditionality’ approaches, which require compliance 
in return for entitlement to benefits. However, in other ways there was a re-emphasis on 
the preventive aspects of family support, and other more ‘penal-welfare’ kinds of 
intervention.  
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It is important to explore the transitions between national policy and developments at the 
local level. One of the criticisms of the ‘grand narrative’ approaches adopted by writers 
such as Garland (2001) is that they have a tendency to present an overly smooth account 
of policy developments at the national level, and underplay local variation and resistance. 
The first ‘theoretical proposition’ (TP1) derived from Garland, suggested that we would 
be unlikely to observe a significant departure from the national policy trajectory at the 
local level. However, other work on contemporary governance, reviewed in Chapter 
Two, also suggested that public policy is a complex process, with elements that can be 
developed, influenced and delivered at different levels. As Chapters Five and Six will 
demonstrate, whilst it is important to acknowledge the significance of national level shifts 
in shaping local policy developments, the ways in which, these developments played 
themselves out at the local level presented some interesting challenges for TP1, and in 
particular questioned the uni-directional ‘top down’ assumptions about policymaking that 
is presented by grand narrative accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
 
Chapter Four: Research design and methods 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the aims and research questions, which guided this 
study, and provide an account of the research design and methods deployed to address 
them. It builds on the previous two chapters, which set out some themes within existing 
academic literature that have informed the study, and provided an account of the broader 
policy context at the national level. The chapter is divided into five main sections. The 
first section sets out the aims and research questions of the current study; the second 
considers issues of broader research strategy and design; the third presents a detailed 
account of the particular methods deployed by the study and considers their strengths and 
limitations; the fourth section outlines the ways in which the data were analysed, and the 
final section considers ethical issues raised by the study and how they were addressed.  
 
Research aims and questions 
 
The general aim of this research study is to explore the complexities involved in the 
crime and disorder policymaking process at the local level. Within this general aim, there 
are several specific research questions, including the following;  
 
§ What were the key developments in policies relating to anti-social behaviour 
(henceforth ASB) in Southern City, and when did these occur?  
§ Who were the key individuals and organisations involved in the development 
of ASB policy in Southern City? 
§ What was the nature of the relationships between key players in the policy 
process locally?  
§ How was ASB policy resisted and/or re-shaped at the local level? 
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Research Strategy and Design 
 
Epistemological underpinnings 
 
Within the social sciences, it is possible to identify two contrasting broad epistemological 
approaches underpinning research strategies. Positivist approaches view the social world 
as something external to the individual and ‘measurable’ in an objective way via 
‘scientific’ methods such as systematic observation, measurement, experimentation and 
analysis. By contrast, interpretivist approaches emphasise the meaningful nature of 
individuals’ participation in the social world, and the meanings placed by people upon 
their actions and those of others. Research methods associated with the physical sciences 
are seen from this point of view as inappropriate for exploring the complex nature of 
human social life (Bryman 2008). Each of these broad approaches is associated with a 
particular methodological approach to empirical research.  
 
As noted above, positivist social research methods are based on the assumption that the 
social world is amenable to objective measurement, and for this reason have often been 
closely associated with quantitative approaches. Such approaches seek to test either an 
individual hypothesis or a collection of theories about a specific subject. This assumes a 
primarily deductive relationship between the theory and research, or the ‘hypothetico-
deductive method’ (Bottoms 2008, p. 94). On the other hand, those from the interpretivist 
tradition tend to use qualitative methods to research the social world. This offers a more 
inductive approach to sociological explanations of particular social phenomenon or 
activities, and is concerned with the generation of new ideas and theories. As Bottoms 
notes, ‘... ethnographic research studies naturally use research methods of a qualitative 
kind, such as participant and non-participant observation, extended interviews and so on’ 
(2008, p. 81).  
 
For Glaser and Strauss (1967), the pure form of this approach is found in ‘grounded 
theory’, which presents empirical research as an evolutionary process, as theoretical 
concepts and core ideas emerge in an inductive way from the ongoing process of data 
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collection and analysis. Bryman (2008) notes that interpretivism and positivism lie at 
opposite ends of a spectrum of research approaches, and in practice are rarely completely 
separable. For example, inductive theory is often the result of having first engaged in 
some deductive theorising, and it is difficult – as would be the case in a purely 
‘inductive’ approach – to enter the field completely free of any theoretical or conceptual 
preconceptions. Furthermore, contrasting methodological approaches are often used 
deliberately in combination to explore the same social phenomenon via the ‘cross-
checking’ approach known as ‘triangulation’. This has been defined as an ‘attempt to 
map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by 
studying it from more than one standpoint’ (Cohen and Manion 2007). This might 
include, for example, the utilisation of primarily quantitative information as a means of 
validating the evidence gained through qualitative research methods, or using some 
secondary statistics or documentary data as a means of contextualising the more focused 
primary qualitative data that has been gathered.  
 
One helpful approach to thinking about the relationship between theory and methods is 
the perspective of ‘adaptive theory’ (Layder 1998). This relies upon having what Layder 
(1998) refers to as being a ‘theoretical scaffold’. This involves the development of a 
series of theoretical propositions, which can be tested and adapted during the course of 
collecting empirical data. Accordingly, a number of theoretical propositions (TPs) were 
developed at the end of Chapter Two, derived from the review of existing literature on 
the governance of crime control, empirical studies of ASB policy, and research on policy 
formulation more generally. These TPs were then revisited during the empirical analysis 
of developments in Southern City, and are discussed and assessed in the conclusions of 
each empirical chapter. Just to reiterate, these TPs were as follows: 
 
· TP1: Following Garland (2001), ASB policies in Southern City reflect the 
‘reconfigured’ characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined 
by fundamental social, economic and cultural forces – and will thus not vary 
significantly from the national policy trajectories on ASB 
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· TP2: ASB policies in Southern City display a ‘schizoid’ tension between  
‘adaptive’ elements on the one hand, driven by instrumental, managerial 
concerns (emphasising such concepts as ‘responsibilisation’ and partnership), 
AND more emotive, politicized ‘expressive’ elements on the other (Garland 
2001).  
 
· TP3:  ASB policies in Southern City reflect a preoccupation with ‘risk’ that has 
been observed in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such 
that it is focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly 
populations, rather than upon punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley 
and Simon 1994). Policy development also displays a tendency to colonise other 
areas of social policy locally such that other policy areas – such as health and 
education - become configured around and driven by the issues of crime and ASB.  
 
· TP4: ASB policy in Southern City is shaped by policy networks of different kinds, 
including relatively stable and continuous ‘policy communities’, and 
‘intergovernmental networks’ comprising participants from national and local 
government (Rhodes 1981, 1997). 
 
For Bottoms (2008), this kind of approach involves a ‘continuing dialogue between 
theory and empirical observations’ (2008, p. 75). The adaptive theoretical approach is 
therefore less rigid than a purely deductive approach (that sets out the theoretical 
framework and then straightforwardly ‘tests’ it), but it is also more focused than the 
purely inductive approach implied by grounded theory. It also offers suitable flexibility 
for the project to grow and develop as informed by the empirical research. This is 
facilitated by the fact that it is an approach to empirical study that is not exclusively 
based upon either the testing or formulation of a specific hypothesis (Bottoms 2008).  
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The operationalization of Talk, Decision and Action 
 
One of the main objectives of this study is to provide a detailed account of the ‘empirical 
particulars’ (Garland 2001, p. vii) of policymaking, as opposed to testing a specific 
hypothesis. However, both the literature review (Chapter Two) and the overview of 
national policy developments (Chapter Three), have suggested a number of more general 
‘theoretical propositions’ that might act as an adaptive guide to empirical enquiry. These 
include the proposition that there are important differences between the policy 
dimensions of ‘talk’, ‘decisions’ and ‘action’ in relation to ASB control; that national 
policy developments can be resisted, re-shaped or re-worked at other levels in the system; 
and that the policymaking process is characterised by complexity and uncertainty rather 
than smooth general trajectories of change (as implied in ‘grand narrative’ approaches).  
 
Pollitt’s (2001 p.938) conceptual framework suggests that there are three analytically 
distinct levels that exist within the public policymaking process that should be considered 
and separated out for analysis. Policy ‘talk’, which is identified as being concerned with 
policy rhetoric and symbolism; policy ‘decisions’ that exist in the form of concrete 
manifestations of policy and include specific legislation, national programmes and 
written policy statements; and finally policy ‘action’ which focuses upon policy 
implementation, and the ways in which policy decisions come to fruition ‘on the ground’ 
(see also Tregidga 2011).  
 
In the case of this research policy ‘talk’ is concerned with the rhetoric that surrounded the 
ASB agenda, particularly at the national level and coinciding with New Labour’s time in 
government. Policy ‘decisions’ are the legislative framework that emerged nationally on 
the subject of ASB. This includes the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, 2003 Anti Social 
Behaviour Act and nationally led initiatives such as ‘Together’ and ‘Respect’. It also 
includes the policy statements and documents that were developed locally largely in 
response to these legislative changes (see Chapter Three, which discusses these two 
elements in more depth). Policy ‘actions’ both nationally and locally include measurable 
indicators such as the numbers of ASB actions that were issued, including Anti Social 
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Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs) (see the findings of this research in Chapters Five 
and Six).  
 
The Case Study Approach  
 
In general, then, the study takes an adaptive theoretical approach. It is not an objective of 
this study to offer empirical generalisations based upon a specific account of 
policymaking within one locality. Nor did this study seek to employ only quantitative or 
qualitative methodologies to the exclusion of the other. Instead the need to use a 
combination of data types was recognised. The study was primarily qualitative in its 
reliance upon interview and documentary data, but drew upon some secondary statistical 
evidence in order to provide a broader context to the research study, and also to guide the 
selection of the particular case study area.  
 
Yin (1984) has defined the case study research method as empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984, p. 23). All of these features apply to the 
current phenomenon under study. As discussed in Chapter Two, the important 
‘contemporary phenomenon’ of crime and disorder policymaking remains under-studied 
in an empirical sense, and in particular the importance of its contextual situation has not 
been made evident in many criminological studies. In general, case studies aim to offer a 
detailed analysis of the features of a particular case or example of a specific area of 
research. They seek to generate results that offer ‘a comprehensive understanding of the 
group under study’ (Becker 1992). Stake (1995) argues that the case study approach is 
‘concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question’ (cited in 
Bryman 2001, p. 47).  
 
The case study approach was the most appropriate research design given the nature of the 
aims and research questions of this particular study. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
limitations of the ‘grand narrative’ studies (such as that of Garland 2001) included the 
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tendency to adopt an overly broad level of generalisation (thus focusing attention on 
major global and national shifts), and a lack of empirical attention to the details of the 
policy process at the local level. This study was concerned to help address the gap 
highlighted by Tonry (2001) who called for more empirical studies of the policymaking 
process, particularly at the local level. Primarily qualitative case study research was 
clearly the most appropriate research design for such a study, as this would allow a 
sufficiently detailed examination of the local context of policymaking, and the ‘lived 
experiences’ of the key policy actors.  
 
The research aims and questions were not amenable to quantitative measurement of the 
type suggested by a positivist epistemological approach. It must be recognised that a case 
study approach cannot be grounds for empirical generalisation in that no single case can 
be ‘representative’ in a statistical sense of the spread of local level policies and practices 
in tackling ASB. As Yin has stated, the aim of case study research is not to make 
empirical generalisations, but rather to generalise to theory. “The crucial question is not 
whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but how well the researcher 
generates theory out of the findings” (Yin 2001, p. 51). In other words, case studies 
enable engagement in theoretical analysis, which can lead to new hypotheses about 
specific social settings. The approach can provide a rich and detailed account of the 
policymaking process in one locality that can be used to test some theoretical 
propositions about the influences over ASB policy, to shed light on a previously under-
explored area, and to give empirically based insights into the nature of the policymaking 
process. The findings can then be compared with other similar studies, including the 
work of writers such as Burney (2005) and Hughes (2007). Such an approach offers the 
possibility of giving some contextualised insights into the nature of the ASB 
policymaking process at the local level. In short, it can help us understand how and why 
things come to be the way they are.  
 
 
 
Unit of analysis 
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Given the nature of the responsibility for ASB policy in England and Wales as outlined in 
Chapter Three, the obvious unit of analysis for case study research was the local 
authority. It is unitary local authorities that have statutory responsibility as a lead 
authority under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (henceforth CDA), and formed the 
geographical locus for Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs). 
The next step was to consider the nature of the case study research design in terms of 
numbers of cases. Consideration was given to conducting a comparative study of two 
similarly sized local authority areas, including for example two or more local authority 
areas that would allow systematic comparison between the policy process in different 
types of local authority area, or between areas with varying approaches to tackling ASB 
(for example, including a range of authorities depending on levels of ASBO usage). 
However, for a number of reasons it was decided that the study should focus upon a 
single detailed case study. Conceptually, this is justified by the need for depth and detail 
rather than breadth for comparison. Given finite resources, inclusion of several case 
studies would inevitably have restricted the level of detail of empirical data collected in 
each. As the key aim of the current study was to undertake a detailed exploration of 
policy development at the local level, a narrower but more in-depth empirical 
examination was deemed more appropriate, which could be achieved through the use of 
what Bryman (2004, p. 51) calls ‘an exemplifying case’. The selection of this type of case 
study design is based upon its ability to provide answers to specific research questions, 
whilst also enabling the examination of key social processes. 
 
The next key step was to identify a local authority area to become the subject of the 
single exemplifying case study. The first stage of this was to assess accessible 
geographical locations. Given that the problems of ASB, and policy responses to these, 
have been most discussed in relation to urban areas (although clearly, such issues also 
affect rural areas), it was decided to focus on a City Council. Candidates for inclusion 
were considered using Home Office data for levels of ASBO usage by local authority 
area across England and Wales. Used in combination with Census data, this enabled the 
calculation of ASBO usage per 100,000 of the population. Whilst accepting the 
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limitations of case study research with regard to empirical generalisation, it was 
important to avoid ‘outlier’ areas for inclusion, in that some local authorities were well 
above average and others were well below. Whilst recognising the impossibility of 
finding a ‘typical’ local authority in this regard, it was sensible to examine an authority 
that fell into the ‘medium use’ category. A number of possibilities suggested themselves 
as candidates for inclusion in the study from this initial analysis of national ASBO 
statistics. The eventual choice was informed by some further conceptual and practical 
considerations. An initial examination of documentation relating to particular local 
authority areas narrowed the choice down to a number of medium use urban local 
authorities that appeared to be adopting a range of interventions to tackle ASB. Practical 
issues of ease of access, travel, and so on, were then considered in relation to the final 
selection. Given that the study was being carried out part-time these considerations were 
clearly significant, and it is important to be explicit about them. The eventual choice was 
Southern City4, a medium use ASBO authority in the Southern part of Britain, near to 
where I live and work. 
 
Time period  
 
This study attempted to provide a ‘history of the present’ (Garland 2001) of ASB policy 
in one city. It was decided to restrict the empirical focus to the period 1998-2007. This 
period was selected on the basis of the preliminary evaluation of documentary data and 
research literature in the field. The start of the period coincided with the election of the 
first New Labour government for whom tackling ASB was such a key focus of their 
policy agenda. The end point came in 2007, which was marked by the resignation of 
Tony Blair as Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party. It made sense to have a 
‘cut-off’ point here, because of the close personal association with Blair and the ASB 
agenda (although of course, policy developments have continued in this arena since his 
departure). 
 
Research Methods 
                                                 
4 This is a pseudonym 
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Case studies are noted for drawing upon multiple sources of evidence and using a range 
of specific methods. The methods of data collection for this study comprised of three 
distinct but related elements: collation of secondary documentary sources, a programme 
of semi-structured interviews with key policy actors, and a content analysis of local print 
media reports relating to ASB policy.  
 
Secondary analysis of local documents 
 
Whilst interviews, surveys and ethnographic observation remain the mainstay of much 
social research, documentary data provides an important focus for social analysis (Scott 
1990). As Wharton (2006, p.112) states: ‘the significance of the documents may be 
located in the historical circumstances of production, in their circulation and reception of 
the item and also the social functions, interpretations, effects and uses that may be 
associated with them’ (Wharton, C. In Jupp, V. 2005). There is now a substantial body of 
work on documentary analysis in social research, outlining how empirical studies of 
documents can enhance knowledge and understanding of ‘identity, the nature of mind, 
constructions of self, other and the world and the conceptualization of social action and 
interaction’ (Potter and Wetherell 1995, p. 81). Prior (2003) notes that documentary 
analysis can be an important and fruitful form of research in its own right, in that written 
documents not only reflect but work to shape and order knowledge, social groups, 
hierarchies and political power. Documents can also be a useful supplement to other 
sources of data, helping to provide an alternative lens against which to test, support or 
refute theoretical propositions. It was in this way, that documents were used in the current 
study. A substantial body of over 40 published documents were gathered. These included 
a range of strategy and policy protocol documents.  
 
Analysis of these documentary sources enabled a degree of triangulation to take place 
between the different types of evidence used in the case study. In this way, the accuracy 
and validity of the interview accounts of the participants involved in the fieldwork could 
also be tested. This reflects the view that triangulation is ‘a salient feature of research 
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methodology’ (Denzin 1970, p.20), in that all findings should be checked as far as 
possible from a range of angles. The purpose of analysing this material was primarily to 
address the research questions regarding what were the main policy developments, when 
did they happen, and who was involved? The documentary analysis therefore had several 
important objectives. The first of these was to provide an initial framework narrative of 
policy change over the time period upon which the study was focused; the second was to 
help map out the local ASB control policy ‘architecture’ in the form of local agencies and 
organisations, and the third was to inform the sampling of key policy actors at the local 
level for the interview element of the research. This data was also useful in providing an 
important basis of comparison with the accounts provided in the interviews. The 
approach to analysis will be discussed later in this chapter, but in brief the aim was not to 
undertake a detailed discourse analysis, which would have been focused upon exploring 
the production of meaning and construction of the social world via text. Rather, the 
nature of these primarily descriptive policy documents lent itself to a more modest form 
of qualitative ‘content analysis’ in order to provide a baseline against which to explore 
the interview narratives of policy change.   
 
The documents included for analysis were of varying types, but the rationale for selection 
was broadly that they provided some kind of evidence about policy development relating 
to ASB locally. Specific documents were tracked down using a combination of Internet 
and library searches, and from discussions with key policy actors at the local level. The 
documents fell into three main categories. The first category was published strategy 
documents, such as the local police force ‘policing plans’ and the Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Strategy Plans that covered the period of study. These documents included 
examples of both policy ‘talk’ and policy ‘decision’ (Pollitt 2001 – see Chapter Two). 
The documents included sections that were largely ‘aspirational’ in nature. For example, 
in one strategy document, there was the argument that the ASB strategy could be a means 
of ensuring that Southern City became ‘one of the safest cities in the United Kingdom’ 
(Community Safety Partnership Strategy 2002-2005). However, these documents also 
included details of concrete policy ‘decisions’ in the form of specific written policies that 
could be enforced in some way (Tregidga 2011). The second type of documentary 
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evidence included the formal minutes from meetings of local level agencies. These 
included relevant meetings of Southern City’s local authority at which issues of ASB 
were discussed, and also of the CRDP that covered the local authority area. The third 
category of documentary evidence included an extensive collection of 119 local media 
reports of ASB and related issues. These were drawn from the three key publications that 
between them cover the main parts of Southern City. Two of these are paid for sister 
publications, the Southern City Post and Southernshire Daily Press, and the third is a free 
weekly-distributed paper the Southern City Observer5. In the event, the media analysis 
did not reveal as much as had been hoped about the details of local policy processes, and 
thus is not included here. However, in a more general way, it provided a useful backdrop 
of information for the researcher and played an important, if minor, part of the process of 
familiarisation with the development of ASB policy – and the reporting thereof – in 
Southern City. 
 
Whilst the local documents were made up of largely qualitative material, they also 
included some useful statistical evidence to demonstrate the trajectory of particular 
features of ASB policy in Southern City. For example, they included local level statistics 
regarding the use of interventions such as ASBOs. It was anticipated that this data would 
support the identification of any particular patterns or trends to have emerged in the use 
of specific interventions. A complete list of the local level documents included in the 
research can be found at Appendix I.  
 
In addition to the local documentation, there were a number of key national level 
documents that, although not subject to detailed analysis, were important in setting the 
broader context of the study. For example, these influenced the initial selection of this 
sphere of policy development as a subject of research, and also helped inform the choice 
of the local authority area in which to carry out the case study. The most significant of 
these were the consultation papers Tackling Youth Crime (Home Office 1997f) and the 
White Paper Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti Social Behaviour 
(Home Office March 2003b). These led to the Government’s Action Plan and its 
                                                 
5 These are pseudonyms 
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enactment of the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act. The Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003 
was accompanied by the national ‘Together’ campaign. A range of documentation 
promoting the aims and objectives of ‘Together’ supported its launch. One of the 
participants in the fieldwork was able to provide copies of the associated promotional 
material, which outlined the campaign and the role of practitioners in its delivery. In 2005 
it was followed by the launch of the Government’s ‘Respect’ programme (see Chapter 
Three). As with ‘Together’, this later national programme was supported by promotional 
material that also provided a useful source of documentary evidence for the study.  
  
Semi-structured interviews 
 
A key element of the research evidence was the data gathered from a series of semi-
structured interviews with key policy actors who could offer an informed view of the 
recent history (and current operation) of ASB policy in Southern City. Interviews are one 
of the main tools used by qualitative researchers as a means of better understanding 
individuals or groups (May 2001). The interview can take a number of forms, varying by 
the level of structure. The more structured style of interview relies upon a researcher 
asking each interviewee a relatively tightly defined set of standard questions. These 
questions are often ‘closed’, in that there is little or no deviation or room for development 
of response by the interviewee. At the other end of the scale, the unstructured interview is 
more of an open-ended conversation, where there is little in the way of pre-defined 
questions. Rather, the interviewer may guide in a very general way the interviewee to 
certain areas of interest so as to ensure that nothing is missed. In these kinds of 
interviews, the interviewee has a considerable degree of freedom to set the course of the 
interview. Each approach has its advantages and limitations.  
 
The highly structured interview with a series of closed questions scores high in terms of 
standardisation and the degree of comparability between cases. It also has the practical 
advantage of being relatively easy to administer (usually according to a pre-set 
questionnaire), and being much easier to manage in terms of the time that the interview 
will take. However, the highly structured approach can also be too narrow, imposing the 
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pre-set ideas of the researcher upon the interviewees’ responses, giving little freedom to 
probe or develop issues in more detail, and restricting the data to rather descriptive and 
shallow ‘factual’ details. On the other hand, the unstructured interview in principle allows 
for an in-depth exploration of particular issues, facilitating the collation of rich and 
detailed data and allowing the interviewee more space and time to articulate the meanings 
and interpretations that they have of the particular area of social life under investigation. 
The interviewer is able to probe and explore answers in more depth, allowing them to go 
deep ‘beneath the surface’ of the more superficial accounts that would be elicited by 
highly structured approaches (Jupp, Davies, Francis 2000, p.61). However, unstructured 
interviews have their limitations. They risk roaming far away from the central topics of 
interest to the research, and each interview can be so different from the other that there is 
little in the way of comparability between cases. In practical terms, highly unstructured 
interviews require an open-ended approach to timing. Truly unstructured interviews can 
take several hours, for example. In a study of this kind, which required dealing with busy 
senior professionals, it was completely impractical (indeed, unethical) to expect 
interviewees to give up this amount of time. The interviews needed a degree of focus, and 
a certain level of comparability between cases.  
 
The current study, therefore, utilised a semi-structured interview approach whereby 
interviews followed a broad ‘topic guide’ (see Appendix II) which was adapted for use 
with particular professional groups. This allowed a degree of deviation and development 
of particular issues, avoided an overly prescriptive approach, but at the same time kept 
interviews focused on the core issues of the study (and importantly, carried out within the 
limited time available to senior professionals and practitioners).  A key advantage of this 
style of interview is that it allows the interviewer to retain a degree of control of the 
process. While semi-structured interviews facilitate the interviewer to be reactive to the 
answers given, and probe for further details when necessary, they also enable the 
participant to actively engage in a dialogue with the interviewer (May 2001). The 
interviewees can speak at length about specific areas of interest, and use language and 
terminology that they commonly employ.  All of this can assist in making participants 
feel more comfortable in the research setting (Jupp et al. 2000). The main criticism of 
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semi-structured interviews is that they can lead to a large amount of material being 
gathered, which can mean that the subsequent analytical process becomes cumbersome: 
‘Semi structured interviews allow a lot of information to be collected from a few people’ 
(Jupp, Davies, Francis 2000, p. 56). 
 
Sampling 
 
The sampling strategy followed the non-random approach of ‘theoretical sampling’ 
(Bryman 2008). This is a type of non-probability sampling that is mainly used in relation 
to grounded theory, whereby theoretical considerations are used to guide the 
identification of respondents who are relevant to the area of study but also include a 
range of viewpoints (Bryman 2008, p.23). Put more simply this is a form of sampling that 
begins with the interviewer having a clear purpose, which informs participant selection. 
The sampling rationale for this current study was informed by the general aim of 
speaking with key policy actors who, by dint of their current or previous position in the 
policymaking system, would be able to provide informed accounts of their experiences of 
the development of ASB policies in Southern City. This involved the identification of 
suitable individuals via the analysis of the documents that had been gathered, as outlined 
above, and via further research on the Internet (including the websites of the City Council 
and the police force whose area included Southern City). In addition, a snowballing 
technique was deployed whereby initial interviewees were asked whether they could 
recommend other people who could provide an account of developments in Southern 
City. This is a widely used approach to sampling that relies upon initial interviewees 
suggesting other suitable participants (Jupp et al. 2000). The full sample characteristics 
are outlined in Table One. This involved a broad range of local level practitioners from 
the case study city, representing the key sectors that had involvement in the local ASB 
agenda. At the same time, it is also acknowledged that in terms of the methods adopted in 
relation to this study, there was also consideration given to undertaking fieldwork 
observation of practitioners as opposed to merely interviewing them. However, even 
though this could have potentially provided a more in-depth and ‘lived’ account of key 
elements of the policymaking process, it may not have allowed such a citywide 
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understanding of the local ASB agenda to be gained, owing to the range of participants 
that were subsequently involved in the fieldwork.  
 
Initially in keeping with their senior occupational status, a formal approach was made to 
all interviewees via letter. This outlined the aims and methods of the study, and 
assurances of confidentiality and anonymity were given (a copy of a sample access letter 
is included at Appendix III). The use of snowball sampling proved to be a successful 
strategy in connection with the selection process for the interviews. At the same time, 
limitations of snowball sampling are that it can raise issues of ‘typicality, bias and 
representativeness’ (Tombs 2000, p. 88). There was a risk that participants would suggest 
like-minded policy actors, who were likely to offer a similar stance on this issue. In order 
to get beyond the ‘official story’, further interview candidates were identified who were 
outside of the core policy process in Southern City, using a number of contacts (including 
personal contacts within the School of Social Sciences). In addition, a number of 
interviewees participated in ‘follow up’ interviews at a later stage of the fieldwork, which 
allowed further probing and exploration of the policy process locally. The early stages of 
the fieldwork involved interviews with the core agencies concerned with ASB locally, 
including the police, the local ASB coordinator, and other local authority personnel with 
an interest in the area including representatives from housing, social services, education 
and also the local youth offending team. The later stages of the fieldwork also included 
interviews with a broader range of policy actors from a range of organisations and 
agencies with potential influence over ASB policy. These incorporated participants from 
community groups, the voluntary sector and local politics, both within the local authority 
and citywide. Practitioners from the Southern City CDRP Executive Board were also 
interviewed, including representatives from the various local authority based delivery 
groups that specialise in ASB, and those involved with young people. Interviews were 
also carried out with senior journalists in the local media concerned with reporting 
developments relating to crime and ASB.  
 
In total, 30 participants were interviewed, and this provided a rich source of qualitative 
accounts, from various different standpoints, of the ways in which policy developed 
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locally, the perceived key influences over these policies, and the nature of the 
relationships between the main policy actors. The interviews sought critical feedback 
from participants as to the ways in which policy had been formulated and implemented 
locally.  
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Table One:  Sample Characteristics 
 
Interview 
Ref 
 
Candidate/Organisation 
 
001 Southern City Local Authority – Dedicated anti social behaviour team manager  
002 
A&B 
Southernshire Constabulary – Coordinator based in the dedicated anti social behaviour team 
003 Southernshire Constabulary – Sector assistant 
004 Regional Government Office – Secondee from Legal Services - Regional criminal defence service 
manager  
005 Southernshire Constabulary - Community Safety Inspector, leader of the dedicated anti social 
behaviour team and the police lead for Southern City on anti social behaviour 
005R Southernshire Constabulary - Community Safety Inspector, leader of the dedicated anti social 
behaviour team and the police lead for Southern City on anti social behaviour (this was a revisit 
interview) 
006 Southern City Local Authority – Anti social behaviour coordinator based within the dedicated team 
007 Local councillor for Southern City and member of the local Southernshire Constabulary Police 
Authority  
008 Chair of Southernshire Local Authority’s anti social behaviour delivery group  
008R Former chair of Southernshire Local Authority’s anti social behaviour delivery group – Had since 
become the acting director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services 
009 Southern City Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership – Two representatives - the anti social 
behaviour project manager and the Crime Reduction Manager who was also the team lead 
010 Southern City Local Authority – The new dedicated anti social behaviour team manager 
010R Southern City Local Authority – The new dedicated anti social behaviour team manager (this was a 
revisit interview). 
011 Regional Government Office – Anti social behaviour policy lead for the region 
012 Chair of Safer Southern City (CDRP) and member of the local strategic partnership 
013 Southern City Local Authority - Programme Director for Partnerships and Localities 
014 Deputy Editor of Southern City Post 
015 Safer Southern City (CDRP) - Assistant Community Safety Officer 
016 Process coordinator for Community at Heart – Part of the New Deal for Communities Programme 
017 Safer Southern City (CDRP) – Project Manager with the remit for anti social behaviour and hate crime 
018 Young Southern City - Manager of Young Southern City’s Volunteering Projects  
019 Southern City local Labour MP  
020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager 
021 Southern City local Liberal Democrat MP 
022 Southern City qualified youth worker  
023 Youth worker from Southern City college 
024 Southernshire Constabulary – Former Chief Superintendent, responsible for the Basic Command Unit 
that covered central Southern City 
025 Service Director of Safer Southern City (CDRP) 
026 Regional Government Office  - Advisor from the Drug Prevention Advisory Service 
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Undertaking elite interviews in practice 
 
The interviews were all with relatively senior professionals and policymakers, and can 
therefore be considered ‘elite interviews’, requiring special consideration relating to their 
specific nature. Elite interviews offer a particular set of advantages to this kind of 
research. In particular, they potentially facilitate an account of policymaking straight 
‘from the horse’s mouth’. In other words, they offer the chance to gather a kind of data 
that is unavailable elsewhere, and the opportunity to ‘get behind’ the documentary 
accounts (Richards 1996). Such interviews often require a careful negotiation of access, 
assurance of confidentiality and building up of trust with the respondents, as was outlined 
above. They also require careful attention to be paid to the busy schedules of the 
interviewees, and the need to respect the pressures upon their time (Lilleker 2003). The 
interviews were an ongoing process carried out across the period of 2005 to 2009. They 
all lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, and were digitally recorded and transcribed with 
the explicit permission of the interviewees. They all took place at the convenience of the 
interviewee, usually in their place of work.  
 
The status of the interviewer in this setting was that of an independent academic 
researcher. This was owing to there being no previous associations with any of the 
selected interviewees, as there are no links between the research area and my full time 
occupation. This status provided both advantages and disadvantages in relation to the 
interviews. The role of ‘outsider’ in some ways helped, in that respondents did not 
assume prior knowledge and explained in full the details of their roles and gave what 
appeared to be full accounts of their involvement in and impressions of policy change. In 
addition, it did appear that the role of ‘interested layperson’ in many cases put the 
interviewee at ease, and to feel able to provide candid accounts of what, to an ‘insider’, 
would have sometimes been contested and locally controversial issues. Against this, there 
were also disadvantages of being an ‘outsider’, in that somebody with direct experience 
of working in the field of ASB policy would arguably have brought to the study a greater 
level of prior insight and understanding of the organisational cultures and micro-politics 
in the agencies and organisations that formed the focus of this research. In order to 
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mitigate this limitation, the extensive reading of the academic and policy literature 
relating to ASB discussed in Chapter Two was helpful, as was the analysis of local policy 
documents discussed below.  
 
In terms of subject matter, the interviews followed, as far as possible, the model topic 
guide presented in Appendix II. Earlier interviews with core members of the local 
agencies concerned with ASB policy enabled an initial mapping out of the key 
dimensions of ASB policy locally, and the relationships between the main partner 
agencies. A number of these interviewees were later interviewed again, in order to 
develop themes touched upon in the initial interviews, and probe further beneath the 
‘official story’ of local policy development.  The interviews included the use of both 
explanatory probes and focused probes, which ask the participant to provide specific 
examples of their experience. They can also be used when seeking clarification about a 
particular discussion point. During several of the interviews the basic probe was also 
used. The purpose of these is to enable the interviewer to repeat specific questions to 
ensure that the interview remains focused (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, p. 93). All 
participants were encouraged to be reflective when responding to questions. For those 
who had been in post for a significant portion of the timescale, they were able to evaluate 
their role in this process. However, for those who had perhaps moved into their role 
nearer to the end of this period it could at times prove limiting, and people had to rely on 
indirect experiences.  
 
Clearly, it was not possible to access representation from all areas of policymaking via 
retrospective interviews. Given the limitations of time and resources, there were 
inevitable constraints in the range of viewpoints accessed. However, a substantial amount 
of detailed information was gathered, from as wide a range of potential policy actors as 
was possible. As will be covered in the next two chapters, the data was more than 
sufficient to address the core research questions. For the most part, the response to the 
research of key policy actors was a positive one, and participants were open and 
welcoming. During the later parts of the fieldwork, the participants who were approached 
for a ‘follow-up’ interview were quick to respond to written requests. Their willingness to 
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engage in this process was probably assisted by their familiarity both with the interviewer 
and their area of study.  
  
Validity and reliability 
 
Validity means that research instruments actually measure what they are supposed to 
measure. In general terms, reliability means that similar results would be found over time. 
One of the main potential limitations of interviews of the kind described above – that 
attempt to gain participants’ own accounts of policy developments – concern factual 
recall and lack of objectivity (Seldon 1996), which can impact negatively on both validity 
and reliability. In other words, interview data would not be valid if, whether intentionally 
or not, they did provide an accurate account of what actually happened. Such data could 
not be seen as reliable if a significantly different account was likely to arise should the 
same questions be asked at another time. Other studies have addressed the same 
difficulties in assessing interview data (Davies 2001; Jones and Newburn 2007; Tregidga 
2011). It is inevitable, when asking respondents to recount their views of developments 
that took place some years previously, that the recall will not be total. In addition, when 
discussing an area that is characterised by a high level of political contestation, or when 
there are relationships of professional competiveness, the accounts of individual 
respondents will be coloured, perhaps sub-consciously, by their own professional or 
political interests. Such limitations on validity and reliability cannot be designed out of 
research such as this. Clearly, these issues needed to be taken into account when 
assessing and ordering the interview data provided by participants in the policy process, 
including difficulties with accurate recall years after the events under consideration.  
 
The way to address these problems would be to conduct research that observed the 
emergence of particular policies ‘as they happened’. This was the approach of the leading 
criminologist, Paul Rock, in his detailed analysis of the development of victim policy in 
the UK. Rock studied the policymaking process as it unfolded from a vantage point 
within the Home Office, or in his words, ‘in situ’ (Rock 2004). It would have been 
hugely beneficial to the current study to observe policy in the process of being made, for 
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example by attending key meetings within the City Council and CDRP where key 
decisions were being taken. However, in practice, this approach was not possible for the 
current research. It was deliberately designed as a primarily retrospective study of the 
recent past. Simultaneous observation of policy development would have required a level 
of access and resources that were not available to a part-time PhD researcher. 
Nevertheless, unlike the study of Jones and Newburn (2007), the timescale of the current 
study did provide some limited overlap between the fieldwork and substantive 
developments in the policy area under consideration. Although the extensive ‘insider’ 
access of Rock was not available in this study, some of the interviews did cover, in part, 
some current developments.  
 
However, the problems identified above were still faced by many of the interviews that 
were conducted. Their impacts were addressed by a careful crosschecking of accounts 
given by policy actors placed at different points in the policy process, and against the 
narratives provided by documentary evidence (following Jones and Newburn 2007). 
There were no obvious examples within the interviews of any attempts to deliberately 
mislead or indeed any glaring examples of errors of memory (in terms of what happened 
and when). The main issue encountered during the interviews was a tendency – perhaps 
to be expected – on the part of some key actors to present a celebratory account of the 
successes of policy development in Southern City, which required a degree of critical 
distance (and again cross-checking with other interview and documentary accounts) in 
the process of analysis and interpretation of the data.  
 
Data analysis 
 
Secondary analysis of documents 
 
As noted earlier, the aim of the documentary analysis was a relatively modest (but 
important) one of providing a detailed documentary narrative of what happened and when 
(and who was involved) with regard to the development of ASB policy in Southern City. 
It was not the intention, therefore, to undertake ‘discourse analysis’ of the documentary 
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sources in order to interrogate in depth the role of textual details in constructing 
‘meaning’ in the realm of ASB policy. Rather, the aim was to undertake a more basic 
qualitative ‘content analysis’ that would help provide a documentary overview of the 
content and timing of formal ‘policy decisions’, which would inform the approach to 
sampling interviewees locally, and at the same time would provide the basis for detailed 
cross-checking with interviewees’ accounts.  
 
Two levels of analysis were applied to the secondary documents. First, in relation to the 
national level policy documents, the analysis was somewhat rudimentary, being focused 
primarily on identifying very broad themes within them as a means of setting the context 
for the local study. Second, the local level policy documents were subjected to a more 
rigorous level of analysis, because they were to form an important source of empirical 
data in their own right. This followed a form of ‘directed content analysis’ via which a set 
of codes are derived from existing bodies of research or theory, and then applied to the 
documents (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Analysis of the body of literature on ASB, and in 
particular previous studies of crime policy development in the UK, had helped inform the 
search for particular key ‘themes’. Several key documents were selected, and these were 
subjected to a systematic analysis, which involved a number of stages. Following a 
general reading through all the documents, they then underwent a process of manual 
annotation and highlighting of key themes in terms of what was the actual content of 
local policy, what happened and when, and which key agencies were involved. This 
material was then summarised on thematic grids, in order to be cross-referenced with the 
interview accounts. Key quotations from the documents were highlighted throughout, and 
referenced in the thematic grids. 
 
Analysing the interview data  
 
The analysis of the interview data can be viewed as taken on a number of stages. 
Although the most intensive element of the analysis came after the fieldwork, in a 
broader sense analysis was ongoing throughout. This is because, the secondary analysis 
of documents informed the choices of interview candidates, and notes and transcripts 
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from each interview were read and assessed as the study progressed, in order to build up 
a fuller picture of policy developments and to identify further potential interviewees. 
However, the most intensive period of analysis came at the end of the fieldwork.  
 
The first stage of this analysis was in the full transcription of all interview data, which I 
undertook myself. This allowed me to become deeply familiar with the data and to begin 
to distil themes and sub-themes within them. The second stage was to carefully read 
through each transcript, several times, highlighting relevant pieces of narrative and 
annotating the hard copies with notes that indicated potential themes within the data. This 
involved the application of standard qualitative analysis techniques (Coffey and Atkinson 
1996), which meant identifying, extracting, coding and systematically plotting the 
relevant material against a number of themes and sub themes. These codes were informed 
by, but not restricted to, themes that had been identified during the literature review. 
They were also influenced by the key research questions that the fieldwork had set out to 
explore. Key quotes in the text were highlighted on the hard copy of the transcripts and 
numbered. The next stage was to construct a set of thematic grids, focused on the core 
themes (and within them, sub-themes) identified at the previous stage. These themes 
formed the horizontal axis of the grids (the columns) and each interview case formed the 
vertical axis (rows). Summary information from the interviews was then manually 
recorded in the relevant cells of the thematic grids. The result was that a detailed 
summary overview of the core themes and sub-themes within the data was available for 
the next stage of the analysis. This stage involved a critical assessment of the thematic 
grids, noting patterns within and between cases, and allowing a much more systematic 
comparison of the key elements of narratives of policy development (as provided by the 
policy actors), than would have been available by individual analysis of transcripts.  
 
Consideration was given to the use of computer software programmes for qualitative 
analysis, such as Atlas or Nvivo. Such programmes can be useful for storing and 
managing large quantities of qualitative data, and can be seen as a more efficient method 
for searching and retrieving coded elements of data (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
However, it is important to note that such programmes cannot undertake the analysis 
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themselves, and there is a danger in assuming too much for such technologies (Fielding 
1993). For some time, leading qualitative researchers have cautioned against a tendency 
to see computer aided analysis packages as a substitute for the intellectual work of 
thematic analysis (Coffey et al. 1996). It is perfectly possible to be systematic in the 
analysis of qualitative data without resorting to computer technology, and adopting a 
manual ‘thematic grids’ approach is one way of doing this (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). 
Whilst computer software may have speeded up this process, and provided a helpful way 
of storing and managing the data, a considerable time investment would have been 
needed in order to train and become familiar with using the programmes. As a part time 
PhD student, I was extremely limited in the amount of formal research methods training 
that I could undertake, and was unable to pursue the School of Social Sciences Diploma 
in Social Research Methods (which includes sessions on using qualitative analysis 
software). I therefore decided that, given the points made about the limitations of 
computer software, it would be probably less time-consuming to undertake a systematic 
manual thematic analysis. 
 
Research Ethics 
 
Ethics are defined as a set of standards by which a group regulates its behaviour, lays 
down what is and is not morally acceptable in pursuit of its aims. Discussions about 
research ethics tend to be clearer in discussions about natural sciences (e.g. medical 
ethics, debates about cloning, euthanasia, animal experiments etc), but social science also 
has impacts upon a range of actors (participants, sponsors, colleagues, other researchers, 
other groups in society, and we need to think about this when we are designing, 
conducting and disseminating research). It is important to remember that ethical matters 
are not just a ‘bolt-on’ to be included in methods chapters, but are important issues that 
need thinking about throughout the research process. The current study was undertaken in 
accordance with the ethical guidelines laid down by the British Society of Criminology, 
with the general aim that the research would at no point harm the interests of any of the 
participants (British Society of Criminology 2006). The key ethical issues raised by this 
study were informed consent and confidentiality. 
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Informed consent 
 
This requires the researcher not only to obtain agreement for the research, but also to 
ensure (as far as possible) that this agreement is fully informed. In accordance with this, 
all research participants were provided with full information about what the study was 
about, what its aims were, how the data they provided would be used, and how the 
findings would be made available. In addition, all were informed of their right to 
withdraw from the study at any point. This information was provided initially, in broad 
form, in the original access letter, and before any recorded interview began, each 
participant was given a fuller verbal explanation of the aims and methods of the research, 
and provided with the opportunity to ask questions. All participants who reached this 
stage stated that they were satisfied with this and that they understood what had been 
relayed to them, and none asked to withdraw from the study. I was therefore confident 
that all participants were fully informed about the purposes, output and audience for the 
research. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
This is another key element of the ethical approach to research, and this study followed 
standard practices to disguise the links between the research data and any identifiable 
individual or organisation. The privacy of all people and organisations that participated in 
the study was respected. Care was taken, in the writing of the findings chapters, to ensure 
that individuals were not identified, and are not identifiable. All interview transcripts 
were listed according to a number (rather than a name), and an identification list for the 
codes (by professional function and not name), was kept separately. All documentation 
and transcripts relating to the study were stored securely, and the data will be destroyed 
after a period following the study, as is now standard ethical practice in the social 
sciences. As can be seen in the following two chapters, standard social science techniques 
were used to disguise the identities of interviewees or other participants. Pseudonyms 
were used for the city that formed the unit of analysis for the case study, and for the local 
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police force, and care was taken to ensure the removal of all identifiers (such as using 
‘she’ to describe a respondent who is the only woman in a group). 
 
Impartiality 
 
Total objectivity is, of course, impossible to achieve. But in accordance with ethical 
principles at all times I tried as far as possible to be objective in my analysis and 
reporting, and be aware of my own tendencies to partiality and bias. Whilst this issue 
usually applies itself particularly to funded research (when the funder may try to 
encourage the researcher to lend scientific credibility to a partisan viewpoint) it is still 
important to be aware of it in unfunded research such as this.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the aims of this research is to contribute to our knowledge and understanding of 
the nature of the policymaking process in crime control. Unlike broader sociological 
treatments of general shifts in crime control policy, the study has a narrower empirical 
focus. The methods it adopted reflected this, and were appropriate to the particular 
research aims and questions. This chapter has outlined and justified the use of a single 
case study to provide contextualized insights into the nature of local policymaking, 
including a combination of documentary and interview analysis. The subsequent two 
chapters will now outline the main themes that emerged from the data analysis. Chapter 
Five will address the ‘who’ and ‘what’ questions (who were the key players in local 
policymaking and what kind of policies were developed locally?), and Chapter Six will 
focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (how and why did policy develop the way that it 
did?). 
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Chapter Five: The emerging ASB control infrastructure in Southern City 
 
Introduction 
 
In the chapters that follow a detailed account is offered of the historical trajectory of ASB 
policy and practice in Southern City, drawing on the conceptual insights of the theoretical 
and empirical literature discussed in chapters 2 and 3. In so doing particular attention will 
be given to the complex relationship between national, local and regional actors and their 
governmental resources.  It will be argued that the story which unfolds is neither that of a 
narrative purely ‘top-down’, national level determinants of policy and practice smoothly 
unfolding in Southern City nor one suggesting the dominance of local politics, capacities 
and actors. Rather, the argument which emerges in the following chapters is that national 
actors and their agendas are vital in providing a crucial set of parameters and policy 
framework within and against which local actors work and develop their practices and 
local agendas.  In turn such local actors and their networks also have space to challenge, 
negotiate and at times recast national, top-down ‘commands’.  In brief local ‘geo-
historical’ contexts matter in the social scientific study of national policy process 
(Edwards and Hughes, 2005). 
 
The main aim of this specific chapter is to outline the emergence of the key features of 
anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy in Southern City during the period of the 
study. Specifically, it seeks to address the following research questions: 
 
· Who (in terms of individuals and organisations) were the main policy actors 
involved in the process of policy change in Southern City? 
· What were the key developments in Southern City? 
· When did these developments occur (in relation to developments at the national 
level)? 
 
The chapter is divided into two main sections, both of which draw upon interviews, 
documentary data, and official statistics to provide a narrative of policy change in 
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Southern City and are focused on the questions listed above. The first section aims to 
identify the key institutions and individuals involved in the policy process that saw the 
emergence of an ASB control infrastructure in Southern City, thus addressing the first 
research question. The second section focuses on the second and third research questions, 
drawing out from the data the key policy changes that occurred locally and when they 
happened. The concluding section provides a brief overview of the main themes of the 
chapter and considers the theoretical propositions (TPs) set out in earlier chapters in the 
light of the empirical evidence discussed here. 
 
Key ASB policy actors in Southern City 
 
Local authority officials 
 
As will become clear from the analysis below, local authority officers in Southern City 
Council played a key role as local, ‘socially situated problem-solvers’ (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2008, Garland, 2001) in developing ASB control policy locally. The local 
authority is a large organisation, and included a range of departments that, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, were not always united in their views and approaches 
on ASB. For current purposes, however, we aim to simply set out the identities and main 
institutional responsibilities of some of the key players. Perhaps the first local authority 
department to consider is the Housing Department. This department was responsible for 
developing a local housing strategy, for managing the authority’s council housing stock, 
and promoting policies locally on affordable housing. It was in the field of housing that 
concerns about disorderly or ‘nuisance’ behaviour by council tenants – and legal 
responses to such behaviour – first emerged, prior to the passing of the 1998 Crime and 
Disorder Act (henceforth CDA) (see Burney 2005, Flint 2009). The Housing Department 
in Southern City was under the direction of a Director of Neighbourhood and Housing 
Services, and played an important role in the development of ASB policy locally. The 
local authority established an Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU) in July 
2004. This consisted of six ASB caseworkers, which were given responsibility for 
specific geographical remits across the city. Underlying the philosophy of this team was 
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the key principles of the Government’s ‘Together’ campaign, which promoted 
partnership working in an effort to solve problems of low level disorder. As a result, this 
team continued to work closely alongside the police based ASB team, partners from other 
agencies and also housing officers, in an effort to ‘resolve anti-social behaviour swiftly, 
effectively and with tangible benefits to the community that has suffered’ (Southern City 
Local Authority ‘Together’ promotional material 2005, p. 6). In cooperating in this 
manner, practitioners from both of these key agencies were able to support one another in 
utilising a range of ASB measures, which included not just Anti Social Behaviour Orders 
(henceforth ASBOs) but also dispersal orders and crackhouse closures. 
 
In addition to a dedicated ASB team within the city’s local authority, there were also a 
number of other distinct players within this organisation who across the timescale of this 
research helped to support the tackling of ASB issues in Southern City. These included 
the youth section of the local authority, coordinated by Children and Young Peoples 
Services. Their role in tackling ASB grew across the period of interest, with the national 
agenda regarding this issue having been moved under their remit in more recent times, 
despite close links having been identified at an early stage between ASB and young 
people. In Southern City, the Children and Young People’s Partnership was established in 
2006, and included representatives from Southernshire Constabulary and the Police 
Authority, Education, local businesses and the community (Southern City Local 
Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). As with other 
elements of the local level ASB framework, this collective formed one of five delivery 
groups that reported to the city’s Local Strategic Partnership. The main focus of the 
Service was to achieve the key deliverables of the ‘Every Child Matters’ programme 
(Southern City Partnership Online 2011).  
 
Another key aspect of Southern City’s local authority in terms of tackling ASB was the 
Social Services department. They were often a feature of the city’s case conference 
structure if appropriate. The Social Services were classed as being amongst the city’s 
support agencies, along with the mental health arm of this department. Both of these also 
had several bolt on organisations that worked alongside them. The Social Services 
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structure extended to four area offices across Southern City staffed by a total of 16 social 
work teams. The work of this department was also supported by the local authority’s 
ASB team, which incorporated staff working on the city’s Family Support Project. The 
aim of this was to tackle some of the city’s most chaotic families. Two social workers 
were also located in the Neighbourhood and Housing Services department with the ASB 
team, whose role was to work with young people at risk of homelessness (Southern City 
Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). 
 
There was also a significant number of ‘Looked After Children’ in Southern City, as at 
2010 this totalled 655, consisting of a mixture of children under five, children of school 
age and post 16 year olds (Southern City Local Authority, Children and Young Peoples 
Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). As part of this, the local authority used a ‘virtual school’ 
structure in an effort to support this group of children in their educational attainment and 
to improve their rates of progress academically (Southern City Local Authority, Children 
and Young Peoples Plan Refresh 2010-11, p. 5). This demonstrated the significance of 
the Education Services, and their potential role in helping to address problems of ASB in 
Southern City. As with Social Services, Education were also deemed to have been one of 
the key agencies that needed to be represented in a case conference setting, particularly in 
those cases that involved young people.   
 
In an effort to prevent both criminal offending, and as a further means of tackling ASB in 
relation to young people, Southern City’s youth offending team also developed its own 
partnership working and were involved in initiatives such as the Youth Inclusion 
Programme, the aim of which was the positive engagement of young people in their local 
communities (see the similar findings of Hughes and Follett, 2006, in the South 
Midlands). An integral part of the programme was the creation of Youth Inclusion Panels 
(YIPs), which were initially established in 2000, by the Youth Justice Board. The Board 
also supported the funding of these Panels via a system of Youth Offending Team 
prevention grants (Southern City Local Authority Online). These Panels targeted those 
young people who were identified as being at risk of offending by other key partnership 
agencies, including ASB teams and local education authorities. Through positive 
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engagement strategies such as the provision of education and careers guidance to these 
young people it was anticipated that the workers that supported these panels would be 
able to change young people’s perceptions of crime and ASB (Southern City Local 
Authority Online). In Southern City the programme also initially established Youth 
Inclusion and Support Panels (YISPs) in some of the city’s priority areas. In contrast to 
the YIPs, the aim of the YISP was to bring together the relevant support agencies in an 
effort to provide support to ‘at risk’ young people. In 2008 the Children and Young 
People’s Services Department of Southern City recommissioned YISPs into locality 
panels. As part of this process the previous ASB and crime focus of the initial YISPs was 
removed, as these locality panels performed a somewhat ‘generic early intervention role’ 
(Southern City Local Authority Care and Safer Communities Scrutiny Commission 
minutes 18th November 2008, p. 7).  
 
Southern City Council: Elected members 
The local authority officials were all ultimately responsible to elected members of the 
local City Council. Southern City Council is a unitary authority covering a population of 
441,000 people and an area of 110 square kilometres. The recent tradition of political 
representation in the city has been left of centre, with either the Labour Party or the 
Liberal Democrats dominating local elections in the past two decades. The city has a 
tradition of local activism, with environmental issues and sustainable transport having 
received considerable political attention locally. The city is divided into 35 wards, each 
electing two councillors for a four-year term. The full council consists of 70 councillors, 
and has ultimate responsibility for establishing the decision making process and 
approving the Council’s budget and policy framework. The full council elects a leader 
and seven executive councillors. Together these executives form the cabinet, which is 
responsible for most day-to-day decisions. For many years, the Labour Party were the 
dominant power in the local City Council, but during the current study, the Liberal 
Democrats took minority control of the Council between the 2005 and 2007 elections. 
After the 2007 elections, the Labour, Conservative and Green parties came together to 
remove the Liberal Democrats from power, and replace them with a minority Labour 
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administration. In February 2009 the minority Labour administration resigned following 
a defeat over a contentious local plan for a waste incinerator, and the Liberal Democrats 
regained control of the Council. 
The most relevant committees for the purposes of this research were the ASB select 
committee of the local authority. The committee was established in 2004, following the 
identification of ASB as a key priority issue to be addressed by committees of this nature 
by the council’s Overview and Scrutiny Management Committee. As a result, the 
‘reduction of anti-social behaviour was seen as a matter of keen public interest and high 
priority for scrutiny, in the context of current local and national activity’ (Southern City 
Local Authority, ASB Select Committee minutes March 2005b). The ASB committee 
had a number of key aims, but its main outcome was to scrutinize Southern City’s 
overarching ASB strategy. The City Council were also represented on the Police 
Authority for the provincial police force in which Southern City was the largest urban 
area, and could thus in theory exert influence over Southernshire Constabulary force 
policy via this body. The Police Authority consisted of eight elected councillors from the 
local authority areas covered by the force, and seven appointed ‘independent’ members. 
Two of the councillor members were from Southern City Council. It is the responsibility 
of this independent body to set the strategic direction of the local force, whilst also being 
able to hold the Chief Constable of Southernshire Constabulary accountable on behalf of 
local community residents (Southern City Police Authority Online 2011).  
 
Regional Government Office 
 
Nine Regional Government Offices (henceforth RGOs) were established in England in 
1994 by the then Conservative Government. Until they were abolished in 2011, they were 
supposedly the means of delivering a range of UK government policies in the regions of 
England. It is also important to note that there is a dearth of sustained research on the 
activities and impacts of RGOs from their inception to abolition (see Hughes, 2007). The 
RGOs represented 12 central government departments, and had responsibilities in 
community regeneration, crime and disorder reduction, tackling housing needs, 
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improving public health, raising standards in education and training, dealing with 
countryside issues, and reducing unemployment. The structure of the RGO that covered 
Southern City included a number of geographical area teams and also several specialist 
teams responsible for dealing with specific themes, including ASB. However, this was 
only a small team consisting of a theme leader, technical support and an interface with 
the geographical area teams. The aim of these geographical teams was to act as a conduit 
between the RGO and community safety partnerships, in addition to a range of ASB 
coordinators (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB Specialist Team). Despite this 
relatively small number of resources, this did not prevent this particular RGO from 
having become a forerunner in the creation of an ASB forum. The aim of this was to 
bring together practitioners from a range of agencies across the area for which the RGO 
had responsibility, in an effort to exchange best practice in the tackling of ASB. ‘[T]he 
main direction of communication tended to be out to the region through the policy leads 
in the partnerships. And what we all tended to do was have regional forums’ (Interview 
026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service). These were further supported by RGO 
attendance at external partnership meetings. 
     
Southernshire Constabulary 
 
The Southernshire Constabulary force area covers 1,855 square miles and has a 
population of 1.6 million people in 630,000 households. At the time of the study, the 
force employed about 6000 staff, of whom about 3400 were police officers, and Southern 
City was the largest urban area within it. The City is policed by the Southern City ‘Basic 
Command Unit’ of the force, which corresponds with the local authority boundaries. 
During the period of the study, this BCU employed over 900 police officers and 170 
civilian staff, and was divided into seven ‘neighbourhood areas’ for the purposes of local 
policing (Southernshire Constabulary Online, 2011).   
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Youth groups 
 
The Young Southern City organisation, which is staffed by a small team of development 
workers, seeks to work with young people from across the city in an effort to positively 
engage them. In doing so, they promote the use of a range of diversionary activities as a 
means of diverting young people away from committing crime and acts of ASB. Young 
Southern City supports a network of 25 local community youth clubs, which in 2009 
supported a total of 3098 young people (Young Southern City Online, 2011). However 
owing to its limited resources, it seeks to target those who are most at risk of becoming 
disaffected. 
 
Local media 
 
Three main newspapers provide the local media coverage for Southern City, the Southern 
City Post and Southernshire Daily Press, and the free weekly-distributed Southern City 
Observer6. Between them, these publications covered the core parts of Southern City in 
addition to extending out to the regions outlying areas. The main local newspapers were 
an important source of local information about the issue of ASB and the policy responses 
adopted by local agencies in relation to the problem. Local campaigns were reported 
extensively, for example the prolific use of crackhouse closure powers in Southern City. 
These were made available via the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act, and by 2007, 50 of 
these identified premises had been closed in Southern City (Southernshire Constabulary 
Local Policing Summary 2006-2007, p. 1). Local media reporting was also instrumental 
in highlighting problems in certain areas of Southern City to the practitioners, ‘just 
maybe two or three times a year you get something on the front page of the [Southern 
City] Post and it will be horrible and you sort of think we have got to sort this out’ 
(Interview 025 Southern City Local Authority Service Director).  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 These are pseudonyms 
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Members of Parliament 
 
Four Westminster constituencies, West, East, South and Northwest, cover Southern City, 
or parts thereof. The trend of representation in these areas began to reflect the national 
picture, with seats having been held initially by MPs from the Labour Party before seats 
were then lost to the Liberal Democrats and in some parts of the city, the Conservative 
Party. 
 
The Western constituency was initially Labour dominated from 1997 until the 2005 
Election, when the seat was lost to the Liberal Democrats. More recently in 2010 the seat 
was retained with an increased majority. The South parliamentary constituency has 
remained a Labour stronghold, with the same MP having held the seat since 1987. In the 
East of the city, this has again remained as a Labour seat since the 1992 election, prior to 
which it had been briefly Conservative. The Northwest part of the city had previously 
undergone significant boundary changes. There has been mixed representation in this 
constituency, with representation having moved between Labour, Labour Cooperative 
(the sister Party of the Labour Party) and most recently the Conservative Party.  
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Dimensions of policy change in Southern City 
 
Policy ‘decisions’ 
 
Prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
 
There was evidence from the interviews that the emergence of ASB as a policy concern 
in Southern City predated the national policy initiatives of the late 1990s. Whilst these 
issues may have been framed in a slightly different language than emerged later - 
focusing on concerns about disorder, noisy or inconsiderate neighbours, and ‘nuisance’ 
behaviour (often in social housing) - they show that ASB policies did not appear from 
nowhere (see Hughes, 2007 pp.110-139 for an overview of the historical emergence of 
ASB as a social problem, both prior to and after the election of New Labour in 1997). As 
in a number of other cities, it appeared that a range of practitioners in Southern City had 
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for some years attempted to tackle problems of nuisance behaviour in a variety of ways 
(Burney 1999; Cowan 1999). Within the housing sector in particular, there was evidence 
of formal legal measures such as injunctions, having been deployed by the City Council 
Housing Department to address problem residents in council housing. For example, under 
the Housing Act 1996 (S153) social landlords were granted the power to apply for Anti 
Social Behaviour Injunctions (or ASBIs) against any council tenants who caused a 
nuisance or harassed other people. These powers were subsequently amended by the Anti 
Social Behaviour Act of 2003 and the Police and Justice Act 2006. As per the ASBO, 
injunctions contained ‘unacceptable actions which the subject must not commit’ (Flint 
and Pawson 2009, p. 421). If these conditions are breached, it amounts to contempt of 
court, and as with the breach of an ASBO, this is punishable by imprisonment. In 
addition, ASBIs can also come with the power of arrest, meaning that any breach can see 
the offender being arrested and held in custody. However, the key difference between 
these two measures is the fact that ASBIs cannot be used upon anyone under the age of 
18 (Flint and Pawson 2009, p. 421). Other injunctive powers had been made available to 
local authorities under the 1972 Local Government Act (S222). These were only to be 
used in ‘exceptional cases if the local authority could also obtain an ASBO’ (Cowan 
1999, p. 360).    
 
[T]he one that we use mostly against local authority residents tends to 
be the ASB injunction on the Housing Act to comply with tenancy 
conditions and then put other conditions attached to that and obviously 
if there have been assaults we can shove the powers of arrest on there 
as well … I think there’s a few things to consider you see the thing is 
the City Council have always tackled, I say always tackled that isn’t 
true, but the policy has always been to tackle nuisance tenants and 
what you have to differentiate between is in those days is what is 
nuisance and what is anti-social and what is criminal. So until the Anti 
Social Behaviour Act came into force properly, which gave us a lot 
more powers and a lot more things that we can do within the Act such 
as the injunctions coupled with the tenancy conditions to say comply 
with it opened up a totally different avenue and a policy could be 
written around that because the thing is you could have a policy but a 
policy at the end of the day is only as good as the legislation that you 
are working with that enables you to keep that policy in place. 
(Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official Caseworker 
ASB Team) 
 
However, formal action appears to have been a relatively rare event, and unevenly spread 
across the city. In some localities, there was greater emphasis placed upon the use of 
 114 
 
 
enforcement measures, whilst others saw little activity in relation to ASB. An explanation 
for this was the variations in the workloads and the approaches of individual housing 
officers: 
 
I think the way to view that would be the south of the city … certain 
other areas, actually for years dealt with ASB either through myself or 
me pushing other people to do it, and other people having an interest 
to do it, whereas certain areas in the city up until the time that the 
ASB team was set up, didn’t have ASB so those things are there to be 
tackled whereas in the south of the city some of them have already 
been tackled. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority Official 
Caseworker ASB Team) 
 
A Senior Police Officer, who had worked in Southern City for many years, reported that 
housing practitioners in particular had issued warnings to residents about ASB, but no 
further action had been pursued: 
 
I think many partners weren’t tackling it like we were. No one was 
tackling it, and if you look at Housing files some housing files still 
brought out to case conference are this thick where warning after 
warning after warning has been sent, threatening further action but no 
further action has been taken. So we were giving people warnings and 
then not backing it up with action so people didn’t take any notice of 
the warnings, and that’s happened over a long period of time. 
(Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager)  
 
This had led, in their view, to a general lack of confidence in the local authorities being 
able to address ASB effectively (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager). This issue was reflected by the general levels of unhappiness that were 
reported by a key housing respondent, who suggested that the early days of the service 
had seen complaints about inconsistencies, lack of feedback from practitioners and a 
slowness in response (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing 
Management). Even though these were issues that the same interviewee suggested had 
been addressed in a later best manner review that was conducted in relation to Southern 
City’s housing management function, there were still some key lessons to be learnt about 
the ways in which housing practitioners were equipped to tackle issues of ASB: 
 
But I think the lesson I learned from that you come into social 
housing, where you perceive social housing to be a supportive caring 
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service and then I come along and say tenants are complaining about 
the failure of the department to deal with issues about breach of 
tenancy conditions and then saying to those people who came into the 
service to be in this supportive caring role, and I am saying to them I 
want you to be policeman effectively for this service, and I want you 
to start getting miscreant tenants into court and evict them or take 
action against them. And actually trying to persuade a bunch of what 
were 65 housing officers that that was a good thing to do despite the 
training and the direction of the policy and the policy directives I put 
in place was never really going to work. (Interview 008 Southern City 
Local Authority Head of Housing Management) 
 
However, whilst the formal powers that were available at the time may not have been 
fully used in Southern City, the equipping of housing professionals with powers to deal 
with ‘anti-social’ residents – under the banner of ‘nuisance behaviour’ – did provide a 
baseline of experience for what was to develop later. At the national level, as outlined in 
Chapter Three, housing professionals had lobbied actively for greater civil powers for 
tackling ASB to be made available to local agencies which was an important driver for 
eventual proposals for ‘Community Safety Orders’, the precursors to ASBOs, in the 1998 
legislation. Thus, in some important ways, the precursors to the emergence of a 
formalised ASB policy structure in Southern City echoed broader developments at the 
national level, where the issue first emerged in relation to social housing practitioners 
(and their professional associations). In some senses, this provides support for TP1, 
which suggested that we would see a similar trajectory of policy development both 
locally and nationally.  
 
The first Southern City Crime and Disorder Strategy 1999 
 
Despite evidence of some earlier piecemeal action in relation to ASB, which had mainly 
concerned perceived problem behaviour by social housing tenants, it was clear from both 
the interviews and secondary sources that the CDA 1998 was the major impetus in the 
emergence of a more partnership based approach in dealing with ASB, particularly 
following the creation of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth 
CDRPs) as a result of this legislation. ‘I think the Crime and Disorder Act was a very 
good piece of legislation. I think it did force, encourage, inspire agencies to work 
together in a way that they clearly hadn’t been able to do before without the legislation’ 
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(Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander).  It also became a key element 
of the response of local practitioners in tackling the issue of ASB:  
 
[I]ts been part of a development of a much sort of wider agency 
responsibility for youth crime and anti-social behaviour, and you are 
getting linkages now that never really kind of existed before, between 
different statutory agencies, and also between agencies working in 
local neighbourhoods and local community organisations. So you 
know … I think it’s had a beneficial effect in that sense, but that goes 
along with other developments. (Interview 020 Southern City Youth 
Offending Team Manager) 
 
Based upon the account of a respondent from the city’s CDRP, even though community 
safety teams in various guises had existed in the city’s local authority for some time, the 
significant change that was brought about by the CDA was that it gave the partnerships 
statutory authority, as they were ‘given a legislative role and a duty to tackle crime’ 
(Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). In Southern City, as elsewhere in 
other larger urban conurbations across England and Wales (Hughes, 2007: chapter three 
pp. 54-82) it led to the creation of a formalised partnership structure that represented the 
local authority, Southernshire Constabulary, the local Health Authority and the Probation 
Service. Representatives were also drawn from the Home Office Prison Department, 
local Police Authority and the lead city councillor with responsibility for Community 
Safety.  
 
Over time this partnership structure gradually evolved to include other voluntary agencies 
and the previously separate Drugs Action team, which was initially established in the city 
in March 1999 as links between this particular agenda and crime/ASB were established 
(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern 
City 1999-2002, p. 10). This provides clear evidence of the formation of a local policy 
network of the type discussed by Rhodes (1997), and supports TP4 which suggested that 
policy networks of various kinds would emerge and play an important role in the 
development of ASB policy locally. The characteristics of these networks, and how they 
impacted on policy in practice, will be considered in the following chapter. The growth of 
a multi agency approach in tackling this issue that was presented by some of the 
respondents, who were involved in the fieldwork, was further supported by an analysis of 
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Southern City policy documents of the time, key to which was the initial crime and 
disorder strategy that was created by the statutory partners following a period of local 
consultation, which covered the period 1999 to 2002.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, like all local authorities, as a result of the 1998 CDA 
Southern City Council was now required by law to undertake an annual citywide audit of 
crime and disorder problems, which formed the basis of this initial strategic plan. It 
provided all of the agencies involved with clear objectives to be measured by 
performance-based targets (Home Office Circular 9/99 Guide to Crime and Disorder 
Partnerships). The achievement of these targets was to be overseen by the city’s CDRP, 
who were also charged with working alongside the courts and local communities to 
ensure that this strategy was being implemented. In the case of Southern City this initial 
strategy document also sought to provide an operating framework for those agencies that 
were involved in directly tackling issues of crime and disorder, including ASB: ‘The 
strategy describes the main findings of the audit, the broad objectives that follow from 
the audit and the organisational framework for its implementation’ (Southern City 
Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, 
p. 1).  
 
This led to a structure being formed in which a total of 19 task groups worked on behalf 
of the city’s Community Safety Partnership in implementing the strategy (Southern City 
Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, 
p. 13). Some of these were newly created whilst others had been established for ‘several 
years on particular areas’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime 
and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p.10) and covered issues such as communities, 
young people, neighbourhoods and the youth offending team, all of which were designed 
to feed into the partnership’s four identified priority areas. These included drugs, young 
people, neighbourhoods, crime and also the fear of crime, all of which could be 
contributory factors to problems of ASB. Even though the strategy acknowledged that 
young people in the city were more likely to be victims of crime, as opposed to 
perpetrators as the ‘majority are law abiding’ (Southern City Community Safety 
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Partnership, Tackling crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 1). Having 
identified these as being the key elements of the strategy to be implemented, the 
framework also outlined four corresponding strategic aims: 
 
· To tackle drugs and alcohol misuse 
· To promote a less criminal society  
· To promote social justice and urban regeneration 
· To reduce crime and fear of crime 
 
(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling crime and 
disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 13) 
 
This structure would be overseen by a full-time coordinator from one of the Partnership’s 
statutory agencies, as supported by the previously discussed task groups. In its 
encouragement of renewed partnership working, the strategy also highlighted on paper at 
least (see Hughes, 2007 pp.132-137, Crawford, 1997) the need for local communities to 
actively participate in this process. Their views were to be represented via the task group 
structure that had been designed to support the partnership, as a result of interaction with 
the city’s non-statutory agencies that could also feed in the views of local business 
groups: 
 
The agencies involved in the … Partnership have a long record of 
working with communities to promote regeneration alongside the … 
Regeneration Partnership, delivering local partnership which promotes 
community safety and reduce crime and fear of crime. The 
implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act will build upon these 
foundations. (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Tackling 
crime and disorder in Southern City 1999-2002, p. 6)  
 
This first Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy (1999-2002) was also accompanied by 
the rollout of a dedicated ASBO Strategy for Southern City. The strategy offered 
guidance for all of the statutory agencies that had been given responsibility for the use of 
ASBOs as a result of the 1998 CDA. It also provided guidance to the local Magistrates 
Courts about the proposed usage of these orders, given their role in this process (as also 
set out in the 1998 CDA). The practitioners in the local authority, in attempting to 
develop a more targeted ASB approach, sought to work in conjunction with the Courts at 
an early stage in order to outline the ways in which they were planning to use this newly 
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developed measure. It was suggested that the provision of this early awareness training 
for Magistrates had proven to be mutually beneficial, having ensured the continuation of 
a good working relationship between local agencies and the network of courts across 
Southern City (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing 
Management): 
 
I think we are only as good as the people who dish out the penalties, 
we can do all we possibly can, we can haul people back to court we 
can make life difficult for them but as soon as the judge turns round 
and says a slap on the wrist go away, we have lost and that doesn’t 
happen very often. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority 
Official Caseworker ASB Team) 
 
This also provided an opportunity to share with those working in the Courts the agreed 
approach that was to be taken in tackling ASB by practitioners in Southern City. It was 
intended that this would be a citywide approach, whereby only in those cases where the 
behaviour had been deemed to be serious enough that an ASBO would be used as a first 
response. Aside from this, the use of the ASBO was to be seen as a tool of last resort, 
only to be used when all other often more informal interventions had failed, ‘if the 
informal route works then why not use that … So we have littered the city with warning 
letters and ABCs and Manchester have littered the city with ASBOs’ (Interview 008 
Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management). This stance was 
seemingly adopted at an early stage in the development of a local level approach in 
Southern City, which appeared to endure throughout the period of interest, even being 
reflected in local media reporting about ASBO usage in the city: ‘A spokesman for 
[Southern] City Council said: The use of Asbos is very much a last resort … and is only 
one aspect of a whole range of work that is carried out to address unacceptable 
behaviour’ (Southern City Post May 2008). Interviewees from all key agencies 
interviewed for the research supported such an approach and confirmed that it was 
generally agreed between the agencies involved. These views appear to confirm the 
strong appeal, locally and ‘on the ground’ of adaptive approaches to problem-solving 
noted by Garland (2001) as part of the ‘preventive turn’ in crime control and given 
empirical support from the research undertaken by Edwards and Hughes (2008) across 
Wales. As such, they provide preliminary support for TP2 that suggested we would see 
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clear evidence of ‘adaptive’ approaches at the local level, with the development of 
partnership structures that attempted to spread responsibility between agencies for the 
management of ASB. However, TP2 suggested that we would see tensions between these 
kinds of policy approaches and the contrasting ‘expressive’ approaches that are based on 
a more politicized and emotive response to problems of crime and disorder. As we will 
see later, the empirical research found little evidence of expressive policies of this sort 
driving policy at the local level. Indeed, where there was tension between the expressive 
and the adaptive faces of policy, this was largely between the national (expressive) policy 
rhetoric, and the local (adaptive) policy responses. These ideas will be developed further 
in the next chapter. 
 
Southern City Community Safety Partnership Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 
2002-2005 
 
In 2002 the Southern City CDRP published their second strategy document. Having 
established a structure that reflected a cross-section of the local level agencies in 
Southern City, it was proposed that the core membership and structure of the Partnership 
would remain largely unchanged to what had been documented in the earlier 1999 
strategy. Representatives consisted of Southernshire constabulary, the local authority, 
Probation Service and the Health Authority, who as a result of the 1998 CDA had been 
tasked to ‘work together with their partners … and other appropriate agencies to reduce 
crime and disorder’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). However, an expansion of their membership to 
include representatives from the Youth Offending Team, Drugs Action Team and chairs 
from several forums covering specific issues such as prostitution and domestic abuse, 
along with a representative member from the voluntary sector was also proposed in this 
later strategy (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 13). The aim of which was to develop a membership, 
which would comprise of ‘key players within the public, private and voluntary sectors, all 
of whom have a commitment to and responsibility for community safety’ throughout 
Southern City (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder 
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Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1). In line with the 1998 CDA, the Partnership sought 
to develop a rolling three-year strategy, with the aim of guiding the partners in the 
achievement of their ‘shared objectives’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 1).  In the intervening time as a 
result of various citywide audits it had become clear there were a number of topics in 
need of greater attention, this included ASB (Southern City Community Safety 
Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 2).  
 
The second Crime and Disorder Strategy therefore appeared to give formal recognition of 
the need for a more targeted approach to be taken towards tackling problems of crime 
and disorder and ASB. This had by this stage become a common factor in the approach 
being taken across the sector, and by the 367 CDRPs that were now in existence (Hughes, 
2009). For the city’s partners this meant that by having identified that there were various 
organisational factors that had impacted upon their ability to achieve the targets set by the 
initial crime and disorder strategy ‘that there is potential to achieve much more’ 
(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 
2002-2005, p. 3). As a result, this later strategy sought to build upon the initial operating 
framework that had been created in 1999 and introduced a number of new ‘organisational 
structures and disciplines’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p.4). These required additional resources, and 
improved coordination between the partners in an effort to achieve a common approach, 
which functioned within a ‘newly developed Performance Management Framework’ 
(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 
2002-2005, p.4). It was anticipated that this would enable clear policy actions to be 
identified and undertaken by the relevant agencies. Such developments would also appear 
to be part and parcel of the broader need to fit into to a performance management culture, 
as directed from the Home Office, by which CDRPs across England and Wales showed 
increasingly convergent types of institutional structures and common targets and goals 
(see McLaughlin et al, 2001 ref in Hughes 2007). 
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So as to support the changes made to the existing partnership structure, the Strategy also 
proposed a refinement of the core group that was to act as an ‘executive team’, 
responsible for driving the Partnership forward. One of the main objectives of this 
smaller core team was to ‘focus on putting in place the structures and processes that will 
ensure the Partnership develops strong competencies and capabilities’ (Southern City 
Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 4), 
part of which was to direct and prioritise the resources available to the Partnership, whilst 
having also ensured that the ‘partners understand each other’s capabilities and are aligned 
on common objectives’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 4). As a result, a series of measurable targets 
focused on issues such as ASB were also introduced as part of the Strategy, in an attempt 
to address inconsistencies of approach between the partners. It was the role of the 
relevant Partnership Task Groups to oversee the delivery of these targets, as these also 
acted as their ‘priority areas for action’ (Southern City Community Safety Partnership, 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 7). These also illustrated clear 
examples of ‘enforceable’ (or at least monitored) policy ‘decisions’ and offered the 
following guidance to practitioners in tackling ASB: 
 
· All anti-social behaviour involving young people, as defined  
in the Anti Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) protocol, will be 
addressed using Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABC’s) in 
the first instance. 
· To visit and take statements from witnesses within 10  
   working days from a case conference. 
· To issue proceedings to the court within 17 working days of  
receipt of the relevant information. (Southern City 
Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Strategy 2002-2005, p. 6) 
 
It is reasonable to argue that the second Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy marked 
an important turning point in Southern City’s policy in tackling ASB as with the 
emergence of a growing multi agency partnership at the local level, there was also 
evidence of the mobilisation of key resources within Southern City’s statutory agencies, 
most notably the police and local authority. The first clear evidence of this came with the 
establishment of a dedicated ASB team in Southernshire constabulary in September 2003. 
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This would also mark the beginning of what would become a period of ‘duopoly’ 
(Hughes, 2007, pp.101-103) between the local police and the local authority in 
responding to ASB issues, which came to dominate the local ‘ASB policy network’, to 
the detriment of some groups (such as youth services).  This duopoly also provided the 
foundations of a ‘policy community’ as described by Rhodes (1997) in his identification 
of key types of policy networks. This was a group that was relatively stable and that also 
had access to resources both within and between these two organisations, which allowed 
them to ensure that the local ASB agenda could really start to gather pace. It also offers 
some support to TP4, which suggested that the local formulation and adaptation of ASB 
policy was shaped by policy networks such as this community and ‘intergovernmental 
networks’, which comprise of participants from both national and local government 
(Rhodes 1981, 1997): 
 
We decided to set up 2 separate teams for funding and operational 
arrangements. Now we have two ASB teams mine based in the local 
authority and … one in the community safety team within the police.  
They are largely funded by the Safer Stronger Communities Fund, 
which is delivered through the (CDRP). Two teams do not work co-
location based in different parts of the city but work together 
seamlessly and have a close working relationship, which is 
fundamental to our success. (Interview 010 Southern City Local 
Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
The creation of this team was preceded by two other important developments within 
Southernshire Constabulary. Firstly, the creation of an ASB Taskforce, ‘established under 
Neighbourhood Renewal, with all partner agencies striving to improve community links 
and tackle offenders’ (Southernshire Constabulary Annual Report 2002/03, p. 15). The 
purpose of which was to research existing best practice in achieving the effective 
reporting and management of incidents of ASB. This initial information gathering 
exercise lasted for a period of three months (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary 
ASB Team Manager). Second, during the early stages of the project, a police database 
was established to record incidents of reported ASB across Southern City. This system 
later formed the basis of the incremental system of response that emerged in Southern 
City in tackling ASB, which existed alongside weekly case conference meetings that 
recognised the need to have the ‘right agencies around the table’ (Interview 005R 
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Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). The eventual establishment of a 
dedicated police ASB team resulted from a successful funding application to the CDRP, 
which drew upon Home Office funds, following the project team’s recommendations 
(Interview 002A Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator). The funds – national 
and local – that were available to drive ASB policy were widely seen as crucial in 
encouraging activity during these early stages. As one Senior Police Officer stated: 
‘Without the money nothing would have happened’ (Interview 005R Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This provides an interesting perspective for 
reflection when considering TP1, which concerned the relationship between the national 
and the local. It suggests that the financial incentives offered by national government on 
this were absolutely crucial in driving policy forward (amongst other things). The 
quotation also has important implications for considering the role and dynamics of policy 
networks and what shapes their effects on policy outcomes (TP4). Here, we see how 
access to financial resources, unsurprisingly, provided a very powerful driver for some 
agencies within the ASB policy network. It seems that the police and the local authority, 
via access to central government funding for this kind of activity, had more resources 
than some groups (for example, representing youth work). Nevertheless, there were 
concerns raised about the long-term provision of funds for this and the local authority 
ASB team, as expressed by a Service Director from within the authority: 
 
Well I think, I think the dedicated teams and I think this is an issue, 
and I think that many, many councils will be dealing with this now, in 
general the anti-social behaviour teams are not mainstreamed, it’s not 
mainstreamed activity. They have been funded with grant funding, 
and funny money. So in [Southern City] for example, we have got 
three police coordinators funded through grants, if the grant funding 
stops, those coordinators won’t be there. In the council we have about 
a quarter of a million pound funding gap for next year, because we 
rely on grant funding from the Home Office, if that dries up that will 
have to be picked up by the local taxpayer. So even though it’s a 
number one priority, its never been resourced to the extent that it 
needs to be and we need to deal with that, particularly in the current 
finances … Things like for example even though you have got money 
for the team, there has never been anything in the budget for legal 
costs. So if you do want to go for an Anti Social Behaviour Order, you 
need to get someone to pay the legal costs. So I think that it’s never 
been funded properly, so resources wise you know the team is quite 
lean when you think about the numbers. Three police officers, half a 
dozen council officers, plus you’ve then got the housing officers that 
 125 
 
 
isn’t, you know it’s not a great deal of resource. (Interview 025 
Southern City Local Authority Service Director) 
The later strategy document suggested that the CDRP would also continue to maintain 
their provision of the ‘strategic leadership for crime and disorder issues within the city’ 
(Southern City Community Safety Partnership, Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 
2002-2005, p. 1). This was a level of influence that was no doubt assisted by their 
financial support for the dedicated police ASB team:  
 
[D]ue to the ASB legislation, which came to us from government you 
suddenly had all this pressure on ASBOs and legislative enforcement 
action, and the ASB team was created in response to that. So [the 
CDRP] has been involved in setting up that team and the processes, 
because they work in partnership with the police team, which is 
funded by us. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager)  
 
The police ASB team consisted of a small group of officers, including civilian staff 
working as ASB coordinators, who were given responsibility for different geographical 
sectors of Southern City, working within the force’s crime reduction department. As a 
result of having been the first dedicated ASB team to be established in the city, it was the 
responsibility of the police lead to not only develop the role of the team in tackling ASB, 
but to also ensure that the relevant systems and processes were put in place that could 
support this work. Therefore, a significant element of their work became ‘actually 
working with our partners in other agencies’ (Interview 002A Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Coordinator) and ensuring that they were forming part of the city’s 
multi agency approach. As a result of these developments the lead police officer 
described himself as being not only ‘the police anti-social behaviour manager, 
responsible for my team, [but] more importantly responsible for the links that my team 
has with the other agencies’ (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager). This was a view that was supported by colleagues in the local authority, who 
suggested that the police ‘will be key in helping us to develop the ASB strategy, we work 
closely with them, with their ASB team’ (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority 
ASB Team Manager):  
 
[T]he dominant agencies were the police, I think that would be 
reasonable to say, I won’t say, they were the dominant agency because 
if you like in the reactive sense because obviously faced with anti-
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social behaviour, they were the how can I put it you know were 
perceived perhaps as the first line of contact, although as it started to 
evolve we started to get you know better engagement for example 
with our Housing Services, they came to take a bigger part of the 
process and the whole. (Interview 012 Chair of CDRP/Southern City 
Local Councillor) 
 
Police respondents also commented that the formulation of this specialist ASB team had 
also had a wider impact upon the rest of Southern City’s police division, in that ASB 
became a much higher priority:  
 
To be quite frank with you, I don’t know if you know anything about 
how calls come into the police. Clearly there’s a large number of 
people who phone the police each year expecting some kind of 
service, clearly there’s a need to prioritise how those calls are dealt 
with and obviously things that are happening that are life threatening 
and happening now, crime in progress are all treated as grade one or 
grade two calls and get a fairly quick prompt police response. 
Whereas things that are less important or happened some time ago or 
are reported crime that a delay won’t affect get dealt with as a lower 
level priority. Now anti-social behaviour historically has always been 
right in that low level category and the police would attend an incident 
really if they weren’t doing anything else. And what we have tried to 
do is raise the profile, raise the importance, raise the priority. 
(Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager) 
 
Police respondents also clearly felt that it was the action taken by their organisation that 
had been the catalyst for a more comprehensive approach being taken to ASB in Southern 
City. In particular, senior police officers stated explicitly that they had been the lead 
agency in the development of the local institutional response, although they had worked 
closely with the local authority once they came on board:  
 
So we were running with this system and we’d done the project work 
and implemented it whilst they were still talking about having a City 
Council ASB team … So I think in terms of that scale our system the 
police database, the police team, well it has been entirely police led 
and we have worked closely with the City Council lead in developing 
the multi agency structure and that’s really been in existence now for a 
year, probably a year fifteen months and is really quite effective. 
(Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).  
 
Despite this strong perception amongst senior police respondents that they had led local 
developments in ASB policy, it was the case that practitioners within the local authority 
had already recognised this as an area of priority before the establishment of a specialist 
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police team. For example, a dedicated post within the existing Housing Services team had 
been created some time earlier, as they tried to shift the emphasis away from piecemeal-
individualised responses from a select few frontline housing officers and towards a more 
strategic approach. A contributory factor in this was that not all of the housing officers in 
Southern City had been keen to get involved with the taking of enforcement action, both 
personally and as a result of competing priorities. Despite senior figures within the 
council’s Neighbourhood and Housing Department having made significant attempts to 
persuade them to take a role in the delivery of policy action in this manner. At the same 
time, some senior local authority staff developed plans for the creation of a dedicated 
team, following the review of their housing management function which suggested that 
what was needed was a response to ASB that went beyond the remit of housing officers. 
The decision to create a separate ASB post in Housing Services proved to be a catalyst in 
the creation of a broader dedicated ASB team within the local authority: 
 
And at the same time I had one manager in particular on that same 
estate in [Southern City] saying we can’t carry on like this, there are 
too many big issues in this community around drugs, alcohol, 
domestic violence, racial harassment, anti-social behaviour to carry on 
the way we are doing this and in fact what she did was create a 
specialist post on that team where one person all they did was anti-
social behaviour. She selected someone who was an enthusiast who 
had a real interest in this stuff, who is now actually on this team, the 
specialist ASB team and that really was the forerunner and a couple of 
officers did the same within a year or two. They said we need to take 
this out from the generic work, which this bunch of people do and 
create a specialist post and that started to work better. We then looked 
at the models of what was going on in the rest of the country, 
particularly Manchester, and the best value review confirmed really 
that that was the way to go. So that’s when we set up the team, it took 
us a little bit longer than I hoped to get that team in place, and they 
have now been running for heading up for two years now. (Interview 
008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing Management) 
  
The local authority’s dedicated ASB team was thus established in July 2004. Interestingly 
its launch in the city coincided with that of the Government’s national ‘Together’ 
campaign, with representatives from the Home Office ASBU having attended Southern 
City to publicise this. Unlike the city’s CDRP, who were primarily responsible for 
examining the strategic development of policy around the tackling of ASB and funding 
issues, the City Council’s ASB team were much more closely linked with the direct 
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implementation of local level policy and its formulation. As a result of this, and owing to 
the high proportion of housing cases, the local authority team took over the enforcement 
function from the city’s CDRP, working in conjunction with the Southernshire 
Constabulary’s dedicated ASB team: ‘So the council ASB team is very much focused on 
interventions to tackle individual perpetrators, individual identified perpetrators’ 
(Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager): 
 
If the case conference has concluded that an ASBO should be sought, 
the Community Safety Team will instruct the Legal Services division 
of the City Council. The City Council will make all applications for 
Orders. Though the application will be made by the City Council, it 
will in effect be made with the full support of the police. (Southern 
City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 10) 
 
In terms of its structure, the local authority team adopted a similar model to that of the 
police, staffing it with caseworkers given responsibility for different geographical areas 
of Southern City. The lead for the team, as with the police inspector, was similarly 
charged with ensuring effective liaison between partner agencies at the local level as part 
of the policy process, in addition to colleagues at the national level, primarily from the 
Home Office. The team appeared to embrace elements of national policy, for example, in 
its explicit advocacy of the need to put ‘victims and witnesses at the centre of everything’ 
(Southern City Local Authority ‘Together’ publicity material). This stance was advocated 
by the initial manager of the dedicated ASB team in the local authority, who suggested 
that for them it was entirely about the victims and witnesses to ASB, and ensuring that 
the ASB which they were experiencing was stopped (Interview 001 Southern City Local 
Authority ASB Manager). This has parallels with widely noted shifts in government 
crime control policies, which had seen the politicization of the crime victim as part of a 
broader appeal to voters (see Garland 2001, and discussion in Chapter Two). All of this 
suggests support for TP1, in the sense that at a general level, policy development in the 
city reflected broader national shifts. In particular, the shift from a primarily enforcement 
oriented populist discourse around ASB to one that incorporated a range of responses, 
including enforcement but also emphasising the importance of rehabilitation as well as 
prosecution. In Southern City it was a sentiment that was further supported in local 
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documentation, including the local level strategies that had been developed in support of 
tackling this issue: 
[Southern City] takes a holistic approach to anti-social behaviour. This 
places the victims of anti-social behaviour at the centre of the solution, 
recognising the need to strengthen communities, support witnesses 
and deal with perpetrators through rehabilitation as well as 
prosecution. (Southern City CDRP Tackling anti-social behaviour in 
Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3) 
 
In terms of the division of the workload between these two operationally focused teams, 
and the impact upon the delivery of policy actions in Southern City, the case management 
teams within the local authority and Southernshire Constabulary were each responsible 
for taking forward any actions that were directly reported to them. Either team was also 
able to make referrals for formal action, which included those made to other Partnership 
agencies under the CDRP umbrella. According to a participant - a senior member of the 
local authority’s dedicated ASB team - it was the local authority that was concerned with 
the most serious forms of ASB (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB 
Manager), as they concentrated upon the management of those cases where formal 
prevention measures were required. This was further supported in later strategy 
documents published by the city’s CDRP. ‘The City Council’s anti-social behaviour 
team, based within Neighbourhood and Housing Services, tackles the most serious cases 
of anti-social behaviour where formal action has failed or is not appropriate’ (Southern 
City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, 
p. 12). Staff within the Housing Services department of the local authority maintained a 
local network of contact points across Southern City (Southern City Local Authority, 
Anti social behaviour. What anti-social behaviour is and how we deal with it, p. 7). Such 
developments reflected the aspirations of the local authority to retain control over this 
area of policy, which followed the growth in their expertise relating to community safety 
and later ASB. This supports the findings of Hughes (2007) which suggested that the 
issue of ASB has become a new set of problems within the broader remit of community 
safety governance. At the same time, the dedicated police ASB team retained a wider 
portfolio including the management of measures such as ASBOs, as they also had to 
address breaches of these particular interventions: 
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11.1 The Police upon attending an incident of an alleged breach will 
have been advised of the existence of an ASBO. The Police will adopt 
a positive approach at every incident. 
11.2 The officer in the case will investigate under normal Police 
procedures. The investigation may involve interviewing witnesses or 
the use of surveillance. The standard of evidence must be good and 
proof is to be “beyond reasonable doubt”. The case will be referred to 
the Crown Prosecution Service. The outcome of proceedings will be 
advised by the police to all appropriate parties. (Southern City CDRP 
Draft ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 11)  
 
The monitoring of formal ASB actions had also become a responsibility for those living 
in the affected communities. Residents in these areas were encouraged to report upon 
breaches of ASBOs, as communication with local communities became a crucial element 
of tackling issues of this nature. At the national level, this had largely resulted from the 
Government’s promotion of their involvement as part of their nationwide ‘Together’ 
campaign in tackling ASB. However, this also had an impact locally, and in Southern 
City the CDRP encouraged the belief that the provision of solutions to tackling problems 
of ASB was not solely the responsibility of any single agency or organisation. Instead 
their strategy outlined that ‘Residents and tenant, the local authority, victims and 
witnesses, the police, Social Services, schools, businesses and many other groups and 
individuals have a role and responsibility to tackle Anti-social Behaviour’ (Southern City 
CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 
11) 
 
Following the creation of dedicated ASB teams in Southern City local agencies 
implemented a supporting operational structure that was designed to deliver policy 
action, which was to be jointly managed by the police and local authority. As advised by 
the CDRP’s ASBO Protocol, any decisions taken to obtain an ASBO were to be 
presented in writing to both the police and an appropriate representative of Southern 
City’s local authority. The initial evidence was to be summarised along with an outline of 
the action that had been taken up until that point. This would then be presented at the 
weekly case conference meeting held in the city, and jointly chaired by the ASB 
managers from Southernshire Constabulary and the local authority. It was at these 
meetings where decisions regarding formal action were taken (Southern City CDRP Draft 
ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 6). The overarching aim of this case conference structure was to 
 131 
 
 
provide a consistent citywide approach to incidents of ASB, coordinated by the ASB 
team representatives: 
 
The case conference will always include a full consideration of the 
impact of the use of an ASBO. The use or non-use of an ASBO should 
be a conscious decision and accompanied by a rationale. The intention 
will always be to seek consensus on the way forward. Where there is 
dissent on any given course of action this should be recorded with 
reasons. Clearly the Magistrates are unlikely to grant an Order where 
the police and the City Council are not in full agreement that an 
ASBO should be sought. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 
2004, p. 9) 
 
This strategy was intended to replace the former approach – perceived by many 
respondents as under-resourced, piecemeal and reactive – with a more strategically driven 
and coordinated approach (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). 
The establishment of the accompanying systems and processes designed to tackle this 
issue sought to overcome these previous difficulties. Its design was influenced by the 
city’s local CDRP, as they sought to maintain their role in addressing the enforcement 
aspect of a national level agenda. The weekly case conference structure was further 
supported by local multi agency meetings, at which individual cases of ASB were 
discussed. The aim of which was to ‘decide on a course of informal action, consult 
partner agencies and look for best practice solutions to prevent anti-social behaviour’ 
(Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 
2005 to 2008, p. 11). If it was decided that formal action was instead required, 
representatives at this local meeting were able to refer cases onto the city level case 
conference for formal action to be agreed upon. 
 
Under this policy, perpetrators of ASB could be subjected to a range of possible 
interventions organised in a hierarchical model, at the base of which was the use of low-
level warning letters. This reflects the ‘regulatory pyramid’ concept highlighted in the 
work of Crawford (2009) and discussed earlier in Chapter Two. These letters were 
primarily produced and sent out by the police to perpetrators of ASB (or their parents in 
the case of young people). According to one of the police respondents, the database 
system that was in use by Southernshire Constabulary in support of tackling ASB was 
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able to generate four types of letter. However, ‘we don’t necessarily use all four because 
that can make it quite a drawn out process’ (Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary 
ASB Coordinator):  
 
This warning letter will indicate the course of action that is proposed 
as a consequence of their anti-social behaviour. A copy of the letter 
will be sent to Legal Services and will be used as further evidence of 
action taken to abate the behaviour. Indeed it may have this effect, 
without the need to take court action. The effect of the letter can be 
monitored whilst evidence is prepared. (Southern City CDRP Draft 
ASBO Protocol 2004, p. 9) 
 
In terms of their success, these low level interventions in the form of warning letters were 
often sufficient to stop the behaviour at an early stage. Police respondents claimed that 
these four levels of letter had an 80% success rate in stopping the problematic behaviour. 
This figure was further supported by the Chief Constable’s report of 2009 to 
Southernshire Police Authority. The aim of this report was to provide an update to 
members of the overall performance of Southernshire’s Command Unit across a range of 
areas, including the force’s approach toward and involvement in tackling ASB: 
 
[Southern City] is currently one of the top ten trailblazing BCU's in 
tackling anti-social behaviour … The ASB unit consists of an 
Inspector and six staff, of which four are funded by [Southern City 
CDRP]. By providing specialist support to neighbourhood teams the 
unit scans up to 40,000 ASB incidents a year targeting those incidents 
where the offender is known. By introducing an incremental system of 
both formal and informal support and enforcement there has been: 
1200 warning letters issued, with 80% success in stopping ASB; Over 
65 crack house closures; more than any other BCU outside  
London (Southernshire Constabulary Police Authority Report of the 
Chief Constable 2009, p. 2) 
 
According to a Senior Police Officer, this success rate was maintained, as the emphasis 
remained upon the full utilisation of a preventative, informal agenda by those charged 
with local level policy delivery. If the warning letter did not succeed they would then 
look to other informally based measures to tackle the ASB. This included referrals to 
other local level agencies, such as the youth agencies that could provide support for the 
perpetrator, or to local agencies working with people with mental health issues, drug or 
alcohol problems. In tackling ASB in young people, there was also the opportunity to 
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utilise diversionary activities, particularly by the police. ‘[W]e try and do as much as we 
can to stop that behaviour before it gets to the point of them needing an ASBO’ 
(Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB Coordinator). The next level of 
intervention available to Southern City’s practitioners was more formally based, but was 
not quite at the level of enforcement. This involved the issuing of Acceptable Behaviour 
Contracts (henceforth ABCs) to perpetrators of this behaviour (see Chapter Three). As 
stated in the Draft ASBO Protocol for the city, these were also to be used when tackling 
ASB caused by young people: 
 
Acceptable behaviour contracts which are a non-legally binding 
contract between the perpetrator, his/her family and the partner 
agencies, are required as the first resort when dealing with young 
people, i.e. Those under the age of eighteen … Where young people 
are involved it will invariably be appropriate that diversionary 
activities and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts should be considered. 
All agencies should work together to avoid the need for the use of an 
ASBO for young people. (Southern City CDRP Draft ASBO Protocol 
2004, pp. 5-7) 
 
Not only were these tools used directly to address the behaviour of individual 
perpetrators, but according to several interviewees, they were also used as a means of 
attempting to address some of the underlying issues that may have contributed to the 
behaviour in the first instance. The option to use more informal measures in this tiered 
system, particularly in the provision of an initial response to incidents of ASB, enabled 
practitioners to reduce the use of formal enforcement measures such as ASBOs. This 
supported the ‘holistic problem solving approach’ that was advocated by Southern City’s 
CDRP in their later strategy documents (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social 
behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3). Whilst these ‘holistic’ 
approaches were clearly ‘managerial’ in that they involved a rational strategic approach 
to problem-solving involving a partnership approach, it is not clear that they can be seen 
as supporting TP3, which proposed that ASB policy locally would increasingly see the 
prerogatives of  ‘risk management’ displacing those of rehabilitation and punishment. In 
its pure form, the ‘risk penology’ approach suggests that governmental authorities accept 
that ‘the problem’ of crime (or here, ASB) cannot be ‘solved’, and the best that can be 
done is to manage it as resource-efficiently as possible. Here, however, we see obvious 
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evidence that local practitioners still held out a clear aim of tackling the problem at 
source, and that the graded approach – whilst reflecting some features of the ‘risk 
penology’ – was still based on the optimistic aim that in some cases at least, the 
fundamental causes of ASB could be tackled.  
 
For the police based ASB team, ‘the aim is to stop anti-social behaviour at the earliest 
possible stage. A variety of interventions are used, including informal warnings and 
contracts and referrals to partner agencies’ (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social 
behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12). A Senior Police Officer 
who was interviewed several times during the fieldwork, clearly perceived the use of 
these more informal low level interventions as having been successful: 
 
[O]ur objective is to stop anti-social behaviour, and if we can stop it 
by getting someone some help or tell them what they are doing is 
wrong then that is what we will do. So we’ll try informal action on a 
partnership level and most ABCs or all ABCs would be done as a 
partnership not just by the police … And then when ABCs don’t 
work, if they don’t work and again about 60% do work and those that 
are done by RJ most of them do work and don’t get breached … And 
then if that doesn’t work we will be referring them onto case 
conference and considering what formal action we ought to take. We 
try all we can to resolve thing at the lowest possible level, and an 
increased number of our cases are being resolved at that level. So 
there are a few less ASBOs being taken out now than there were three 
or four years ago and there are many more lower level interventions 
taking place. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager)  
 
However, in order for these informal measures to prove effective in tackling ASB, at the 
top of this hierarchical model of interventions there needed to be a credible threat of 
formal enforcement action, usually in the form of an ASBO. Once again, this 
demonstrates evidence of the regulatory pyramid approach involving increasing severity 
of punishment for each stage at which compliance is not achieved (see Crawford 2009). 
Should the use of warning letters and informal contracts such as ABCs fail to be effective 
in addressing ASB, then the partners must be prepared ‘the threat of a formal action being 
at the top of the tree there, and where warning letters have failed, and informal contracts 
have failed and the behaviour persists we must be prepared to take a strong line and take 
the formal action’ (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This 
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was a sentiment that was echoed by the team manager of the ASB team in the city’s local 
authority, who suggested that owing to the way in which interventions such as ASBOs 
are monitored in the city and their ability to tackle breaches in an effective manner that 
‘people know that getting an ASBO is a very serious order, need to know that we are 
watching them and we feed that back to them we continually review and feed back on 
how people are behaving … We do always inform that if they do breach we do prosecute 
for that and they will be brought before the court. So it’s that clear consistent approach 
that is essential’ (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). 
These were sentiments that were echoed in Southernshire Constabulary’s annual report of 
2003/04. This not only highlighted the creation of the force’s dedicated ASB team, but it 
also illustrated the city’s strengthening approach toward tackling issues of this nature, 
“this is not a ‘softly softly’ approach though. There is always an enforcement angle 
alongside the intervention. A person cannot be anti-social in [Southern City] and get 
away with it” (Superintendent of Southernshire Constabulary 2004, p. 16). However, 
there was still some divergence between the approaches of these practitioners, mainly 
around the use of formal action in tackling cases of ASB: 
 
That may be a little bit where I conflict with my local authority 
colleagues whose role is about preparing for formal action, and they 
get very excited about taking formal action against somebody. Well I 
would rather not take someone to case conference and find another 
way of resolving it to be quite frank, and I think by portraying the 
national lead I think the Government’s got to be particularly careful 
about the impression it gives of the need for formal action. Yes we 
have got to be prepared to take formal action if it’s absolutely 
necessary but we have got to have a balanced approach. (Interview 
005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager) 
 
 
This quotation provides a fascinating insight into the tensions within the local ‘politics’ 
of ASB, as well as tensions between the national and the local. With regard to TP1, 
which suggested crudely that local policy would largely follow national directives, it 
provides empirical evidence as to why this might not be so straightforward. When 
powerful local organisations in the ASB network such as the police are prepared to 
publicly challenge a perceived national over-emphasis on ‘enforcement’ to the detriment 
of other approaches, then TP1 seems immediately less straightforward. Similarly, it 
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provides evidence in support of the tension between ‘adaptive’ and ‘expressive’ 
approaches within the local policy network (see TP2), with perhaps the local authority (at 
least in the view of the police) being more inclined to an expressive support for 
enforcement, when the police (perhaps counter-intuitively) were suggesting that other 
methods might be more appropriate and more effective. It might be speculated, despite 
the lack of activism on the part of local elected representatives, that local authority 
officials still felt more driven towards actions that might have wider electoral appeal, 
whereas perhaps the police felt more sheltered from ‘democratic’ influences. 
 
Southern City Anti Social Behaviour Strategy 2005-2008 
 
In 2005 the local CDRP Executive published its ASB strategy for the next three-year 
period, which extended until 2008. This formed part of the CDRP’s broader Crime 
Disorder and Drugs Strategy for the same period. Its publication followed a consultation 
period of approximately six months, which involved both public agencies and the City 
Council’s Anti Social Behaviour Select Committee. As has been highlighted in the 
previous discussions of the city’s initial strategy documents, the partners continued to 
aspire to a safer city where ‘communities will be crime-free, peaceful and orderly, where 
clear standards of behaviour are understood’ (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social 
behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 5). As with previous 
strategies, this was informed by the results of the 2004 citywide audit, which by this point 
contained a section concerned with the levels of ASB in the city that was also informed 
by the national one-day count of ASB that had taken place in September 2003. This 
suggested that a total of 767 reports of ASB had been made in Southern City, the tackling 
of which had taken up 40% of total police activity on this particular day (Southern City 
CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 
7). Based upon a MORI Survey that had been conducted across all of the ‘Trailblazer’ 
areas, which included Southern City, it was evidenced that ASB continued to be rated as 
‘relatively high as a problem’ by local residents, which ranked comparatively alongside 
other much larger cities across the country (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social 
behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 7). Interestingly, the 
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‘Trailblazer’ authorities recorded a higher than national average in the rating of ASB as a 
problem, despite the application of targeted resources in tackling this issue. This appeared 
to provide support to those who had argued that in areas where additional funding was 
received for ASB control, there was a danger that too much time would be spent on 
bidding for this, and not enough on actually ensuring that the initiatives had been 
implemented: 
 
This all comes back to proper evaluation of initiatives … what 
happened for a period of time certainly during my time, is that you 
would invest a disproportionate amount of time bidding for money … 
for funds for initiatives and the (RGO) they would incur costs on 
being the arbiter of that. You then have to spend a lot of time 
justifying what you spent it on, but what we never did was spend 
enough time evaluating. So government are after quick wins, so lets 
find five million quid to spread around the country on initiative a. It’s 
like saying after a day that’s working now lets roll it out, when you 
know … it’s initiative overload … and anti-social behaviour is a good 
example of that … lets just embed what works to make sure we know 
that it works first. So whether it’s anti-social behaviour, acceptable 
behaviour whatever, give yourself enough time and of course 
government doesn’t work like that. Ministers need a quick win so that 
I can go back to the Treasury and get more money for our department. 
(Interview 024 Former Southern City Police Commander) 
 
The approach taken toward tackling ASB by the city’s practitioners by this later stage 
continued to fit in with wider national policy appeal of ‘joined-up’, multi-agency 
approaches which while predating the period of New Labour (see Blagg, 1988, Crawford, 
1997, Gilling, 1997) was certainly consolidated in the decade of the Labour 
administration (Gilling, 2007). More particularly this had been influenced by the 
Government’s ‘Together’ campaign, and was now based upon a central partnership 
between the local CDRP, Home Office and the public (Southern City CDRP, Tackling 
anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 3). In contrast to 
the previous task group structure that had supported the operational delivery of the local 
crime and disorder strategy, by this later period an ASB delivery group had been created 
which had been given ‘delegated responsibility’ by the local CDRP for tackling ASB in 
Southern City. This consisted of membership from Southernshire Constabulary and the 
local authority, and was chaired by the head of the Council’s Housing Management 
section. The same individual also had responsibility for the city’s ASB Network Group, 
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which included broader representation from not only the statutory and voluntary sectors, 
but also from local community groups. The purpose of this group was to enable an 
exchange of best practice, in a similar way to that of the structure of local multi agency 
meetings that had been set up across the city as part of the development of an operational 
structure. This was designed to support the delivery of ASB policy actions, of which 
there had been several since the last strategy, including new legislation in the form of the 
Police Reform Act 2002 and the Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003, which had culminated 
in the provision of additional specific powers for practitioners in tackling issues of ASB 
(Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 
2005 to 2008, p. 3). 
 
The response of practitioners to ASB issues in the city appeared to continue the theme of 
previous strategies, with the emphasis placed upon the adoption of a ‘problem solving’ 
approach. As noted earlier, this suggests a degree of support for elements of TP2 (which 
suggested that we would see a tension between adaptive and expressive elements at the 
local level), and of TP3 (which predicted a growing influence for instrumental ‘risk-
driven’ policies to manage ASB). However, again we should note that the adoption of an 
instrumental and managerial approach was not sufficient to support the idea that a ‘risk 
penology’ had come to characterise local ASB policy, since there remained a clear 
commitment to more ‘traditional’ penological goals of punishment on the one hand, and 
rehabilitation on the other. The local approach was underlined by the need to ensure that 
all informal measures had been exhausted prior to a case being referred to the city’s 
weekly case conference for formal action, which it is deemed in this later strategy 
document to be ‘proportionate to stop the anti-social behaviour’ (Southern City CDRP, 
Tackling anti-social behaviour in Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12): 
 
Since the inception of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, [Southern 
City] had adopted a problem-solving approach. Whilst this involves 
taking formal action through the powers available in law, it is 
underpinned by informal methods. The holistic approach places the 
victims of anti-social behaviour at the centre of the solution, 
recognising the need to strengthen communities, support witnesses 
and deal with perpetrators through rehabilitation as well as 
prosecution. (Southern City CDRP, Tackling anti-social behaviour in 
Southern City. A strategy for 2005 to 2008, p. 12) 
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As part of this strategy aimed at combating ASB through the use of informally based 
measures as a tool of first resort, this later document also encouraged at least at the level 
of rhetoric (Hughes, 2009) increased involvement from members of affected local 
communities. As a result of newly introduced legislation, the partnership by this stage 
could offer an increased range of initiatives to assist in this process, which included an 
ASB Hotline that was monitored by the local authority ASB team, a product of the 
Government’s ‘Together’ campaign, and the provision of public training and awareness 
sessions. As part of this it was also possible for Mediation to be utilised as a means of 
settling neighbour disputes in particular, before cases were escalated. An element of this 
renewed emphasis upon community involvement in tackling issues of ASB locally, was 
the recognised need of the Partnership to increase public confidence in the measures 
being utilised by practitioners in addressing ASB. It was anticipated that this would be 
achieved through the introduction of a range of further initiatives, which included the 
city’s YIP and YISP programmes that targeted young people, and a renewed police 
presence across communities as a result of the creation of Police Community Support 
Officers, a role introduced following the passing of the Police Reform Act (see Chapter 
Three). A further key element of this Strategy was the recognition of the need to improve 
environments, with the creation of a dedicated Graffiti Partnership, the use of CCTV in 
both the city centre and other identified local centres and the introduction of the Clean 
and Green project, which encouraged local community groups to address illegal 
activities, including fly-tipping and dog fouling. All of this suggested a broadening in the 
scope of methods being used by the city’s practitioners in order to tackle issues of ASB 
locally.  
 
More recent developments 
 
By the end of the fieldwork, it was clear that practitioners in Southern City had begun to 
sense a decline in the emphasis being placed upon the tackling of ASB by those at the 
national level. This was associated primarily with the change in Prime Minister, from 
Tony Blair to the former Chancellor Gordon Brown, which had occurred during the 
period of the fieldwork. Respondents sensed that ASB was not ‘such a hot topic 
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politically as it used to be’ (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP), as increasingly other 
issues took priority in the Government's political agenda. These included issues of 
immigration and economic affairs (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP). At the same 
time, there was a clear decline in the levels of policy talk associated with ASB. Where 
there were references to ASB, these often came in a context that hinted at the adoption of 
a softer stance by those at the national level (Millie 2009). The previously ‘shrill tone’ of 
the ASB agenda under Blair’s leadership, appeared to be on the wane (Hughes 2007, p. 
120). This illustrates the significance of ‘policy talk’ in that it can have real impacts in 
setting the tone and context for actual policymaking (Pollitt 2001). Whilst there was 
resistance on many levels to the more punitive approaches suggested in Blair’s original 
rhetoric, the power of the political discourse made it difficult to resist at least elements of 
this approach. The new Prime Minister also appeared to distance himself from Blair’s 
approach to this issue. The final signifier of change at the national level came with the 
movement of the Government’s ASBU, away from its previous location within the Home 
Office, to the Department for Children Families and Services. The net result of this was 
to give impetus to a shift in focus, which had begun with the Government’s previous 
‘Respect’ programme.  
 
Central to this shift was a reorientation of aims, away from enforcement and punishment, 
and more towards prevention and support for parenting and families, and young people in 
general. This represented both a symbolic and practical reconfiguration of ASB policy 
away from a punitive focus, which had a clear impact upon partnership working at the 
local level. This further brings into question the validity of TP3, which suggested that 
ASB policy would increasingly see risk management becoming the dominant focus at the 
expense of rehabilitation (or punishment), and that policy in other areas would become 
‘governed by ASB’. By contrast, these shifts demonstrated a move in the opposite 
direction, with ASB policy increasingly governed by reference to other areas of social 
policy. The statutory partners in Southern City recognised the need for representatives 
from children, youth and families sector to become more engaged in the formulation of 
local level policy regarding ASB: 
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Although there is still quite a strong emphasis around tackling ASB 
head on, there’s been a slight softening of that is my take on it with a 
much greater emphasis around preventative work … there’s a much 
greater emphasis around not just challenging young people but 
working with young people and families and a much stronger 
emphasis on parenting. And we have seen that shift in emphasis, 
which has been accompanied by a shift on funding as well. So more 
money going into the parenting arena then we had previously had and 
much greater emphasis on the family intervention programmes and 
projects around the country … So I think at national level spilling 
down to local level that’s probably the biggest change that I have seen 
over the last year or two. (Interview 008R Southern City Local 
Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services) 
  
These shifts seemed to reduce the demands placed upon practitioners to deliver the 
previous enforcement-based elements of policy action, which again had encouraged more 
local partners to accept their role in the tackling of ASB. This came at a time when 
practitioners had sought to make full use of government legislation on this issue, as local 
level policy was also being formulated. However, the use of enforcement action in 
relation to ASB had not disappeared altogether. In fact, New Labour in its later phase of 
government had continued to seek to expand the breadth of the powers available to 
practitioners (see Chapter Three). By contrast though, this approach was accompanied by 
an explicitly more preventative set of policy options, as the Government seemingly 
sought a more balanced approach. This was possibly due to the emergence of local 
resistances to national level policies, and an increasingly more negotiated stance being 
developed in relation to issues such as ASB, noted elsewhere by commentators across 
localities (see for example Edwards and Hughes, 2008). ‘Before I think it was very much 
central government saying to local government this is what you are going to do, now it’s 
more central government talking to local government about how we are going to deliver 
what’s needed to be delivered from central policy so we have methods of passing things 
back up through the same mechanisms’ (Interview 013 Southern City Local Authority 
Programme Director for Partnerships and Localities).  
 
At the level of Southern City, this was manifested in proposals for increased amounts of 
support work to be undertaken by those at the local level, as national policymakers 
looked ‘to parallel legal actions with much more stuff around support work’ (Interview 
008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing 
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Services). These shifts provide an interesting perspective on TP2, which suggested that 
we would see ongoing tension between the ‘adaptive’ approach and more enforcement-
oriented kinds of policy associated with expressive approaches. Rather, what emerged 
was an interesting admixture in which enforcement and other approaches were combined 
in a complimentary way, at least in theory.  
 
Later local level strategy documents that were produced in Southern City were 
underpinned by a need to ‘provide support for those at risk of anti-social behaviour’ and 
the provision of targeted support services for perpetrators’ (Southern City CDRP, Final 
Draft. Anti social behaviour strategy 2008-11. Promoting positive behaviour, p. 11). The 
levels of support that were offered by Southern City’s practitioners included access to a 
range of professional, statutory or voluntary organisations, all of which could assist 
perpetrators with advice and guidance on a range of topics, particularly in relation to the 
challenges that were being faced by young people (Southern City Local Authority Care 
and Safer Communities Scrutiny Commission minutes 18th November 2008, p. 4). 
However, it was recognised that it may be difficult to secure positive engagement with 
these range of services. In an effort to combat this, practitioners were also able to utilise 
more formal methods, which included the use of Individual Support Orders and Parenting 
Orders (see the work of Sadie Parr, 2006; 2009). Both of which ‘can be applied to ensure 
people engage with support’ (Southern City Local Authority Care and Safer 
Communities Scrutiny Commission minutes 18th November 2008, p. 4). Thus, the 
importance of having addressed the underlying causes of ASB rather than simply 
punishing the perpetrators (the seeds of which were seen in the ‘Respect’ Agenda), was 
increasingly visible, both nationally and locally.  
 
The impact of this more preventative era upon those operating at the local level in 
Southern City enabled local level practitioners with a similar viewpoint to begin to take 
more of an active role in this process. This was a shift that was supported by the Chair of 
the ASB Delivery Group, (which had delegated responsibility from the local CDRP for 
tackling issues of ASB in Southern City), who suggested that those who favoured a more 
supportive means of tackling ASB had begun to have more of a voice in this setting, as 
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the balance was gradually restored between ‘stick and carrot approaches’ (Interview 
008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing 
Services). By the latter stages of the research fieldwork (2008), practitioners had also 
begun to formulate the next ASB strategy for the city, which covered the following three-
year period from 2008 onwards. The ASB team manager from the City Council was 
responsible for refreshing this document, which at the time of their second interview was 
out to consultation: 
 
I hope it builds on the previous ASB strategy … for the city, and the 
focus as I said is the triple track approach of support, enforcement and 
early intervention, maybe putting more play on that than there has 
been the case in the past. Certainly we spoke last time we met around 
the evolution of this central government agenda being enforcement 
led. I think the fact that we have sort of broken down these barriers 
between different responsibilities for different aspects you know of 
that prevention work locally, we now work I hope because of the 
national agenda has given us an opportunity to work much more 
closely with our colleagues in Children and Young Peoples Services, 
the traditional social services if you like, we sort of share common 
objectives so I think all of that is certainly considered within the new 
ASB strategy. (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB 
Team Manager) 
 
In Southern City, it was clear that a ‘two man band’ style of response had previously 
emerged in the tackling of ASB, which was initially dominated and led by key senior 
police officers and local authority officials in the city. Whilst initial policies had 
emphasised the importance of robust enforcement action (e.g. in the Streetwise project, 
see Chapter Six), this was later moderated by the renewed emphasis that was placed upon 
the importance of prevention and the option of the use of less formal interventions. Such 
developments did not come without criticism locally. Some practitioners reported that 
this had emanated from some local residents who were attracted to the highly publicised, 
more overtly enforcement-based stance of practitioners that had been taken in cities such 
as Manchester. This was reflected in local media reporting, with an article from the 
Southern City Post about the use of dispersal orders in the city reporting that whilst 
‘[o]pponents complain that the hammer-to-crack-a-nut approach criminalises all 
teenagers without proof of their intent, while residents in other areas believe the powers 
don't go far enough’ (Allen 2007). This provides an interesting perspective in relation to 
 144 
 
 
TP2, which suggested that the tension between adaptation and expressive (populist) 
policies would characterise local ASB policymaking. Whilst some such tensions were 
observable, there was little evidence of a strongly driven ‘populist’ policy (in terms of 
promoting tough enforcement action) at the local level (although there were isolated 
examples of such approaches, perhaps exemplified in the Streetwise Project – see the 
next Chapter). However, the local media source quoted above demonstrated that populist 
pressures did not always work to support punitive enforcement action. Whilst this was the 
case in some areas, in others it appears that popular opinion was critical of such 
approaches for their potential exclusionary impact on young people. Some local policy 
actors in Southern City expressed support for the city’s refusal to adopt wholesale the 
enforcement approaches of some high profile local authorities. There was even a hint of 
pride that the local approach had been subject to public criticism by a leading councillor 
from Manchester, who at the time was also acting in a national level capacity: 
 
We got some stick from Bill Pitt about that in his sort of role that he 
played nationally where he was saying well I don’t agree with that, 
that’s not the Government’s policy. We said well it may not be the 
Government’s policy but it is our approach in [Southern City] and we 
are content to stick to it, and that’s where this the voice if you like of 
the people saying you can’t just do enforcement, you can’t just do 
enforcement, you have got to have other things otherwise you are 
potentially driving young people into a particular route. (Interview 
008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of 
Neighbourhood and Housing Services) 
 
This raises questions about TP1, which suggested that we should expect substantively 
similar ASB policies to develop at the local level, driven by the broader influences at 
national level. Although national influences were clearly extremely important, there 
remained very significant room for local resistance and policy formulation, and thus 
variation.  
 
By the later stages in Southern City, it was apparent that practitioners were continuing to 
use those systems for tackling ASB that had been created during the early stages in the 
formulation of a response to this issue. The only difference being that these working 
practices had now become more embedded than they had been during the earliest 
interviews undertaken (circa. 2005). It was suggested by a participant with a background 
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in the police, that the embedding of ASB as a 'theme', had been the effect of New 
Labour's previous two terms in government. It was their opinion that this had resulted 
from the continual exchange between nationally led initiatives such as ‘Together’ and 
‘Respect’ on the one hand, and local policies on the other. However, this respondent 
added: ‘[w]hether it was intended to happen that way or whether that was a coincidental 
output I don’t know’ (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). 
In the case of Southern City specifically, it was more than likely that this had had a 
contributing effect upon the growing establishment of ASB working practices, owing to 
the previously received national recognition in the form of both ‘Trailblazer’ and 
‘Respect’ area status. As a result Southern City had been held up as an example of best 
practice regarding tackling ASB. In order to maintain this, there needed to be full 
engagement with these national level programmes, and the development of a coordinated 
local approach. This was especially due to the range of additional pilot projects that 
practitioners had been charged with undertaking, as a result of this extra level of national 
scrutiny:  
 
Like I have said it always has been a cross cutting theme ASB, and I 
don’t see that that’s changed in any way if anything the fact that there 
is no longer a ‘Respect’ Taskforce within the Home Office, has helped 
facilitate the embedding of that culture in all those council, central 
government departments. (Interview 010R Southern City Local 
Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
It was therefore this cycle of practice, which in Southern City had led to national 
recognition of practitioner efforts in relation to tackling ASB that had seen it becoming a 
fixed element of the local agenda. There was also a pressure placed upon local agencies 
to maintain a national reputation, having achieved ‘Trailblazer’ status, been identified as 
a ‘Respect’ zone and been a ‘Beacon’ authority. All of which had culminated in Southern 
City’s local authority in particular having received a lot of attention from both those at 
the national level, and also from other areas that sought to learn from their examples of 
best practice in this field. The institutional framework and related systems that had been 
put in place during the early years of the new millennium remained largely unchanged 
during the years that followed. In the words of one police interviewee (who had been 
involved in the initial creation of these mechanisms), these had proven to be ‘very sound 
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work, and what we set up then is still appropriate and relevant … [It’s] the same policy 
and structure that we set up in 2003’ (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB 
Team Manager).  
 
Policy ‘Actions’ 
 
In Pollitt’s (2001) terms, policy ‘action’ is defined as actual policy ‘outcomes’ in the 
form of concrete examples of policy implementation ‘on the ground’. Of course, this still 
leaves some room for confusion between what might count as a policy action at the local 
level (potentially ranging from the adoption of a clear local policy as a response to 
national legislation, to the actual policy ‘outcomes’ in individual cases). For current 
purposes, one useful indicator of policy ‘action’ in the arena of ASB control could be the 
numbers of ASBOs (or other formal interventions) issued in a local authority area. This is 
not to argue that this is the only indicator of action. Rather, that for current purposes it 
provides a useful (and measurable) proxy that can be compared against shifts in policy 
talk and policy decisions.  
 
As Chapter Three has already outlined, we know that in the years immediately following 
the CDA, there was evidence of low take up of the ASBO across England and Wales. 
Home Office statistics showed that only 317 in total had been issued between April 1999 
and March 2001 (House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into Anti Social 
Behaviour 2004). This perhaps offered an indication as to the growing unpopularity of 
this measure amongst practitioners locally, which was not just confined to those within 
agencies concerned with young people, despite acknowledgement that this was a sector 
of the population that had come to be particular targets of ASB management (Millie 
2009, p. 115). As noted above, in Southern City many practitioners expressed a dislike of 
the Government’s enforcement led approach. This group included Social Landlords who 
have seemingly shown a preference in these cases for the use of non-enforceable 
measures, such as the ABC, indicating perhaps that ‘the appetite for punitive measures is 
not as great as the plethora of enforcement legislation might suggest’ (Burney as cited in 
Millie 2009, p. 198). As Table Two shows, this impression was certainly borne out by the 
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figures on ASBO usage that were issued in Southern City during the period of interest of 
the study. In the first four years of the drive on ASB policy, relatively low numbers of 
ASBOs were issued. There was a pattern of increasing usage of ASBOs during the 
middle part of the decade, increasing from 10 in 2002 to a peak of 89 in 2004. There was 
then a steady decrease in the numbers of ASBOs issued, falling back down to 29 in 2007 
(see also Hughes 2007, p. 124 and his noting of similar peaks in ASBO usage).  
 
Table Two: ASBO usage in Southern City 
 
Year   ASBOs issued 
2000   12 
2001   19 
2002   10 
2003   31 
2004   89 
2005   61 
2006   34 
2007   29 
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As noted in Chapter Three, the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act was accompanied by a 
national ASB campaign called ‘Together’. Its aim was to encourage communities to 
develop a more robust response in tackling ASB, but in a broader sense it also aimed to 
address some of the national variations in approach that had begun to emerge. This 
regional variation in policy action - the actual implementation of the new measures - was 
recognised by interviewees in Southern City. As we discussed in Chapter Three, local 
authorities such as Manchester City Council became recognised nationally for their high 
levels of ASBO usage, often to the exclusion of other more informally based measures: 
‘They [Manchester] have gone for broke on them, they have served hundreds and 
hundreds of ASBOs’ (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing 
Management). This claim was further supported by Home Office statistics, which by the 
time of this particular interview in 2006 had seen Manchester having issued a total of 
1464 ASBOs, making them second only to London (Home Office Online 2006). Such 
comments were made with a degree of disapproval, and it was interesting that both police 
and local authority officials in Southern City were so keen to distance themselves from 
what they saw as an overly punitive approach. In interview, this contrast in practice was 
regularly raised by research participants: ‘we may have just topped a hundred [ASBOs] I 
don’t know, but we’ve not gone for broke on them, we have been much more select about 
how we have used them, we have gone much more for informal interventions rather than 
for legal action’ (Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing 
Management). Even though Home Office statistics suggested that Southern City had in 
fact issued 256 ASBOs by 2006, significantly higher than the perception of this particular 
respondent, the rate of use of this intervention in the city was much lower compared to 
the rates seen in cities such as Manchester.  
 
As we noted above, the police respondents were equally explicit in distancing themselves 
from an over-reliance on ASBOs and enforcement approaches generally. In contrast to 
the claims of some influential commentators on police-driven approaches to community 
safety (see, for example, Coleman et al, 2009, Gilling, 2007), these local police actors, in 
the field of ASB management at least, were supportive of the preventive turn and 
adaptive problem solving.  In Southern City they claimed very high levels of ‘success’ 
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for less formal interventions, such as warning letters and ABCs, based upon the case not 
having been returned to them within a six month period. The official reporting of the use 
of these interventions by Southernshire Constabulary indicated that a total of 282 ABCs 
were issued between April 2004 and March 2006 (Southernshire Constabulary Online). 
In discussing the use of these measures, local authority officials also claimed that the 
ABC, in practice, had a ‘massive success rate’ (Interview 008 Southern City Local 
Authority Head of Housing Management). Despite these very self-conscious attempts by 
leading police and local authority officials to present Southern City policy in a certain 
light, the actual figures for total ASBOs issued only partly supported their impressions. 
There does seem to have been, contrary to some of the claims made, a quite significant 
increase in ASBOs during the early years of the new Millennium. These figures remained 
substantially lower than some of the more enthusiastic local authority supporters of 
ASBOs nationally, such as Manchester where in 2004 they issued 430 ASBOs (Home 
Office Online 2009) but at the same time Southern City’s rates were higher than many 
other local authorities’ figures, of the same period. This caused them to rank at the 
bottom of the top 10 of ASBO usage across criminal justice area in 2004, alongside other 
larger cities, before there was a marked decline in the use of this particular intervention 
from the following year onwards (Home Office Online 2009). Despite this there was still 
a stark contrast between the levels of ASBO usage recorded in Southern City and the area 
at number nine, as they compared favourably with other similarly sized areas.  
 
Whilst the picture of declining use of ASBOs was certainly clear, even at the end of the 
period considered, the numbers of ASBOs issued annually remained two to three times 
higher than in the years at the start of the decade. In terms of the policy ‘talk’ of leading 
police and local authority officials, and the policy decisions as manifested in local policy 
statements and documents, there was a clear attempt to distance Southern City from the 
more extreme models of enforcement associated with local authorities such as 
Manchester. But in terms of one measure of policy ‘actions’ – e.g. numbers of ASBOs 
actually issued – the picture was not quite so clear.  
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Of those ASBOs that were issued in the city, it was reported by several respondents 
involved in the fieldwork that the breach rates had been relatively low. For a local 
authority ASB officer this was explained by the ‘selective’ approach that had been taken 
to the use of this particular measure (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority 
Official Caseworker ASB Team). Practitioners sought to ‘look at cases we tend to know 
we can tackle, deal with, resolve and it’s rare that they get breached, we do get breaches 
there’s no doubt about it but we don’t get that many’ (Interview 006 Southern City Local 
Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team). However, this offered a contrasting picture 
to that which was occurring nationally during the study. Local media reporting on this 
issue in 2008 further supported these findings, following the release of Home Office 
statistics: 
 
 Yobs … are breaching their anti – social behaviour orders more than 
three times each, government figures reveal.  
 
Records released by the Home Office show the number of orders 
(Asbos) issued in the region almost halved in 12 months, from 61 in 
2005 to 34 the following year.  
 
But despite the small number handed out by officials, offenders broke 
the conditions of their orders on 109 occasions in 2006, an average of 
3.2 times each. (Southern City Post, May 2008) 
 
By 2010 Home Office statistics were suggesting that nationwide the breach rate against 
the use of ASBOs was around 56% (Home Office Online 2011). In an attempt to counter 
negative perceptions regarding this figure, Home Office staff used this as an opportunity 
to suggest that what a high ASBO breach rate in fact suggested was that these orders 
‘have teeth’ as "[a]pproximately 55 per cent of adults that breach an ASBO are given 
immediate custody" (Southern City Post February 2007). It is possible to apply the same 
data locally, in order to identify breach rates of ASBOs by criminal justice area. In the 
case of Southern City this again presented a conflicting picture to that offered by local 
respondents involved in this study, with a breach rate of 49.3% having been recorded in 
this area alone by 2010. By this point, Southern City had issued 410 ASBOs, of which 
202 had been breached at least once. Out of these 202 breached orders, 155 had been 
breached on more than one occasion. This suggested that each ASBO issued in Southern 
City was breached on average 4.6 times (Home Office Online 2011). It is this apparent 
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decline in the numbers of ASBOs being issued in Southern City, alongside increased 
breach levels that potentially provides evidence of Garland’s (2001) politics of denial, by 
supporting the idea that crime will not be effectively tackled through the use of punitively 
based measures alone.  
 
Overall, then, in terms of policy actions there was evidence of a decline in the use of 
formal measures following the peak in ASBO figures in 2004. In Southern City this saw 
the rate of ASBOs issued decline from 89 at its peak, to 61 the following year in 2005. 
The lowest point in these rates came in 2007 when only 29 ASBOs were issued in 
Southern City, a quarter of what it had been in 2004 (Home Office Online 2009). There 
had been a similar decline in the use of other comparatively formal measures such as 
dispersal orders. These are place-based sanctions brought into force by the 2003 Anti 
Social Behaviour Act (S30-36), which can be used by the police to ‘exclude groups of 
two or more persons from a designated area, where their behaviour or presence is likely 
to be perceived by others as anti-social’ (Hadfield et al. 2009, p. 469). It was suggested 
that the previous use in Southern City of this particular measure had proven to be more of 
a ‘temporary stop gap exercise of additional powers’ and it was instead recognised that 
what was actually required was a problem solving plan (Interview 005 Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Even though there had been some examples of 
positive publicity surrounding the use of dispersal powers in the city. These included 
cited examples of the use of these measures specifically in Southern City, in promotional 
material published as part of the Government’s later ‘Respect’ campaign: 
 
When the community was consulted as to whether a dispersal area 
was necessary in the [an] area of [Southern City], the resounding reply 
was ‘why aren’t you using it already?’ Since the dispersal was 
implemented, it has been hugely effective in dispersing groups of 
problematic individuals in an area where the police often face conflict. 
(Southernshire Constabulary ASB coordinator) 
 
In terms of the distribution of their use, following several surveys of local CDRPs by the 
Home Office between 20 January 2004 and 31 March 2006, 1065 areas nationally had in 
total been designated as dispersal zones. However, within this timeframe there had also 
been a corresponding 42% decline in their use across the period 2005-06, the only ASB 
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related intervention to witness such a drop in its usage nationally (Crawford and Lister 
2007, p.10). At the same time, in contrast to other measures such as ABCs, ASBIs, 
demotion orders, crackhouse closures and parenting interventions across the same period 
saw dramatic increases in their usage (Home Office 2007a). ‘The downturn in use also 
reflects a more general preference among many community safety and ASB practitioners 
to prioritize preventative approaches over enforcement’ (Crawford and Lister 2007, p. 
10). This was a pattern that was similarly reflected in Southern City, where the initial 
take up of the use of this intervention between April 2004 and March 2005 saw 29 group 
dispersals imposed, a figure that was more than halved the following year with only 13 
group dispersals having been issued (Southernshire Constabulary Online). 
 
In terms of the other measures that were in use in Southern City to tackle ASB, the use of 
ASBIs continued to be favoured over full ASBOs, as these had proven to be both costly 
and difficult to obtain (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager). Nationally this was supported by data gathered across local authority 
landlords. In the area covered by Southern City, this suggested that across the period 
2008-2010 a total of 174 ASBIs had been granted (Wall 2010, p. 14). Several 
respondents reported that the decline of the use of the ASBO since its peak in 2004 was 
also related to the growing number of options open to practitioners in dealing with this 
issue. Perhaps particularly in those cases involving young people where there had been a 
continuing preference against the use of ASBOs wherever possible: 
 
[W]e’ll use the power like we would use lots of powers in local 
Government, when it’s appropriate and proportionate to the situation. 
So there’s been no loss in confidence in the legal actions, we still do 
loads of legal actions in [Southern City] wherever we need to that’s 
the bedrock if you like. (Interview 008R Southern City Local 
Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services) 
 
This illustrates that by the end of the study, the shift at the national level combined with 
changes in the approach of local level practitioners, had in fact enabled a potentially 
larger group of partners to legitimately consider other options in addressing ASB. The 
overtly enforcement-based approach of the initial New Labour government had begun to 
decline (Burney, 2005, Hughes, 2007), and practitioners in favour of a softer approach 
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were given the opportunity to become more involved in local level strategy formulation, 
and in making an active contribution to the process of shaping this: 
 
Where there was the people who were on there that would have been 
there to represent the softer approach if you like, the working with, 
providing the support and stuff, their voice had been heard but 
because the enforcement role nationally was in the ascendancy very 
much, lots of legislation coming through and high expectations on the 
‘Trailblazers’ and all those sort of things, which Louise and her team 
had launched, that voice wasn’t heard quite so strongly. I think with 
the change in emphasis that voice is coming through a bit stronger, 
that’s what I was beginning to see. Now, I haven’t been there for these 
last eight/nine months but my expectation is that will be, that will 
have a greater representation in the new ASB strategy that [Southern 
City] produces, or is about to produce in the next month or two. My 
expectation is that will have a bigger voice, a bigger say in the 
strategy. The enforcement will still be there, but that other voice will 
have grown up had a chance to mature a bit more I suppose if you 
like. So we will see more stuff around support plans for individuals, 
the parenting stuff, the working with challenged families and things 
like that, perhaps in a way that we didn’t quite see before. So that was 
probably the biggest shift in emphasis that I was beginning to see in 
that 8 months or so last year. (Interview 008R Southern City Local 
Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services) 
 
This enabled Southern City’s practitioners to broaden their approach toward the tackling 
of ASB, incorporating the more widely received methods that now increasingly coincided 
with the national level agenda on this issue. In Southern City this resulted in the use of 
alternative interventions, such as restorative justice, which was a method that was 
increasingly being used by the police as an additional means of settling cases of ASB (in 
part building on the initiatives noted by Burney (2005) as emanating from Thames Valley 
and its police force as well building on the longer tradition of restorative justice 
programmes across the world, McLaughlin et al (2003)). It was an approach that also 
reflected the newly developed national level desire for whole households to be actively 
engaged in this process. This was as opposed to just addressing individual behaviour, 
when tackling incidents of this nature (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority 
ASB Team Manager). The use of these measures was based upon reparations being made 
to individual victims, as the role of affected communities and residents remained pivotal 
having influenced the development of the practitioner response toward tackling ASB. It 
was also through the use of these measures that practitioners within Southern City once 
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again received national recognition for their efforts, something that had been a key 
feature of their early responses to the issue of ASB. On this occasion, Southernshire 
Constabulary became one of nine pilot areas for the Home Office, running Youth 
Restorative Disposals (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager). Practitioners in this area were seen to have adopted a pioneering approach, not 
only in addressing the behaviour of young people in this manner, but also in signalling in 
part a departure away from a performance culture orientation for the police (Interview 
005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). The city’s local authority had 
also received further national recognition, as they had been awarded ‘Beacon’ authority 
status by the latter stages of the fieldwork: 
 
[A]lthough a lot of people think of RJ s a pink and fluffy option I 
don’t think of it like that, I think of it as a much harder option where 
people are actually coming to terms with what they have done and 
having an opportunity to put things right and ‘repair the harm’ as we 
say in restorative justice terms. (Interview 005R Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager) 
 
There was also evidence in the local media to support the extension of this recognition to 
individual practitioners in the city. This was reported in the Southern City Post in 2007, 
when an ASB coordinator who had worked in close cooperation with a resident to enact 
an ASBO against a nuisance neighbour had received an award from Prime Minister Tony 
Blair: [they] have been to Central Hall, Westminster, where Tony Blair presented 
certificates to a handful of anti-social behaviour co-ordinators from across the country for 
their work with the public. Mr Blair said: "Across the country, communities are making 
use of the powers we have given them to curb anti-social behaviour. Anti-social 
behaviour co-ordinators have played a vital role in this transformation - working with 
local people to identify problems and solutions" (Southern City Post March 2007). 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that ASB policy had been somewhat uncoordinated in 
Southern City up until the passing of the 1998 CDA, which led to the creation of CDRPs. 
Again this reflected wider processes across most local authority areas in the decade of the 
1990s (Crawford, 1997, Hughes, 1998). These CDRPs sought to bring the statutory 
agencies together in a more joined up approach as prior to this there had been isolated 
pockets of activity in addressing problems of low-level disorder. The new partnership 
arrangements produced a number of written strategies, in line with legislative 
requirements. These focused upon outlining the manner in which problems of low-level 
disorder and crime in areas such as Southern City should be tackled, and included a range 
of measurable objectives and targets. Overall, it seems that leading local practitioners in 
Southern City favoured a more holistic ‘problem solving’ approach to ASB that focused 
upon the use of informally based diversionary methods as a tool of first response rather 
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than simply repression and exclusion. This operating framework was outlined in the 
initial crime and disorder strategy, which was designed to support this style of response. 
By the time of the second strategy being developed in the city, it was evident that 
practitioners within Southernshire Constabulary and the local authority were beginning to 
emerge as policy leaders in the field of tackling ASB, as dedicated teams were 
established in each and resources were mobilised for the first time in a more targeted 
manner. The establishment of the necessary systems and processes that were designed to 
tackle ASB in the city accompanied this formation of operationally focused teams, as a 
duopoly of control between the police and local authority began to emerge.  
 
There was a gradual ascendancy of a coordinated, adaptive approach, accompanied by 
routinisation in tackling issues of ASB as these emerging systems and processes became 
gradually more embedded (despite the high profile ‘zero tolerance’ initiative of 
Streetwise which was met with much enthusiasm by the Home Office ASB Unit, 
discussed in Chapter Six below). This led to the city being highlighted by central 
government as an example of best practice in tackling issues of ASB, which began with 
their introduction of the high profile Streetwise Project aimed at tackling persistent 
aggressive begging in the City Centre. Nonetheless alongside this ‘tough’ initiative, there 
was also clear evidence to suggest the use of a pyramid approach in relation to the range 
of interventions that were being used by practitioners. This culminated in local 
practitioners working closely alongside Home Office colleagues throughout the period of 
interest of this study, despite evidence of the approach that was being most routinely 
adopted locally contrasted with the more enforcement-oriented response that was being 
encouraged by some politicians at the national level. With regard to ASBOs, even though 
Southern City reflected national trends, with peaks in the usage of these interventions 
being recorded in 2004/2005 followed by a sustained period of decline, their numbers 
never increased to the proportions seen in other more enforcement led areas such as 
Manchester. Therefore, it appears that practitioners seemingly maintained on balance the 
problem solving approach to ASB that was advocated in the strategy documents that were 
produced locally in response to broader national policy shifts. 
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This chapter has provided some interesting empirical insights in relation to the four 
‘theoretical propositions’ outlined at the end of Chapter Two. With regard to TP1, which 
suggested that we might expect to see a general similarity of approach in ASB policy in 
Southern City to that being set out at the national level, there were mixed findings. The 
findings supported the view that national policy agendas – including both specific 
legislation and a range of policy ‘tools’ and resources – were vital in stimulating local 
policy changes in this area, and also in setting out broad parameters within which ASB 
policy played out at the city level. However, the empirical findings also brought into 
question the notion of a straightforward ‘top-down’ (or ‘national-local’) view of policy 
change. There was evidence of substantial resistance to some aspects of the national 
agenda, and a reworking of different elements – mediated via the relationships between 
local agencies and actors – to produce a distinctive local policy mix. This would suggest 
that a conceptualisation of crime (and ASB) policymaking that valorises the broad 
national picture does risk over-simplifying what is a much more complex empirical 
reality. Turning to TP2, there was certainly strong evidence of a tension between the 
‘adaptive’ dimensions of ASB policy, and those of a more expressive nature. However, 
the largely practitioner-led nature of local ASB policy (evidence of interventions by 
elected politicians was notable by its absence) resulted in a relative lack of local 
‘populist’ pressure, with local practitioners largely engaging with national policy 
agendas. At the same time, there were clearly tensions between the adaptive approaches 
favoured locally, and the more expressive and strident tone of national policy rhetoric by 
politicians such as Tony Blair, and officials such as Louise Casey. This tension was 
referred to explicitly by a number of interviewees.  With regard to TP3, there was some 
evidence of the emergence of a more risk-oriented and managerial approach to dealing 
with ASB, and one which involved the active engagement of a range of partners beyond 
traditional ‘criminal justice’ agencies. However, there was little evidence of ASB 
becoming the dominant focus of other agencies (such as health or education), and at the 
same time there remained an important commitment to finding ways of solving the 
‘problem’ of ASB, in particular via more traditional ‘penal-welfare’ measures of family 
support and youth services. So this chapter demonstrated only limited support for TP3, 
and suggested that the ‘risk-orientation’ proposed by Feeley and Simon requires 
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adaptation for the much more complex picture suggested by the empirical research. 
Finally, TP4 suggested that local ASB policy would be characterised by the emergence of 
clearly defined ‘policy networks’ of the types outlined by Rhodes (1997). There was 
certainly evidence of the emergence of networks of policy actors, and a degree of 
formalisation of these networks resulted from the statutory requirements of legislation 
such as the CDA 1998 (which required the establishment of local CDRPs for example), 
and by the provision of a set of formal tools (and new resources) for practitioners in the 
field of ASB. Nevertheless, it was not clear that the networks that did emerge fell neatly 
into the categories put forward by Rhodes. Indeed, rather than a relatively established and 
broad based ‘policy community’ around ASB, what seemed to emerge was a looser 
policy network that was dominated and led in practice by a ‘duopoly’ consisting of the 
police and the local authority. The nature of relations between local policy actors is 
considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Exploring the Anti-Social Behaviour policy process in Southern City: 
Power, negotiation and contestation in multi-agency governance 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the findings from the fieldwork and documentary research, which 
explored the complexities and contingencies of the local policy process. In general then 
the aim of this chapter is to explore the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ as well as the ‘what’ 
questions:  
 
· How and why did ASB policy in Southern City come to take the shape that it did?  
· What were the key influences on the policy trajectory followed? 
· What was the nature of the relationships between key local players in the policy 
process?  
· What does this tell us more broadly about the nature of policymaking in this 
field?  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, there is a burgeoning research literature on the day-to-day 
experiences and realities of multi-agency partnership working in the governance of crime 
and disorder (Hughes 2007; Gilling 2007; Crawford 2009, Henry, 2009).  However the 
ways in which these processes take shape and are variously constituted with regard to 
anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB) policy and practice locally has as yet been largely 
side-stepped in most criminological commentary where the focus has remained 
‘doggedly’ on the broad national tendencies (Squires 2008a & b, Millie, 2009 but see 
Hughes and Follett 2006; Edwards and Hughes 2008; 2009).  Building on the evidence 
and claims made in the previous chapter, this chapter examines the relational processes 
lying, sociologically, at the core of policy development and the institutionalisation of new 
governmental practices. 
 
The following key themes of the Southern City ASB policy process are highlighted both 
with regard to the timeline for policy change presented in Chapter Four, and in terms of 
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any features regarding inter-agency relationships which persist across the whole period of 
the fieldwork: 
 
· Policy zealotry and the ‘special relationship’ of Southern City and the Home 
Office ASB Unit; 
· The rhetoric of multi-agency partnership cooperation and the persistent reality of 
a police-local authority ‘duopoly’; 
· The marginalisation of the Regional Government Office and other local partners. 
· Reconfiguring the centrally driven agenda and institutionalisation of the modest 
‘adaptive strategy’. 
 
The concluding section of the chapter will reflect on these issues and in particular what 
implications the empirical analysis reported here had for the four ‘theoretical 
propositions’ outlined at the end of Chapter Two.   
 
Policy zealotry and the ‘special relationship’ of Southern City and the Home Office 
ASB Unit 
 
In considering this relationship between these two local level agencies, it is also 
important to again acknowledge the influence of the direct nature of the links that had 
been established between these key policy actors and those working at the national level 
at the Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU). This close working relationship 
between the Home Office team and members of the Council ASB team was a feature of 
Southern City’s approach that was first highlighted during 2005-2007 and the initial 
stages of the fieldwork, and was discussed in the previous findings chapter as being a 
potentially distinguishing feature of Southern City’s emergent policy response to ASB 
when compared to other cities and localities (see Burney 2005; Hughes and Follett 2006). 
The origins of this ‘special relationship’ appear to be found with key individual policy 
actors both nationally and in the local authority who were strong willed, shared common 
commitments and enthusiasm and were able to drive forward policy delivery both locally 
and nationally. This was especially marked in the national ASB lead, Louise Casey, 
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whose fervent enforcement-based stance to the tackling of ASB has since attracted 
comments from other writers in this field. This led, for example, to Casey having been 
described as being both ‘an outspoken and fervent campaigner’ whose role as lead of 
what was anticipated as being a five year programme involved, according to one 
academic commentator, ‘preaching and supplying advice to local agencies’ (Millie 2009, 
p. 31). This was a style of approach that had been witnessed by some of the practitioners 
in Southern City, with both Louise Casey’s individual approach and the work of the 
wider ASBU having clearly set the tone for the country on this issue, largely following 
Blair’s policy lead: 
  
I mean it’s some different people, but one of the things that, that there 
was something about the way that Louise [Casey] worked she is a 
very charismatic person, very strong leader, very strong views about 
things and would impress on people that ‘that’s the way things are 
going to be, okay?’ But at the same time worked very, very closely 
with local delivery agencies, particularly local councils, where there 
was a willingness to respond to her approaches. (Interview 008R 
Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and 
Housing Services)  
 
In Southern City Casey’s enthusiasm and charisma was seemingly supported by the key 
ASB officer in the local authority team.  As one of the latter’s colleagues noted:  
 
And we had a manager … who was a very positive manager, wanted 
to make a big impact, wanted to get on and do stuff and she pushed, 
and pushed, and pushed … and moved us on a long way. (Interview 
008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of 
Neighbourhood and Housing Services) 
 
The approach preferred by Casey which during the early stages was largely premised 
upon practitioners fully embracing the use of enforcement-based action and following 
Blair’s initial policy drive, was not always one that was favoured locally. This supports 
TP2, with the demonstration of a gap between the two levels of policy developments, as 
the centre favoured a more punitively based scheme of action, whilst scepticism 
regarding this approach was expressed locally. Nonetheless she was perceived as being 
determined to seek the delivery of policy actions, maintaining a personal influence upon 
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this agenda and emerging policy developments as a result of reporting directly to Tony 
Blair as the leader of the Government’s ASBU: 
 
Louise Casey’s single mantra is action, action, action, I need to see 
action, when you are taking action on issues I know you have listened 
to me and are doing something about this and I think she has got this 
direct from Blair as I know they are pretty close on these things … So 
I would say nationally Tony Blair’s been behind this agenda, they 
appointed someone in Louise Casey who we had previous experience 
of working with on homelessness and rough sleeping and she is an 
absolute dynamo of activity, she is one heck of a pusher she’s like no 
other civil servant that I have ever come across, she is quite unique. I 
mean the other thing is of course the Home Office doesn’t much like 
research, and Louise’s stance has been from the start of this I am not 
interested in doing research I am interested in action and that is what I 
want to see. If you want to research it research it, I am interested in 
action and I think that has borne out of what the constituency MP’s 
were saying to Blair. We have put all this stuff in place but nobody is 
doing anything about it or very few people, or why is it that in that 
city, something is happening but in my city nothing is happening that 
is not acceptable. So the message from Louise Casey has been action, 
action and I want to see it happening everywhere not just where you 
choose to do something about it. (Interview 008 Southern City Local 
Authority Head of Housing Management) 
 
In the case of Southern City, practitioners here seemingly avoided the use of an 
enforcement-based stance through their continued advocacy of a more ‘holistic problem-
solving approach to anti-social behaviour’ (Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2002-
2005, p. 3). This was a theme that remained consistent in the partner’s ASB policy 
documents across the period, as local practitioners combined the success of the more 
overtly enforcement stance of projects such as Streetwise (see later discussion in this 
chapter) with the seemingly softer approach advocated in their broader strategies. This 
further supports the analysis of the previous chapter and its implications for some of the 
theoretical propositions. Rather than a relatively straightforward implementation of 
national policy agendas (as suggested by TP1), and an ongoing tension between adaptive 
and expressive responses (as suggested by TP2), what was visible in Southern City was a 
complex admixture of both strategies, including clear elements of national influence but 
also many examples of local reworking and tailoring. This was visible in the system of 
early intervention and mechanisms designed to divert perpetrators away from continued 
engagement in anti-social activities. If these were to fail then enforcement action would 
be utilised. ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders will be used where appropriate alongside other 
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intervention or diversionary measures or where other approaches have not been effective’ 
(Southernshire Constabulary 2004, p. 1). The seeming lack of wavering from this 
position, apparently enabled them to adopt an approach that somewhat favoured the use 
of more informally based actions, at least in the first instance.  
 
According to the manager of Southern City’s Youth Offending Team, locally Casey was 
best understood as having been the main reason behind the emergence of a small group of 
‘local ASB zealots’ (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager), 
which consisted of individuals who were extremely ‘enthusiastic’ in their approach 
towards the tackling of ASB. These were views that were supported by the subsequent 
local authority ASB Team Manager, who suggested that the launch of the later ‘Respect’ 
Taskforce had been accompanied by ‘an almost evangelical drive at that time by Louise 
(Casey) and Tony Blair to deliver this ‘Respect’ agenda’ (Interview 010R Southern City 
Local Authority ASB Team Manager). The influence of these personalities upon the 
resulting national level ASB agenda was then reflected in their ability to drive and 
influence local level policy developments in relation to this issue (Interview 020 Southern 
City Youth Offending Team Manager) and enabled certain practitioners to emerge as 
being more dominant than others locally. As has been discussed, this included the leaders 
of the two dedicated ASB teams in Southern City, in particular the initial manager of the 
local authority team. In the opinion of the Youth Offending Team Manager, it was this 
individual who had demonstrated this as having been a key element of their approach. 
Even though this same participant acknowledged that when compared to some of the 
other personalities that they had had experience of, for example in Manchester where 
they had opted for a heavily enforcement led approach, Southern City’s initial local 
authority ASB Team Manager was in reality a comparative moderate in their approach 
(Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). Other participants 
involved in the fieldwork, including a former youth worker in Southern City also made 
reference to the role that key individuals could play in the way in which policy actions 
were being delivered locally, and also the problems that this can cause. They suggested 
that ‘if you have got big personalities in an area who are adamant that their way is best 
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whether that’s from a young peoples service point of view or you know or anyone else 
you won’t move’ (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker): 
 
[T]here were certain types of what I would describe as local ASB 
zealots, who were contributing to the sort of the development of 
policy, you know. And once, once it came into being in a sense, again 
there was some fairly sort of Messianic individuals who were sort of 
leading it locally, that then got then in a sense that got taken up into 
the national scene then the whatever they call it, the Academy … I 
mean I think at one point certainly around sort of 2000 at that sort of 
point in time, 2000 to sort of 2003, 4, 5 it was very much central 
government pushing the agenda you know, in a very, very sort of high 
profile way, in the Louise Casey days. Since she fell out of favour 
let’s say, basically its become a bit more low key from the national 
level … you know the zealotry as I call it, seems to of become much 
more moderated, and I mean we still have the person that was the lead 
for who managed the council’s ASB team … and I mean she was sort 
of you know a relative moderate, but certainly I met people from 
Manchester who were you know were right off the wall, in terms of 
the zealotry. (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team 
Manager)  
 
The views of the local Youth Offending Team Manager are borne out in the peaks and 
troughs recorded by the Home Office who measure the use of interventions such as Anti 
Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs). Locally as highlighted by Table Two in 
Chapter Five, there had been a steady increase in the use of ASBOs in Southern City, 
mainly during the peak years of Casey’s personal involvement with the national ASB 
agenda. These figures were set to fall again as of 2007 when the ‘Respect’ Taskforce was 
disbanded and Casey moved into a less high profile role, focusing her attentions instead 
upon the issue of community policing. Interestingly, during this time Southern City’s 
initial local authority ASB Team Manager had seen their personal profile increasing in 
connection with the tackling of ASB, as they transcended the boundary between the local 
and national levels of policymaking as a result of their role as an expert practitioner, 
playing an active part in the Government’s later programme of ‘Together’ academies 
(Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 1). In fulfilling this role, it enabled this particular 
policy actor to maintain an overview of national level developments, as well as the local. 
This also offers support to TP4 as it reflects the strength of the initial ‘policy community’ 
that developed in the city in response to the tackling of ASB, having evolved from an 
‘issue based’ network, and also the role that intergovernmental networks can play in 
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policy development.  As a result, this key individual was also able to engage directly with 
important actors at the national level, a relationship that would under normal 
circumstances have been governed by a network of Regional Government Offices 
(henceforth RGOs). It was also an approach that was not particularly favoured by the lead 
of the police ASB team, who in contrast was content to retain a more localised focus as to 
the development of an ASB response: 
 
I am not too bothered actually about what is going on nationally. I will 
take advantage of national money when I can say I can put it to use for 
a local purpose, but my concern is [Southern City]. [The Local 
Authority ASB Manager has] got a slightly wider outlook on things 
and [is] a bit more tuned into the political agenda I think … but I see 
my priority is concentrating on how we do it … and [the Local 
Authority ASB Manager] at a touch of a button would be off to the 
Home Office or off to do some ‘Respect’ thing or some ‘Together’ 
thing there but I think fine. (Interview 005 Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager)   
 
By 2008 neither of these national and local policy actors was still in their initial posts. As 
a result, they no longer governed the relationship between the national and local levels of 
the policymaking process of Southern City. However, this had not seemingly diminished 
the style of ‘personal engagement’ that had already been developed whilst they had been 
involved owing to the fact that this had become an established rapport that by this point 
extended beyond individual personalities. This had led to the police ASB Team Manager 
who was visited twice during the fieldwork, having described in the later interview how 
in Southern City they had always been quite ‘lucky’ in having benefited from a close 
working relationship of this nature with policymakers at the national level, which in the 
opinion of a local authority practitioner, had seeming enabled them to have the ‘ear if you 
like of central government’ (Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team 
Manager): 
 
So there was still that real engagement with people which you don’t 
often find actually I think between national and local government it’s 
not been the case elsewhere in my experience, certainly in quite the 
same style anyway and that may relate to the way in which a number 
of Home Secretaries have chosen to work over the years … And when 
Blair was quite heavily involved in ASB stuff and showed quite a lot 
of interest, he would actually do the same. When he came to see 
something he came to see it and listen to people and maybe some of 
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that is still carrying on in that sort of style. (Interview 008R Southern 
City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing 
Services) 
 
It was therefore the opinion of both of these participants that they saw no reason as to 
why this relationship between the levels would not continue, not least given that Home 
Office colleagues continued to remain in direct contact. This had seen them consulting 
with local level practitioners on legislative developments, and seeking their opinion as to 
where, if necessary, improvements could be made to enhance policy implementation and 
delivery on the ground (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager). This was further supported by the transition of staff from local to national 
levels, which helped to contribute to the bilateral relationship that had developed between 
local and national ASB policy. It also demonstrates how policy can be influenced both 
upwardly as well as downwards. So in relation to TP1, whilst local policy may have 
developed largely in line with national policy trajectories, there is not only evidence of 
local resistance to national trends, but of local influence over the direction of national 
policy: 
 
Plus the fact that we have a very, very good relationship with the 
Home Office, especially Louise Casey’s team which is obviously the 
ASB Unit, in fact they headhunted a couple of our people in the past 
who are working up there now, so quite a lot of the information they 
know how to get it from us and we know what they need so it works 
well … [our ASB Manager] has a very good working relationship 
with Louise Casey and people at the top in fact she goes out and she 
does quite a lot of Home Office seminars so she has got their ear 
anyway, so it’s a case of if we need to bend it we can normally 
suggest what we want and it’s up to them then to decide whether or 
not it’s feasible. (Interview 006 Southern City Local Authority 
Official Caseworker ASB Team) 
 
The ability of those working on the ground in Southern City to influence ongoing 
national level policy developments was also reflected in their work in tackling ASB 
having been cited in a number of national government documents on the subject of ASB. 
These included promotional material produced by both the ‘Together’ and ‘Respect’ 
campaigns that cite examples of Southern City’s use of dispersal orders, in addition to 
references being made to the use of the Streetwise campaign in tackling aggressive 
begging (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2007; Home Office 2003; Office of the Deputy 
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Prime Minister 2002). This was also mentioned in government guidance in relation to 
drug use, and in documents that were produced in connection with Southern City’s 
application for national statuses such as having become a ‘Beacon’ authority7. 
 
‘Charisma’ and blazing a trail in Southern City 
 
From the perspective of the influence of this relationship between key policy actors upon 
the development of a local ASB policy agenda, the Head of Southern City’s Housing 
Management was able to recall how Louise Casey had visited the local authority’s 
management team and delivered a presentation on the Government’s ‘Together’ 
campaign, during which she indicated that there was an opportunity for Southern City to 
become a ‘Trailblazer’ authority as part of the Government’s broader programme: 
 
It’s interesting how some of these things are down to personalities and 
are down to personal relationship and contact really. So she [Louise 
Casey] had some degree of respect for the work we had been doing 
she had already been to [Southern City] on that stuff and really we 
continued to develop on that basis. So eventually she came to 
[Southern City] and talked to our management team and said this is 
the Government’s ‘Together’ programme I am going to present it to 
you and she took about 15-20mins to do that, and she said there is the 
potential for you to become a ‘Trailblazer’ … we would like you to be 
a ‘Trailblazer’ but you have to sign up to this agenda are you willing 
to do this and we said yes. (Interview 008 Southern City Local 
Authority Head of Housing Management)  
 
As previously discussed, the Government’s ‘Together’ campaign was a national strategy 
designed to support the implementation of the 2003 Anti Social Behaviour Act and its 
resulting ASB Action Plan. Interestingly, it was officially launched in Southern City in 
July 2004, at the same time as the local authority’s ASB team. It was an event that was 
attended by Louise Casey as a national level presence in Southern City was maintained. 
The main aim of the campaign was to ‘encourage citizens to take an active role in 
identifying and stamping out anti-social behaviour’ (Southern City Local Authority 2005, 
p. 1). This was largely as a result of those at the national level having revisited the theme 
of personal responsibility and accountability. It is worth noting that later research 
                                                 
7 can’t refer directly as anonymised the city in the research 
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published in response to the launch of the Government’s campaign reflected a more 
complex picture (including the finding that the public wanted to see the development of a 
more balanced response in tackling ASB). In turn the research argued the case for 
policymakers who were able to “balance tough enforcement through ASBOs with strong, 
high-profile action to prevent problems and offer young people constructive alternatives 
to hanging around on the streets” (Hough 2005, Online). As part of the Government’s 
ASB Action Plan ten local authorities became ‘Trailblazer areas’ as announced in 
October 2003 by the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, and this included Southern 
City (BBC Online 2003). The aim was for these areas to receive additional support from 
the ASBU in addressing specific problems associated with ASB. In the case of Southern 
City they became a ‘Trailblazer’ authority for begging, and along with four other cities 
were given responsibility to “audit and profile the people begging on the streets and take 
action to reduce the number of beggars by at least 60 per cent by March 2005” (Inside 
Housing Online 2008). In Southern City work was already underway in tackling the issue 
of persistent and aggressive begging, with the Streetwise project having been launched in 
August 2002, which was designed to tackle the dual issues of rough sleeping and 
homelessness in the city and was centred upon the achievement of three key aims, the last 
of which suggested a movement towards the taking of a tougher stance: 
 
· To promote and educate the public to alternative forms of  
   giving 
· To provide advice, treatment and support for those most in  
   need 
· To ensure that persistent begging will not be tolerated in  
   [Southern City] 
 
(Southern City Local Authority Neighbourhood and Housing Services 
Executive 2002, p. 2) 
 
The launch of this project followed the identification of begging as being a key issue for 
residents in a survey, which suggested that a majority of respondents were ‘reluctant’ to 
go into the City Centre owing to an apparent begging problem. The survey prompted 
further research to be undertaken to ascertain the extent of this issue. The results 
suggested that at the time there were ‘over 200 people … begging in the city centre area 
and that 95 per cent of these had convictions for Class A drug use.’ In addition 40 to 50 
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of these were either ‘persistent or aggressive’ in their approach (Home Office no date, p. 
18).  
 
In its approach, the Streetwise Project offered a more enforcement-based response to this 
problem, which was in marked contrast to the stance taken toward more generalised ASB 
issues across the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (henceforth CDRPs) crime 
and disorder strategies. However, as with tackling ASB, it was premised upon local 
partnership working between the city’s local authority and police, who were supported by 
two full time drug workers from the English Churches Housing Group (Home Office no 
date, p. 18). Streetwise patrols were introduced in the city to directly tackle the beggars, 
with the begging coordinator from the local authority working alongside police officers 
‘as this client group are often violent and can carry weapons’ (Southern City local 
authority 2005, p. 3); “the workers go out on patrol two to five times a week at varying 
times – we don’t want to be predictable” (Southern City Local Authority Streetwise Co-
coordinator). These staff would go out for between ‘25–30 hours a week on the streets, 
beginning at around 4.30pm and make contact with people who beg’ (Davies and Waite 
2004, p. 44). Their aim was to remove the beggars from the streets, particularly those 
who used this as a means to support drug habits. Where the offending beggars 
persistently resisted engagement with practitioners and their planned approach to assist 
them in addressing their drug problems, they would then be exposed to the enforcement 
aspect of the project. This began with a caution and could result in a full ASBO 
application being made. ‘This legal action is quick and can prevent displacement to other 
areas by allowing the inclusion of conditions preventing begging in England and Wales’ 
(Southern City Local Authority Streetwise promotional material 2005, p. 1). One of the 
key aims of the Project was to send a clear message throughout the city that it would ‘not 
tolerate persistent begging on the streets and people who do this will be arrested’, 
advocating a ‘tough love’ approach (Homeless Forum Minutes 2004, p. 3). It was a 
response that was based upon removing these problematic beggars from the streets of 
Southern City permanently; with the use of a mixture of formally based measures and 
support where necessary, ‘our last resort is going to court and getting an injunction with 
the threat of jail if they go back out begging’ (Southern City Post October 2003). Despite 
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this, the use of this full range of varying degrees of enforcement-based measures aided 
practitioners in having achieved significant results in response to tackling this issue. It 
included ‘over 300 arrests’ having been made during the six months between the end of 
2002 and the beginning of 2003, with enforcement action having been taken four to five 
times a week. Reports of practitioners’ efforts in tackling this issue were also highlighted 
in the local media: 
 
The project aims to help beggars leave [Southern City] streets and, if 
they are hooked on drugs, to seek treatment for their addiction. They 
will be offered housing and access to methadone to help them kick 
their habits. However, if beggars refuse this help they are threatened 
with a court injunction which will ban them from begging. If that is 
broken, they face prison. [Southern City], together with Brighton, 
Leeds and Westminster in London - which also have schemes to 
tackle begging - have now been chosen to lead by example and will 
work closely with Home Office officials to help put a stop to the 
problem. [Southern City’s] zero tolerance on begging has proved so 
successful that the Home Office wants to work with Streetwise 
officials and encourage other local authorities to take up the fight to 
rid city-centre streets of beggars. (Southern City Post October 2003) 
 
In tackling this issue practitioners also made use of the various support measures and as a 
result ‘(m)any people, who had previously refused drug services, are now in treatment. 
The project has meant a visible reduction in begging in the city’ (Home Office 2003b, p. 
48). All of which contributed to practitioners achieving their 60% target as set by the 
‘Trailblazer’ scheme. It was a ‘success’ that was achieved because ‘the campaign took a 
no tolerance approach to begging, and enforced the message that begging is not 
acceptable’ (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). Even though 
this zero tolerance stance was initially seen as being highly contentious, according to an 
account of the project given by a local authority official that was closely involved in its 
development, it is a model that has since been used in a number of other local authority 
areas nationally (Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). The 
source of this controversy amongst local policy officers was mainly owing to the 
perceived repressive nature of this response, although it was set to become a model that 
was later adopted in several other local areas in their attempts to address this issue 
(Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager) (and see Squires 2005; 
Burney 2005). This was largely owing to the Project having been highlighted by the 
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Home Office who worked in conjunction with the city’s practitioners, resulting in “[a] 
number of local authorities have already been down to Streetwise and have taken the 
scheme's ideas away to try and use in their areas” (Streetwise coordinator Southern City 
Post October 2003). As a result, Southern City’s Streetwise Project went on to become 
‘the first pilot of a national scheme’ (Housing Forum Minutes 2004, p. 2). At the same 
time it also became the first big project to be tackled under ASB strategy, as the issue of 
begging was included within the Government’s definition of ASB and later recognised in 
the city’s ‘Trailblazer’ status. Despite the emphasis placed upon the use of enforcement- 
based actions, these were offered as a last resort after affected individuals were 
encouraged to address their drug issues with the support of key workers, reflecting the 
problem solving approach of the Partnership’s broader crime and disorder strategy. 
However, it maintained a more overtly enforcement stance, which would contrast with 
the later more preventatively based approach that was advocated by practitioners in 
response to ASB.  
 
Even though ASBOs remained at the pinnacle of the options available to practitioners in 
tackling this issue, through the adoption of the use of a regulatory pyramid (see 
Crawford, 2009), the use of these measures was premised on all other routes having been 
exhausted. Interestingly, the local authority individual who led on the Streetwise 
campaign locally later became the initial ASB manager responsible for leading the local 
authority’s dedicated team. The early work of this particular policy actor on the city’s 
Streetwise Project had brought them into close contact with key policy actors at the 
national level, as those in the Government’s ASBU and the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister assisted in the development of this project (Housing Forum Minutes 2004, p. 2). 
More generally, ‘Trailblazer’ authorities such as Southern City as part of this process 
were required to develop a ‘strategic’ partnership with the Home Office ASBU. The aim 
was to assist those at the national level to ‘develop and roll out best practice and 
innovation’ as noted in the audit of another ‘Trailblazer’ area, who had been charged with 
tackling the issue of abandoned cars (Liverpool Local Authority Crime, Disorder, Anti-
Social Behaviour & Drug Misuse Audit 2004). In becoming a ‘Trailblazer’ authority 
there were also other notable benefits, which included the provision of additional national 
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level funding, and also broader information and peer type support as a direct outcome of 
national initiatives (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). 
This was mainly because practitioners in these ten areas were then deemed to be the 
exponents of best practice in tackling ASB related issues: 
 
It means that we get that additional support and more focus on the city 
from the Home Office in terms of achieving targets in this field, and 
looking at us as an exemplar in that field and to share that practice 
regionally there are benchmarking groups locally. We have the 
network group with [the RGO], as an authority we are a member of 
the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance group and we will share 
information and attend local regional meetings and ‘Respect’ will be 
looking to make sure we are fulfilling our role as a local champion 
working closely with the local people … and using the tools and 
powers to effect some tangible change. That is really what ‘Respect’ 
means if successful here other ‘Respect’ areas across the country of 
which there are now 40 areas, will impact on the development of 
further legislation and national strategy in tackling ASB. (Interview 
010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
As previously discussed in this chapter, the reality of developing such a close working 
relationship with those at the national level could already be seen in Southern City, and 
the benefits that they received from their involvement with those working at the Home 
Office, which included Louise Casey. In some ways the early recognition that had been 
received in relation to their work in tackling begging, legitimised the evolution of this 
initial relationship between Southern City practitioners and those at the national level, 
which would later be supported by the awarding of further national statuses, such as 
identification as a ‘Respect’ area as a result of the Government’s later campaign by the 
same name, and also as a ‘Beacon’ Authority, for its work in preventing and tackling 
ASB (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood 
and Housing Services).  Indeed the local authority publicly acknowledged the benefits of 
the ‘special relationship’ in its ‘Together’ promotional material as can be seen from the 
below extract: 
 
Working so closely with the ASBU and other ‘Trailblazers’ means 
that we have a wealth of resources that we can link into, including 
invaluable case law experiences. The ASBU had provided us with vast 
amounts of literature and materials free of charge that have been 
distributed to staff and key partners via training sessions. Key figures 
within the ASBU have frequently visited [Southern City] for events 
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such as the recent Tenant Participation event on anti-social behaviour, 
where both Louise Casey the Director of the ASBU and Bill Pitt, 
Home Office Ambassador generously gave up their time to make the 
event particularly relevant and valuable to our tenants. (Southern City 
Local Authority 2005, p. 1)  
 
The seemingly continual national level recognition that was received by Southern City 
during the period of interest, not only enabled the showcasing of their work to a broader 
audience through mechanisms such as the Beacon Showcase Event that was held in the 
city in June 2008, but it also inevitably increased the access of selected local policy actors 
to those within central government. As a result, it also afforded them the opportunity to 
offer feedback to those at the national level on both the policy and legislative tools that 
were being developed and used in this arena: 
 
[W]e have been able to feed into that as well working with some 
people from the Home Office, because we have used that legislation 
very well, particularly the crackhouse legislation, we are able to 
consult with the Home Office and they consult with us about what 
certain changes we may want or need for that legislation, and then that 
goes through as policy, and that’s been quite useful we’ve managed to 
change some legislation in that way. (Interview 002B Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Coordinator) 
 
This interchange between the developments in Southern City and at the national level 
provides a slightly different take on TP1. Whilst there was certainly similarity in the 
policy trajectory nationally and locally, this was not necessarily due to a straightforward 
adoption of national policies at the city level. Rather, it reflected a complex synergy 
between the national and the local, in which each influenced the other. 
 
Negative consequences of the ‘special relationship’ locally 
The direct nature of this relationship between key local practitioners and those operating 
at the national level did also have a negative impact. This was mainly in terms of local 
level relationships, which had resulted in a degree of fragmentation occurring in the rest 
of the local CDRP Partnership structure. This was an impression gained from the 
accounts that were gathered early on in the fieldwork.  These accounts suggested that at 
times this relationship between a select few at the local level, and those leading on policy 
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nationally had damaged the relationships between the local authority most notably, and 
the police as their key partner, and the rest of the Partnership structure, (this included 
representatives from the Probation Service, Police Authority, the city’s Fire and Rescue 
Services, Crown Prosecution Service, RGO, Prison Service, Health and the voluntary 
sector). This highlights the significance of the emergence of policy networks at the local 
level. In Southern City this had seen the gradual evolution of an initial ‘issue based’ 
network into a ‘policy community’ as it became apparent that as is suggested by TP4 that 
the local ASB policy response was being shaped by policy networks of different kinds, 
the formation of which was also having an impact upon existing partnership relations. 
This had come as a result of the membership of this later community fitting with Rhodes’ 
typology of a more select group, who are able to exert influence not only on the basis of 
the size and scope of their organizations, but also crucially in their ability to both harness 
and exchange resources, something that had been actively encouraged between the police 
and local authority in Southern City. However, the negative result of this was that 
agencies external to Southern City’s core partnership structure, including those at the 
regional level, increasingly found themselves on the periphery of the local decision 
making process. This included the remaining elements of the local CDRP external to the 
dedicated ASB teams, which despite a perceived role in maintaining a strategic lead over 
ASB policy development locally, felt that they needed to regain control over the way in 
which policy decisions around the ASB agenda in Southern City were being made. In an 
effort to redress this balance, they were keen to try and open up the direct link between 
these two levels of local and central governance, as they sought to make this ‘less 
exclusionary’ (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). As a result, this 
became one of the CDRP’s key objectives from 2006 onwards as was reported during the 
interview that was conducted with two representatives from this partnership: 
Although we do want to, not break the link but, you know open up 
that link, that direct tight link with the ‘Respect’ Taskforce and ASB 
[team] and just take into account other partners as at some point their 
funding is going to stop and we need to know what’s going … to pick 
up the pieces really. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Project 
Manager) 
 
 175 
 
 
At the same time, Home Office contacts continued to pursue direct relations with local 
colleagues in Southern City who they had grown confident in working with, which at the 
time were primarily based within the local authority: 
 
[T]he ‘Respect’ Taskforce they tend to go straight … to the ASB 
team by and large … when the ASB team was being set up … all the 
focus was on that and it was a very strong team piloting a lot of the 
new initiatives and [Southern City] got a lot of recognition for it. 
And as a result there was a lot of direct contact with the Home Office 
and the team. So Government Office became a little less involved, 
and to an extent so did we, so but they are always there when it 
comes to meetings, and they are on the Exec and they are keeping an 
eye on things. (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Manager) 
 
The local authority dedicated ASB team in particular seemingly required little or no 
assistance in gaining approval from those at the national level regarding their input into 
the formulation of a local level approach toward tackling ASB.  In the case of Southern 
City, both the dedicated ASB teams seemingly benefited from this close working 
relationship that had been developed mainly by those working in the local authority ASB 
team. This was mainly because it was their initial ASB Manager who had formed these 
earlier links with leading national policy actors such as Casey as a result of the launch of 
the city’s Streetwise project in 2002 as previously discussed.  
 
The rhetoric of multi-agency partnership cooperation and the persistent reality of a 
police-local authority ‘duopoly’ 
 
Evidence of cooperative relationships in the duopoly 
 
As discussed in the previous findings chapter, one of the key developments to occur in 
Southern City, both in terms of partnership working and policy development was the 
establishment of two dedicated ASB teams. These were located in two of the city’s core 
local agencies, the police and local authority, and were instrumental in the development 
of a close working relationship between these two core organisations. Initially the two 
ASB teams, according to the Southern City CDRP officers interviewed during the 
fieldwork, were created in response ‘to the ASB legislation which came to us from 
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government. You suddenly had all this pressure on ASBOs and legislative enforcement 
action and the ASB team was created in response to that’ (Interview 009 Southern City 
CDRP Project Manager). As a result, these two ASB teams became responsible for the 
formulation of the accompanying systems and processes designed to tackle the issue of 
ASB, as those at the national level continued to advocate a ‘denial’ response towards 
tackling ASB (Garland, 2001) that those operating at the local level were encouraged to 
support. In Southern City, by appearing to cater toward the more enforcement based 
aspect of the national level agenda, whilst in reality taking a more problem solving 
approach, local level policy actors reflected the ‘schizoid’ tension between the ‘adaptive’ 
and ‘expressive’ sides to policymaking, supporting TP2. In Southern City, this resulted 
crucially in the establishment of a weekly case conference at which cases potentially 
requiring formal action would be discussed. The responsibility for the chairing of these 
meetings was shared between the respective leaders of these two teams. This was an 
approach that also required the team leaders to develop a level of expertise across both 
their fields of knowledge, as the police ASB team lead often found himself making 
‘decisions on possession proceeding and housing injunctions, which is totally a housing 
function … [and] which would be [the local authority ASB team lead’s] area of 
responsibility’ (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Both 
leads would thus find themselves in the position of having to make decisions in cases that 
came under the remit of the other agency. At times this suggested a blurring of 
responsibilities: ‘So sometimes I find myself as chair of that meeting making a decision 
about a total council job, nothing to do with the police whatsoever, so that is quite bizarre 
sometimes’ (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).  
 
In common with local trends across England and Wales (Burney 2005; Hughes 2007) the 
local authority and the police were the key conduits and leading players in the 
development of a local approach toward tackling ASB in Southern City, thus acting as a 
de facto duopoly despite the public rhetoric of more plural and de-monopolised 
partnership working (supporting the thesis of Hughes 2007, p. 73-6). This was a 
sentiment echoed by other participants interviewed during the fieldwork that cited the 
significance of the police and local authority role in the development of local level 
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strategy. This was a view that was shared – unsurprisingly - by both the city’s initial and 
subsequent ASB managers from the local authority, “who saw themselves and the police 
as being the leaders in this field, particularly in terms of delivering policy actions” 
(Interview 001 Southern City Local Authority ASB Manager). And by the later stages of 
the fieldwork it was suggested that “we have a renewed focus if you like in the work that 
we are going to do, to both lead on enforcement, which is my main bag, early 
intervention and prevention and making sure that there’s support that runs right the way 
through that for both the perpetrators and the victims of anti-social behaviour” (Interview 
010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager).  
 
The dominance of police and local authority officers in shaping ASB strategy locally was 
not, of course, an unusual feature of partnership work nationally, as other agencies were 
often seen to be taking a backseat in multi agency settings (Gilling 2007; Hughes 2007; 
Skinns 2003). This may have been down to the central government pressure that was put 
on both the police and local authority to respond quickly to national level shifts on this 
issue, particularly during the initial stages of ASB policy rising to prominence in central 
government thinking. The Police ASB Team Manager reported that such pressures had 
been a further contributory factor in the growth of the good working relationship between 
these two agencies at the local level. Both the scale and the pace of changes being made 
by those at the national level meant that a broader range of partners were now better 
equipped to respond to this issue. In particular, as a result, locally in Southern City it was 
no longer an issue that was seen as being just the province of individual housing officer’s 
workloads, as it had been prior to the creation of these dedicated ASB teams in 2003. The 
issue of ASB increasingly became seen as being a ‘new specialism’, (Hughes 2007, p. 
103) amidst the wider portfolio of community safety professionals at the local level on a 
more generalised basis:  
 
We had to be quite quick to respond as did the council and for the first 
two years it was a bit of a two man band I suppose, that’s the council 
ASB team based in the Housing office, Housing department, but now 
more and more of the other departments are becoming involved, and 
it’s becoming accepted. (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary 
ASB Team Manager) 
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Evidence of tension/conflict in the duopoly 
 
Although the overall opinion about these two teams amongst the interviewees was that 
they had mutually benefited from the formation of a close working relationship, there 
were at times conflicts between these two large-scale organisations and their working 
practices and cultures. This was acknowledged not only by observers of it, but also by the 
practitioners from within the dedicated teams. It seemed that at times the partnership was 
strained. Interviewees reported that at an early stage of policy development, there was a 
sense of rivalry between the police and local authority ASB teams. A senior police 
respondent and leader of Southernshire Constabulary’s ASB Team believed that their 
counterpart within the local authority team would try to ‘create the impression’ that the 
systems and processes put in place to tackle ASB were shaped primarily by the local 
authority. However, they reported as evidence to back up their claims regarding police 
‘leadership’ that the local authority team was not created until July 2004, sometime after 
that of the police team (Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager).  
 
So despite the apparent strength of the policy community of which these two key 
organisations formed a critical part, there were at times conflicts underlying this 
relationship. These appear to have originally emerged in connection to disagreements 
about the precise nature of the shared approach to dealing with ASB. In contrast to the 
often-prevalent assumptions in critical research on ASB and policing (Squires 2005), the 
Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager argued that the police had at times been 
less willing than the local authority to utilise formal actions. “Well I would rather not 
take someone to case conference and find another way of resolving it to be quite frank” 
(Interview 005 Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). Interview evidence 
from the police respondents suggested that local authority officials had, paradoxically, 
been more focused on enforcement than their police counterparts. It was also evidenced 
in the zero tolerance approach that was advocated in relation to the tackling of begging, 
which as previously discussed came under the banner of the city’s Streetwise Project, and 
which caused some early controversy owing to the stance that was taken. This approach 
was apparently underlined by the adoption of a ‘holistic approach’ according to the local 
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authority’s promotional material for the project (Southern City Local Authority 2005, p. 
3). This suggested that the police were a ‘moderating’ influence in the development of a 
more nuanced ASB policy locally, and had been a key driver of the ‘graduated approach’, 
which consisted of the use of informally based measures such as warning letters and 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (henceforth ABCs), as tools of first response particularly 
when dealing with young people, before cases were escalated for formal action and 
referred to case conference for further consideration. The lead for the police ASB team 
argued that the utilisation of more preventatively based measures, had contributed to a 
decrease in the number of formal actions being used in the city by 2006 (Interview 005 
Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This offers further support to TP4 and 
the notion that influence can also be exerted from within policy communities, particularly 
from one such as this, which was dominated by two of the key local players in ASB 
policy. 
 
At the same time, a caseworker from the local authority ASB team cited differences in 
opinion between the two regarding information-sharing protocols, as also having 
contributed to these emerging conflicts. Such differences may have arisen in part because 
the police and local authority were two large organisations, which at times operated in 
different ways and according to very different cultures and processes of internal decision-
making. At times, it also seemed that there were failings in communication between 
them: 
 
The key partner is the police without a doubt and that relationship can 
be a bit strained at times because of the priorities that they have got 
and culturally we are two quite large organisations and trying to bring 
two organisations together to work face to face comes with some 
tensions at times because we work in different ways but you have to 
work through those things and we have been doing that over the last 
couple of years. But I would say that the police are far and away our 
chief partners in this, I nearly said partners in crime, and so working at 
policy strategy level and at operational level it’s absolutely crucial that 
we line up our resources and [coordinate] the way we do things. 
(Interview 008 Southern City Local Authority Head of Housing 
Management). 
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There were also broader tensions being experienced during the period of interest, as 
following the introduction of the ASBO nationally, local practitioners who had 
experienced problems associated with costs, resources and time delays reported 
difficulties. In Southern City, during the early stages of the fieldwork in 2006, a local 
authority officer working as an ASBO caseworker described Magistrates at this time as 
having been ‘a little reluctant to give them [ASBOs] out’ (Interview 006 Southern City 
Local Authority Official Caseworker ASB Team). This was a perception that may have 
resulted from the Court’s consideration of “the appropriateness and the necessity of a 
ASBO application”, despite having praised the work of the local authority’s legal team 
and “the quality of the applications received” (Southern City Local Authority, ASB 
Select Committee 2005, p. 4). There were also issues being experienced in the 
streamlining of the ASBO process, as commented upon by Southernshire Constabulary’s 
ASB Team Manager: 
 
[I]t wasn’t uncommon for us to say right we want an ASBO, it took 
months to pull a case conference together and by the time you’d 
presented your evidence to case conference to make a decision, the 
evidence was out of date and then to go to court with that evidence 
and by the time you built all these delays in you might as well give up. 
It’s important that the structures are streamlined sufficiently to 
actually make use of the legislation. (Interview 005 Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager)  
 
 
The marginalisation of the Regional Government Office and other local partners 
 
Life beyond the duopoly 
 
In formal terms national government aimed to utilise RGOs as a means of supporting the 
ASB ‘crusade’ and not least checking that local action was occurring on the ground. A 
representative from the RGO, which included in its geographical remit, Southern City 
reported this as follows: 
 
[I]n fact we have had some [councils] … where I have seen our role as 
being to go along and say that we do expect you to be aware of and to 
use where appropriate these interventions. You can’t just ignore them, 
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not least because as part and parcel of the ASB package. The Home 
Office does provide £25K a year to each local authority, which is 
generally used to fund or part fund an ASB coordinator role to help 
them give that extra resource to this area if you like. So it’s very much 
I think it comes down to how high a priority is anti-social behaviour in 
your local authority area, what is the public perception of that, so how 
important is your need as a local authority and the various relevant 
authorities to respond to that and what is your capacity to respond to it 
too. (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB specialist team) 
 
The impact of the autonomy of the police and local authority from the CDRP and their 
‘special relationship’ with the Home Office ASBU was that it did not require them to 
interact with those at the regional level as a means of gaining contact with those at the 
Centre, which would have been the normal manner in which this dialogue would be 
conducted (see Hughes 2007, pp. 46-7). In particular, colleagues within the RGO with 
responsibility for Southern City were prevented from managing this interaction, and from 
acting as the interface between the two levels, especially when it came to policy 
development (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB Policy Lead). This may have been 
compounded by changes that were also being felt between the RGO and the Home 
Office, as there appeared to be a distancing between the two: 
 
When I was the domestic violence lead initially the national domestic 
violence lead was very keen to engage both the coordinators from the 
partnerships, the domestic violence coordinators, and the domestic 
violence coordinators from the government offices. And so we would 
go up and we would have meetings, and we would share practice and 
we would have an input into developing policy … And then you had 
this kind of realisation over time that there was this distancing, that 
was when I started sort of saying to people you know this isn’t right 
… I think there was two things. There was some new ambitious 
people who had become part of the senior management team, who 
decided that it was no longer the role of senior officers, that’s me and 
my colleagues, to be going to the Home Office, they should be the 
people that had that dialogue. So there was that kind of local decision 
made, but allied to that I think there was also a distancing. (Interview 
026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service) 
 
In regard to Southern City’s practitioner relations with the Home Office, this may have 
stemmed from the apparent desire of the city’s local authority practitioners to act 
independently of other external influences than that of the Home Office as they continued 
to develop their direct relationship with those at the national level. A further RGO 
representative reported that the local authority had continued to maintain a good working 
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relationship with them, particularly in sharing information about the local authority’s 
performance in this area. Any potential increase in the RGO’s involvement in ASB in the 
future was something that the participant suggested could only assist in strengthening the 
authority’s working relationship with them, whilst ensuring that on a broader level there 
was a more consistent regional strategic response: 
 
We have had a close relationship with [the RGO] in sharing out 
information and being able to report back to them on how we are 
performing … [the RGO] are very keen to get more involved as a 
local champion and to provide an intermediary role between local and 
central government, quite rightly so, and I think that can only improve 
the relationship that we have with them and that information flow to 
get a more coherent, strategic regional response to ASB which we 
haven’t necessarily had. Operationally they do attend our local CDRP 
meetings we have had a well established peer group [Southernshire] 
user group chaired by [the RGO], which has been fairly effective but 
given quite different dynamics and different levels of problems 
between the authorities with [Southern City] probably being the 
region’s capital, certainly the larger authority we have quite markedly 
different problems here and levels of ASB as compared to some of the 
smaller rural local authorities within [Southernshire], but it’s still 
useful to share those experiences and have information sharing with 
them I think. Also ties in with some of our targets for the coming year 
as a ‘Beacon’ authority around sharing experience. (Interview 010 
Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
There were also wider issues reported during the fieldwork in relation to the everyday 
contact between those operating locally and the national level, and the way in which this 
negated any involvement from the RGO. Two respondents from the city’s CDRP 
described how they had been involved in coordinating a visit from the Home Secretary 
and that the Home Office ‘came straight to us and [RGO] got very uppity about that, 
there’s protocols and that wasn’t appropriate and blah, blah, blah and the woman said I’m 
sorry I used to work for the ‘Respect’ Taskforce and that’s the way we did it. So I 
thought that was quite interesting’ (Interview 009 Southern City CDRP Manager). Whilst 
noting the ‘by-passing’ of the RGO in such instances, it should be acknowledged that 
some of those working in the CDRP did wish to see a return to a more open style of 
dialogue between the levels involved in the process, with the RGO ideally functioning as 
a conduit, which would involve all of the relevant local partners:  
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I don’t know to what extent that’s true of other places cos I know that 
the anti-social behaviour manager and Louise Casey knew each other 
quite well already, and they had both been involved in the rough 
sleeping initiative years before so there was a history there so to what 
extent that was driven by personality or to what extent that’s the way 
the ‘Respect’ Taskforce tends to work anyway I don’t know … But I 
think there are issues, that relationship has created some issues so they 
are funding the direct council team and they are putting money in 
there, they are piloting the family support project and they’ve just 
given them the money to double in size but they are not funding the 
police ASB team, which we fund, but the police ASB team needs to 
provide support to do all the work and all the evidence gathering on 
the front so their work is being increased but the funding is not going 
to them it’s being bypassed it’s not the complete picture. So you know 
I think there does need to be a widening up of approach and focus 
because you know really the police are saying can we have another 
coordinator because there is all this work being funded by the Home 
Office that we have to support. But I think that within Safer [Southern 
City] trying to get another coordinator paid for is … we are trying not 
to pay for the three we are already paying for. I mean that’s a whole 
other issue that is possibly because of this relationship and [the RGO] 
and us being out of the link you are not really being picked up so I 
mean that’s another task is to widen horizons. (Interview 009 
Southern City CDRP Project Manager) 
 
The local RGO did attempt to improve the relations between the local and regional levels 
of the policymaking process, which led to the establishment of an Anti Social Behaviour 
Coordinators Network, the aim of which was to coordinate a local level approach. The 
RGO practitioners who were involved in the creation of this went on to become 
forerunners in the development of this particular approach of promoting the exchange of 
best practice in this manner, as this model was later replicated in other areas (Interview 
004 RGO Technical Lead for ASB Specialist Team).  
 
One RGO participant suggested that they had similarly been kept ‘out of the loop’ not 
just by local but also national level colleagues, particularly when dealing with the 
‘Respect’ Taskforce. This led the same interviewee to remark that ‘they did things quite 
independently from us a lot of the time’ with often no real engagement with those at the 
regional level (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB Policy Lead). Even though the ASB 
Team Manager from the local authority acknowledged that some of the difficulties being 
experienced by the RGO in relation to ‘Respect’, might well have been as a result of 
them not having demonstrated a significant involvement with it: 
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I think by their own admission [the RGO] would say that they have 
not been that involved in the ‘Respect’ agenda and maybe that has 
been a shift led by the development and rollout of LAA (Interview 
010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager).  
 
It may well have been this exclusion from both local and national level interactions that 
had led by the latter stages of the fieldwork to those at the regional level seemingly 
struggling to find any role in policy development in the case of Southern City. This had 
also been impacted upon by a reduction in the resources being directed to the regional 
level by those in government to support this element of their work. This may have been 
attributable to ‘the financial pressures on these departments and the need to downsize and 
have all these voluntary redundancy schemes, these were biting at our backs all the way 
through and that was kind of what started the sort of problems for the staff basically 
because they were basically wanting us to disappear’ (Interview 026 RGO Drug 
Prevention Advisory Service). In the long term in the opinion of another RGO 
representative, it was anticipated that this would potentially result in their inability to 
continue to deliver all of the Home Office’s expectations. This included being able to 
maintain an overview of the work being done ‘on the ground’ by local level practitioners 
in relation to the delivery of ASB policy outcomes (Interview 011 RGO Regional ASB 
Policy Lead). It was therefore this decline in the levels of regional involvement of ASB 
policy which also led to a participant with a background in the local authority’s housing 
department commenting that from a practitioner’s perspective ‘there is a view in local 
government that the regional offices we don’t really know what they are there for and 
they are constantly scratching to find a role’ (Interview 008R Southern City Local 
Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). This was a view 
that was shared by others not just at the local level in Southern City, but also across 
Community Safety Partnerships more generally, particularly in England (see Hughes 
2007, p. 46):  
 
Sitting on the partnership would be the government office [name of 
region], a whole building of people you frankly don’t know why they 
exist and they cost a fortune. They were the middle people between 
Ministers saying you need to be doing this oh right yeah, and they 
would sit around, crazy. (Interview 024 Former Southern City Police 
Commander) 
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Reconfiguring the centrally-driven agenda and institutionalisation of the modest 
‘adaptive strategy’ 
 
The supporting partnership structure 
 
Whilst the RGO was cast in the role of wasteful ‘middleman’, a reconfiguration of the 
centrally driven approach was evident from the observations of local actors in the latter 
stages of the fieldwork. The reconfiguration had seen the maturing of the relationship 
between policymakers at both levels of the process and some re-balancing of the 
relationship of the local and national in this policy field, as those in government  began to 
recognise the limitations of attempting to govern from the centre (Garland, 2001), 
supporting the idea of ‘at a distance’ governing (see also Osborne and Gaebler, 1993).  
According to one Education officer:  
 
You know I think before it was always us and them, and I think now 
it’s how we need to do things and we being all of us. Because I think 
there is a more tacit understanding now that central government can’t 
run it all from Whitehall, which is when this particular government 
started they thought they were going to be able to do run everything 
from Whitehall. And now there’s a realism that it’s a local presence 
that is needed and it’s not government office, it’s actually people who 
deal with people and you know we as a local authority deal with our 
local community, whether it’s rubbish that hasn’t been picked up, or, 
or anti-social behaviour or a Education issue and actually you need 
someone who can talk about it and understand it not somebody who’s 
in Whitehall saying I gave ‘x’ thousand pounds for that to happen and 
it didn’t. (Interview 013 Southern City Local Authority Programme 
Director for Partnerships and Localities) 
 
Outside of Southern City’s core agencies and their relationship with those at the national 
level, there was also a range of other partners in Southern City, who had by 2008 become 
more actively involved in the local aspect of the policymaking process, an impression 
that was gained from the accounts of those participants who were involved in this later 
stage of the fieldwork. At the same time, this reflected the increased desire of those at the 
national level to extend the scope of local support in order for the relevant policy 
outcomes to be delivered by practitioners at this level, which was locally reflected in the 
scope of the agencies that were now being represented by the CDRP, which by the time 
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of the publication of the city’s 2008 Crime and Disorder Strategy had been expanded to 
include representatives from the Fire and Rescue Service, Prison Service, Crown 
Prosecution Service and ‘various departments’ of Southern City’s local authority, in 
addition to the Voluntary Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration 
(VOSCUR) (Southern City CDRP, Final Draft. Anti social behaviour strategy 2008-11. 
Promoting positive behaviour, p. 3). In terms of the history of Southern City’s partnership 
relations, this would represent the final stage in a series of transitions (see also Hughes 
and Edwards, 2002). This had begun with:  
 
· Isolated efforts in tackling ASB, mainly dominated by housing officers working 
in conjunction with the police; 
· To zero tolerance and trailblazing on this issue which provided a foundation for 
the emergence of a ‘special’ relationship between the local and the national; 
· And ending with a potential opening up of the local element of this process, as 
seemingly a broader range of practitioners began to engage with this agenda.  
 
By 2008 there was also a growing recognition of the need for active engagement across 
all local partners, in order for the effectiveness of policy action to be both maximised and 
mutually agreed. In this manner it was also reinforcing the belief of those at the national 
level of the need for there to be a shared responsibility across all relevant partners for the 
delivery of an ASB agenda: 
 
I make it clear to everybody all of the time that the most effective 
interventions come from fully consulting with all relevant parties … 
That’s the absolute way to go as you then have buy in from 
everybody, the right intervention is selected, it is supported from all of 
the agencies there and there is the best possible chance the 
intervention will then work. (Interview 004 RGO Technical Lead for 
ASB Specialist Team) 
 
At the same time, there had also been a reported growth in the number of agencies that 
had begun to ‘buy in’ to the ASB agenda, as based upon the accounts of respondents. 
This was a process that had also been affected by several other contributory factors by 
these later stages of the fieldwork. The more significant of these had been that by this 
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time Southern City's style of response to tackling ASB had became somewhat easier to 
identify, as working practices had become more embedded locally. This was a view that 
could be supported by the evidence provided by practitioners from both of the city’s 
dedicated ASB teams. These participants in the fieldwork offered accounts of their ASB 
procedures, as highlighted by a coordinator from Southernshire Constabulary as follows: 
 
Our main responsibilities, we do low level interventions, diversionary 
activities working with individuals causing us problems and trying to 
stop that behaviour, liaising [with] police officers trying to solve 
problems that they have, they bring information to us and ask us we if 
we can deal with situations. We look at things like closure of 
crackhouses, dispersal of groups, ASBOs, ABCS and we are also now 
taking on work from a higher level within police … we decide 
whether ABCs are appropriate or whether we are looking at dispersals 
things like that, or whether we want to take it to a higher level to more 
formal action. After the local multi agency meetings we then at a 
higher level have a case conference, which is held weekly… and [we] 
hear about five or six cases every week. So it’s quite a high turnover 
and at that case conference we will speak about an individual and 
again all the relevant people so that will be social workers, drugs 
workers, youth workers whoever is most relevant to that individual, 
and that works really well for us. It’s a system that’s been set up and 
established for quite some time, and it’s working really effectively 
because all the partners are round the table at the right time and 
nobody’s really getting left out. If somebody is not at the meeting they 
get the minutes sent to them … and it’s tackling the problems much 
more effectively rather than one agency going off and doing one thing 
and another agency going and doing something completely different. 
(Interview 002B Southernshire Constabulary ASB coordinator) 
 
The establishment of these mechanisms designed to tackle issues of ASB appears to have 
seen the local level ASB agenda clearly forming part of a wider preventative agenda, 
leading to improved linkages across the various agencies involved (Interview 020 
Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). It also suggests the institutionalisation 
of a local preventive infrastructure which Garland (2001) pointed to, not on the basis of 
any empirical research conducted by him but in relation to the insights of Crawford’s 
1997 work, which was later supported by Hughes’ 2007 monograph. This was whilst the 
broader ASB agenda at the national level had undergone a similar process of evolution 
during this time, which had contributed to the tackling of this issue having become part of 
everyday working life, particularly for those practitioners from the core agencies 
(Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager). This suggested a 
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perceived mainstreaming of ASB policy locally, particularly as a result of the 
Government’s ‘Respect’ Agenda: 
 
So the ‘Respect’ brand, the little logo isn’t being publicised anymore, 
you know it’s probably been removed from the Government website. 
It’s evolved and now that agenda is now being subsumed into 
everyday working and there’s no longer a need for a brand if you like 
cos it’s what you do everyday and that’s certainly the expectation and 
I think that’s our experience locally. (Interview 010R Southern City 
Local Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
It was also a response that had become more about collective responsibility at the local 
level, ‘I think it was more about a shared collective approach about what was going on. A 
more creative innovative look at what could happen to achieve it’ (Interview 024 Former 
Southern City Police Commander). This occurred as those at the national level continued 
to encourage a multi agency response to this issue, especially through the use of 
performance-based strategies. In terms of the police, this meant the introduction of ASB 
related targets and objectives within local force policing plans. These were designed to 
reflect the objectives contained within the national policing plan, in which ASB was 
amongst one of seventeen performance indicators by 2003 (The Guardian Online 2003). 
It therefore became a feature of Southernshire Constabulary’s 2002-03 policing plan for 
the first time, as the force sought to ‘reduce local disorder and anti-social behaviour’ 
mainly through the reduction of fear of crime rates, and the public perception of ASB as 
measured by the yearly British Crime Survey (Southernshire Constabulary 2002, p. 14). 
By the time of Southernshire Constabulary’s Policing Plan for the following year, the 
force ‘compared favourably with the national average’ in its measurement of the ‘feeling 
of public safety’. The plan suggested that this had been achieved through the ‘appropriate 
use of tools such as ASBOs, ABCs, fixed penalty notices, action against badly run 
licensed premises under the Licensing Act 2003 and other ideas set out in the 
Government’s Anti-Social Behaviour Action Plan’ (Southernshire Constabulary 2002, p. 
14). However, the setting of targets of this nature in relation to issues such as ASB did 
not always meet favourably with the local practitioners who were charged with its 
delivery. A respondent from regional government commented upon the impact of the 
introduction of more performance based measures from their perspective, ‘[a]nd then we 
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were sort of these kind of people in the middle, who had no teeth in terms of performance 
management … For me and my colleagues one day we were advisors with Drug 
Prevention Advisory Service then we were performance managers of wider partnerships’ 
(Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention Advisory Service): 
 
I think it probably was I think you know the service has gone through 
a time when there was not much inspection of it to a time when then 
the Treasury got more involved and it was about what value for 
money are we getting from the police service and we became 
performance driven, and target driven which is rubbish often. I mean I 
am not saying that we shouldn’t be held to account for performance, it 
just went far too one way you know and a drive for detection rates I 
think can skew the activities of the organisation and prevent a service 
like the police doing the right thing in the right way at all times, and 
anti-social behaviour is a good example of that.  You know if you are 
not very sophisticated about the way you measure it and record it and 
kind of encourage organisations effectively to work in partnership it 
can get lost in the desire to have an x % detection rate and probably a 
detection of crime targets and all this kind of stuff. (Interview 024 
Former Southern City Police Commander) 
 
Integral to the use of these performance based strategies, was a corresponding national 
level shift toward ‘neighbourhood approaches’ in tackling issues of crime and low-level 
disorder, as increasingly this became the responsibility of all practitioners who were 
involved locally in the provision of community safety (Audit Commission 2006, p. 3). It 
was suggested that in order to achieve the targets set for those delivering policy responses 
‘(a)ddressing crime and anti-social behaviour must be linked to other improvements in 
the environment to enhance the quality of life for people. To be successful, CDRPs need 
to work with other partners to develop short and long term solutions based on local 
knowledge of what people really want’ (Audit Commission 2006, p. 3). However, as the 
partner engagement appeared to grow in response to these increasing national level 
demands, there also emerged renewed differences in approach between Southern City’s 
practitioners. In the same way that they had been apparent between the local authority 
and police, these conflicts were mainly based upon decisions regarding the appropriate 
types of action to be used in a case. This was given that some partners favoured full 
engagement with the national level legislation, which at times would mean the use of 
formal interventions such as an ASBO or dispersal order, whilst others sought to 
emphasise the need to address the underlying causes of the behaviour, preferring to 
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continue working with individuals until all other means of approaching the tackling of 
this issue had been exhausted (Interview 025 Southern City Local Authority Service 
Director). This does however pose an interesting conflict with TP3, which suggests that 
criminal justice policies would become more focused upon the issue of risk management. 
Whilst this was a shift that had appeared to occur nationally, locally in Southern City 
policy actors were keen to maintain their position on tackling the underlying cause of 
ASB, rather than just concentrating upon its impact.  
 
Another potential area of conflict that was highlighted by Southern City’s practitioners 
was in relation to the tackling of ASB and young people. This was an issue raised by the 
local authority ASB Team Manager during their second interview, when they suggested 
that working relations had improved with colleagues from Children’s Services, as they 
now sought to meet the needs of both the community and young perpetrators: 
 
[I]t was never that bad but we are working better now, better 
communication, we are on board with the same agendas, same 
strategy there really is a breakdown in some of these silos if you like. 
(Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager) 
 
The other site of potential conflict was that of individual personalities, and people having 
their own agendas, which did not necessarily fit with wider objectives (Interview 022 
Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker). These contrasting approaches were 
mainly highlighted at the local multi agency meetings (see Chapter Five), a network of 
which existed across Southern City. This apparent divergence in approach across the 
broad range of local level partners is perhaps best illustrated by the relationship between 
the core agencies and practitioners from the youth sector, including the youth offending 
team, youth workers from both the local authority and the voluntary sector. Initially this 
had emerged as a result of this particular sector’s broadly preventative approach in 
tackling ASB and a general reluctance for young people to become labelled as being 
‘criminal’ as a result of the use of enforcement-based interventions. This therefore led to 
the preferred approach of these agencies seeming to be in conflict with the strategy of the 
city’s core partners. It was particularly apparent during the initial stages of formulating a 
coordinated approach toward tackling this issue, when it was acknowledged by the ASB 
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Team Manager from Southernshire Constabulary that in relation to the local youth 
offending team, as an organisation the police had experienced some difficulties in getting 
to grips with this particular team’s stance on the issue of ASB. It appeared that they had 
their own hierarchy of response to this issue, which at times conflicted with the police’s 
desire to utilise formal interventions such as ASBOs (Interview 005R Southernshire 
Constabulary ASB Team Manager). This had also been exacerbated by the acknowledged 
slowness of the youth offending team to engage in wider partnership working at the local 
level, especially during the early stages of the rise of the local ASB agenda (Interview 
020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). However, by the time of these later 
interviews in 2009 there was seemingly a more integrated system in place for dealing 
with both the issue of youth crime and ASB, which had enabled this particular team to 
become more engaged in this process (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending 
Team Manager). Also by this stage there was a range of other local partners, including 
those from organisations that would not have previously considered the tackling of ASB 
to be a priority. This was a standpoint that had previously been shared by the police in 
Southern City as illustrated in this passage: 
 
[W]hen we were wanting to ASBO everybody a couple of years ago 
they wanted to keep young people out of the criminal justice system 
and thought it wasn’t appropriate to ASBO them. So there were some 
conflicts and maybe we understand their position a little bit more now, 
they have their own pecking order of what comes where, supervision 
order, referral order, ISSP they have their own levels of orders that the 
court will give and they see ASBOs as a last resort after all those 
orders whereas we might see it a little bit earlier on in. (Interview 
005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager) 
 
As those within the police worked toward an understanding with practitioners from 
Southern City’s youth offending team, so the same approach was taken in a broader sense 
toward the city’s youth sector by the statutory partners. This was done in an effort to try 
and rectify the relations between these two sectors, and also with a view to encouraging 
the undertaking of a greater multi agency approach locally, which sought to engage with 
partners from all sectors. However, in the opinion of a former youth worker in the city, 
this had been a process that was somewhat impeded by the emergence of key policy 
actors at the local level and their ability to dominate the delivery of this particular agenda. 
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This was despite the acknowledged efforts of the police to try and increase their work 
with both young people directly and via youth inclusion panels, as they sought to 
continue to improve this particular aspect of local level partnership working and to ensure 
that all other routes were exhausted before formal action was utilised. ‘I think [the police] 
had much more of a positive impact than just the stigma, the labelling and you know well 
we’ve got these orders now let’s use them’ (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority 
Youth Worker): 
 
I think it changed over the years and I think work was done a lot to 
make sure that those conflicts were dealt with and managed and to try 
and get a multi agency approach to things, but then it goes back, it 
goes back to individuals again, and individuals will and want to get on 
and you know work in a, a multi agency approach really. I think like 
with most issues you can’t work in isolation and you have to work 
together, but if everybody’s got their own agenda, and how do those 
fit in and I think people also forget that it’s okay to disagree, as long 
as you have an open and frank discussion about why you disagree, and 
go okay we disagree but we can still work together. But you go into 
some of these, I remember going into some of the meetings and you 
disagree with someone and you feel like that’s it then you are not 
spoken to for the rest of the meeting. We are going to disagree we are 
coming from different angles but it’s how you know, how do we deal 
with these disagreements and then work to finding some solution, and 
if this is how agencies are going to behave what do you want from 
young people, how do you want that, how do you want barriers to be 
broken down if you know young people can see the agencies not 
getting on and you want to break down these barriers with them, well 
how if we can’t break down the barriers ourselves. (Interview 022 
Southern City Local Authority Youth Worker) 
 
This meant that by these later stages of the research period, there were still issues 
seemingly being experienced in ensuring the full engagement of all youth focused 
organisations in the city, including those from the voluntary sector. These can be of 
significant importance in addressing ASB, as they can be used as a mechanism through 
which young people can be diverted through their engagement in a range of positive 
activities, and perhaps more significantly offering them somewhere to go. As 
acknowledged by the youth offending team manager, this is something that these 
organisations are able to do without the requirement to formally engage with any other 
local level partners (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). A 
representative from the ‘Young Southern City’ voluntary organisation, which seeks to 
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positively engage young people in an effort to divert them away from both criminal and 
ASB activities, was also interviewed during the fieldwork. They highlighted how despite 
the continued emphasis placed upon the links between young people and the 
Government’s ASB agenda, there was still by this stage no formal referral process in 
place between themselves and a number of the other local agencies across the city. This 
had resulted in them as an organisation continuing to operate outside of Southern City’s 
core partnership structure, owing to the lack of any ‘meaningful partnership’ between 
these practitioners (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City’s Volunteering 
Projects). Instead what existed was a fairly informal arrangement, which was reliant upon 
personal relationships between themselves and those working in the statutory partnership 
agencies across the city. Despite this, it had seemingly allowed for young people to be 
referred by both the local Youth Offending Team and the Probation Service into 
voluntary organisations such as this, which had its origins in the broader youth club 
movement. In those few instances where a working relationship had been established 
with colleagues from Southern City’s statutory partners, the interviewee likened this to a 
procurement/contractor relationship, where as an organisation they are required to 
provide the core agency with a service. Despite this not being a full partnership of the 
style that had been seen in other aspects of Southern City’s partnership structure, it had 
enabled this particular participant to attend several Strategy Groups run by the local 
authority (Interview 018 Manager of Young Southern City’s Volunteering Projects).  
 
However, even where there had been participation in groups such as these, the 
interviewee suggested that the reality of this in terms of their ability to be able to 
influence policy had been minimal given that it was felt that at these meetings, there was 
little opportunity given to voice a meaningful opinion on any particular issue, with 
participants only being given a short time to consider matters. This had led the participant 
to conclude that this is not a ‘very productive way of influencing something’ (Interview 
018 Manager of Young Southern City’s Volunteering Projects). The ability to influence 
ASB policy specifically had proven to be even more difficult. This was seemingly as a 
result of this agenda having been based in the local authority’s Neighbourhood and 
Housing Services directorate, which it was felt was too far removed from the youth 
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services. As a result it presented practitioners from this area with little opportunity to 
influence key developments around this policy area (Interview 018 Manager of Young 
Southern City’s Volunteering Projects).  
 
In assessing these relationships between core elements of Southern City’s partnership 
structure and the youth sector in particular, the main concern seems to have been based 
upon the perceptions of those from the statutory partners. This was an issue that had 
further extended toward youth workers in the city. A respondent from this sector who had 
gained significant experience as a youth worker during the period of interest, and as with 
other participants from this sector in Southern City’s seemingly ‘other’ partnership 
structure, they expressed similar sentiments to that of the other interviewees. This offers 
evidence in support of TP4, with the existence of an ‘other’ policy network within the 
youth sector. This had similar characteristics to that of Rhodes’ (1997) identified 
‘professional network’. These are both stable and have restricted membership, and in 
their composition are similar to ‘policy communities’, evidence of which in Southern 
City has also been identified. These networks are different to communities in that they 
are based upon serving the interests of a particular profession, retaining significant 
vertical interdependence. However, they are often keen to isolate themselves from other 
networks. The experiences of respondents from this network, with regard to the 
perception of this group had been gained both on an individual and community basis, 
having sat on local housing panels, Community Safety Partnerships and also worked with 
young people who had been made subject of interventions such as ASBOs. As a result, 
one of these respondents suggested that they had seen the demonstration of a heavily 
enforcement led approach in Southern City, particularly prior to the emergence of the 
dedicated ASB teams within the police and local authority. At this stage, this had seen the 
leadership for tackling this issue emerging from practitioners within the local authority’s 
housing department, who during this time had been keen to make full use of tools such as 
the ASBO: 
 
The main key players were housing, like as we are talking now 
housing, housing, housing I can just picture them now they were a 
huge driving force behind the ASBOs and how the targeting of young 
people so yeah the main pushers of the ASBOs were the housing 
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department. (Interview 022 Southern City Local Authority Youth 
Worker) 
 
Despite the prominence given to Southern City’s statutory agencies, and the crucial role 
of the local authority in particular in developing local level policy, it is evident that there 
were further levels of partnership working in apparent isolation in Southern City. This 
potentially formed part of the city’s acknowledged four-tier structure of response to ASB, 
which was put in place to ‘consult, form strategy and policy, decide on a course of formal 
action, and tackle the root causes of ASB’ (Southern City Local Authority ASB Team 
Manager 2005, p. 5). It was therefore within this broader operating framework that each 
of these partners had a role, albeit somewhat overshadowed by the continuing duopoly 
between the police and Southern City’s local authority.  
 
The virtual partner? Mobilisations of ‘community’ in ASB policy and practice 
 
Over the course of this research it became clear that the community also became at least 
as a rhetorical referent a part of the city’s broader partnership structure. Members of local 
communities appeared to have played an active role in initially highlighting ASB as an 
issue to their local MPs, which raised the profile of low-level disorder, whilst 
subsequently they were encouraged to take an active role in the policing of measures that 
were introduced to tackle this issue. This resulted in them having to also work in 
partnership with local agencies. This led to them being cited by a fieldwork participant as 
having been a key part of the ‘Holy Trinity’ of partnership working in Southern City 
(Interview 010R Southern City Local Authority ASB Team Manager), as they became a 
recurrent theme of this case study: 
 
The Government has been held to account and has had to respond over 
the public’s perceptions of ASB. They have identified it as a key 
priority for them and I think that is now being reflected in the 
Government’s agenda and central legislation. The ‘Respect’ agenda 
has developed in recent years … when we were set up as ‘Trailblazer’ 
authorities the Government kicked off its ‘Together’ campaign, which 
was about together we are going to tackle ASB that has morphed and 
developed into ‘Respect’, which has in a far more detailed way looked 
at that preventative aspect. It’s looking at working with the 
community and making sure that we feedback to the community so 
that they understand what is being done locally and that is 
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undoubtedly a result of feedback that has been received from local 
people. (Interview 010 Southern City Local Authority ASB Team 
Manager) 
 
By the later stages of the fieldwork, a recognised role had been given to the community 
in the Government’s national rolling out of the ‘neighbourhood policing’ strategy (Home 
Office, November 2004). In this later initiative, those at the national level sought ‘active’, 
participatory community engagement in tackling the issue of ASB and community safety. 
The result was the introduction of a system of regular Partnership and Communities 
Together (PACT) meetings across Southern City (Interview 010R Southern City Local 
Authority ASB Team Manager) in common with many localities across England and 
Wales (Hughes and Rowe, 2007). These were claimed to be ‘local public engagement 
meetings on crime’ (Casey 2008, p. 32). The aim was to bring community representatives 
together with beat managers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and also 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams, who it was proposed would act as the ‘face’ of 
community engagement and communications with local residents regarding issues that 
impacted upon both crime and justice concerns within the local area (Casey 2008, p. 58). 
These meetings were designed to offer community members the opportunity to not only 
have direct engagement with key members of their local police force, but also to be able 
to influence the identification of local level priorities for their areas, which the police 
were required to respond to. 
 
In response to this newly developed structure, there were some tangible ‘mobilisations’ 
of communities that occurred as the council took responsibility for the running of 
Neighbourhood Partnerships across the city, as once again communities continued to 
remain a focal point in the formulation of this later response to the tackling of ASB. The 
Partnerships have a similar motivation to that of the local PACT meetings, in that they 
seek to bring together local practitioners and the community. However, unlike the PACT 
forum that focuses upon local interactions between residents and the police, the scope of 
Neighbourhood Partnerships is much greater. This seeks engagement between local 
residents and a range of representatives from local statutory agencies, councillors, one of 
whom chairs the meeting, community groups and the voluntary sector. These have been 
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introduced as part of the local authority’s long term view of being able to devolve to 
these Partnerships both a degree of decision making, and the management of small 
community budgets (Interview 021 Southern City Local MP), with the emphasis of these 
meetings being upon the shaping of local services. They also seek to identify and address 
local problems, picking up on key issues that are affecting communities, which may 
include ASB (Interview 008R Southern City Local Authority Acting Director of 
Neighbourhood and Housing Services).  
 
It is anticipated that as a result of this process locally developed solutions to these issues 
are easier to sustain, having secured a degree of community cooperation in its 
implementation and subsequent maintenance. This was articulated as it became clear that 
ASB continued to be a key priority for local residents, both as a result of the data 
provided by the CDRP’s strategic assessment and the views of local residents that were 
being expressed at the local PACT meetings. “[T]hese are local meetings held around the 
city where people bring their local issues that they want to be tackled, you know and 
ASB is a priority” (Interview 017 Southern City CDRP Project Manager). This followed 
the early identification that ‘anti-social behaviour was the number one priority’ for people 
living in this city (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team Manager). 
This came as a result of a Quality of Life Survey that was undertaken in Southern City in 
2003, which had initially highlighted the need for a targeted local level response to be 
developed. However, by the later set of interviews that began in 2008, there had been 
some shifts secured in relation to public perceptions of ASB (Interview 008R Southern 
City Local Authority Acting Director of Neighbourhood and Housing Services). These 
were supported by the publication of an update of the CDRP’s Crime and Disorder 
Strategic Assessment, which suggested a continuing positive trend in ‘public confidence 
regarding ASB’ based upon the city’s 2010 Quality of Life Audit, despite ASB remaining 
as the ‘most common Neighbourhood Forum priority’ (Welshman 2011, p. 4). By 2008, 
this had evolved into a Neighbourhood Policing strategy and the establishment of forums 
such as PACT, both of which sought to advance the role of local communities in claiming 
ambitiously to be capable of addressing this issue through the promotion of a joined up 
approach at the local level in which residents would become directly engaged with the 
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partnership agencies. It appears that public perceptions remained an important factor in 
providing this agenda with a degree of momentum as had been seen in the initial 
emergence of ASB as a politicised concept: 
 
Public pressure. ‘We want something done; we are not prepared to put 
up with this’ just as a general message, I think that’s really been the 
sort of impetus behind it if I was honest about it. There’s one 
argument that says we do it because the Government tells us to do it I 
say that the reason why it has developed as it has, has been aided if 
you like by a public pressure to deal with some of the issues what the 
Government have been saying is actually reflective of public opinion 
and public pressure, I think very much a growing reluctance to accept 
levels of what is perceived to be unacceptable behaviour. (Interview 
012 Chair of CDRP/Southern City Local Councillor) 
 
 
The role of evidence in policymaking 
 
Among some members of the local policy network, criticisms were aired regarding the 
‘evidence-free’ zone surrounding approaches to ASB policy and practice.  These were 
mainly concerned with the lack of evidence-based policy that had been used to support 
the development of this particular local policy response to the tackling of ASB, and 
similarly the approach being encouraged by those at the national level. The youth 
offending team manager in Southern City seemingly echoed a sentiment that had been 
expressed by the Opposition at the national level, regarding the apparent lack of 
evaluation as to the effectiveness of ASB initiatives such as ‘Together’ and ‘Respect’. 
‘Respect promised so much and has delivered so little. The Government hasn’t even 
completed a proper assessment of where it thinks its various interventions are working.’ 
(Ford 2008). This view was echoed in the following assessment of Southern City’s Youth 
Offending team manager: 
 
But if you take the whole thing right from the centre outwards the 
amount of resources that are actually going into anti-social behaviour, 
and yet nobody seems to have demonstrated or tried to demonstrate 
whether it’s effective or not yet, a decade on after the legislation 
enabled it, which was in 98, it is, it is interesting. (Interview 020 
Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager) 
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The same respondent also suggested that ‘I don’t think they know and I don’t think 
there’s been enough work to find out whether it is effective or not’ (Interview 020 
Southern City Youth Offending Team Manager). In terms of the response that had been 
formulated by local practitioners in Southern City in particular, this was an issue that had 
also been highlighted by the seeming lack of follow up of individual cases. This had 
apparently left practitioners to presume that if someone had disappeared from their radar, 
then the behaviour must have been dealt with, regardless as to how this had been 
achieved. This can be illustrated by the 80% success rate that was quoted to the 
researcher by the local police, in connection with the use of the warning letter as an 
informal intervention. The only basis for which was the fact that ‘80% of those don’t 
come back to our notice again’ (Interview 005R Southernshire Constabulary ASB Team 
Manager), regardless as to why. This was an approach that was in stark contrast to that of 
the youth offending team, who were able to measure their effectiveness in terms of 
‘preventing offending and reducing reoffending’ (Interview 020 Southern City Youth 
Offending Team Manager), and was possibly a contributory factor as to why this 
particular local agency representative found the ASB response so difficult to interpret. It 
therefore represented for this participant a notable gap in the system that had been 
developed in Southern City, but one that they could also contribute to filling, as they 
were in a position to be able to offer additional information in those cases where they had 
been involved in the imposition of an intervention. It was anticipated that in doing so, the 
impact of the range of Southern City’s ASB response could be better evaluated. Instead, 
the same participant suggested that this merely relied upon public perceptions within 
affected communities, and whether they believed that there had been any significant 
improvements made as a result of the use of ASB interventions, regardless of them being 
either formal or informal. Therefore, ‘you know presumption is that it must work, I don’t 
know, but nobody seems to be doing the research’ (Interview 020 Southern City Youth 
Offending Team Manager). In the opinion of this particular participant, this had 
somewhat stemmed from the emergence of a range of ASB ‘zealots’ at both the local and 
national levels within the policymaking process, and also the ‘evangelical’ nature of the 
stance taken on the issue of ASB, which ensured that it was given a certain momentum. 
This had been coupled with national level assurances that something was being done to 
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tackle this issue, and as local practitioners were encouraged to take action so the reports 
of ASB began to increase. In considering this alongside both the pace and the scale of the 
change that was also being enacted at the national level, in terms of new policy initiatives 
and the introduction of new legislation, in the opinion of this participant it made it hard to 
interrupt this process: 
  
It’s quite difficult for anybody to put their hand up, is it actually 
working are you quite sure about this … it’s a civil order, but what it 
has is criminal sanctions right okay for breach, are you actually sort of 
criminalising stuff that isn’t actually criminal behaviour and are you 
shoving more people, more and more young people, into a kind of you 
know a sort of a justice system, and are you imposing the quite 
ridiculous sort of conditions on young people, for very long periods of 
time you know, and in effect, it I think at a certain point in time the 
whole ASB apparatus became a kind of alternative youth justice 
system (Interview 020 Southern City Youth Offending Team 
Manager) 
 
Conclusion 
 
In considering those elements that have contributed to the shaping of ASB policy at the 
local level, it is possible to identify several key factors. The first of these was the initial 
impetus and continuing impact of national level shifts upon local level policy. These were 
seen both in terms of the emergence of key personalities at the national level who sought 
to drive forward the policy agenda, and the provision of a raft of legislative measures 
aimed at equipping local practitioners with the tools necessary to be able to tackle the 
issue of ASB. Both of these were factors in the development of a coordinated local level 
response in Southern City, which continued throughout the fieldwork stage of this study. 
Initially, practitioners had to respond relatively quickly as the national level momentum 
on this issue grew, marking significant changes locally from 2003 onwards. As a result, 
formal policy often developed only after concrete-working practices had been 
established, as the demands made for policy action at the national level continued to 
grow. By the later stages of the fieldwork, ASB responses had become more embedded in 
the local level agenda, and it was apparent that this had remained a key element of the 
work of practitioners. Although the fundamental elements of the mechanisms that had 
been put in place to address this in 2003 had since undergone little change, local 
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practitioners continued to refine their overall approach. This had enabled the expansion 
of the scope of the measures being offered, both to fit in more with the preventative 
stance now being encouraged by those at the national level, and again in response to 
national level policy shifts. 
 
We now return to the theoretical propositions that were outlined earlier in the thesis, and 
consider briefly what light the empirical findings discussed in this chapter has shed upon 
them. TP1 suggested that we might expect ASB policies in Southern City to reflect the 
‘reconfigured’ characteristics of late modern crime control – largely determined by 
fundamental social, economic and cultural forces – and we would not expect them to vary 
significantly from the national policy trajectories on ASB. The key theme of the 
empirical findings of this chapter supports the basic notion of national-local similarity, 
but the picture of interplay between national-regional-local axes is more complex than a 
simple triumph of national without compromises on the one hand, or hegemony of the 
local on the other. Rather, what we saw was a complex intermingling of the local and the 
national, in which local developments in Southern City (facilitated by the movement of 
key personnel between national and local government) were clearly important in shaping 
developments at the national level. The second TP suggested that ASB policies in 
Southern City would display a ‘schizoid’ tension between  ‘adaptive’ elements on the one 
hand, driven by instrumental, managerial concerns (emphasising such concepts as 
‘responsibilisation’ and partnership), AND more emotive, politicized ‘expressive’ 
elements on the other (Garland 2001). There was strong support for this admixture in the 
empirical findings from Southern City, although importantly, the tensions between 
instrumental and expressive were rarely played out within the local policy community. 
Rather, the picture was one of a local consensus – at least between the main players – for 
a managerial and instrumental approach to ASB, but one which found itself occasionally 
in tension with a more populist drive at the national level. Having said this, there was 
clear evidence in this chapter of some tensions within the local policy network, not least 
between the police (who, perhaps surprisingly, were less focused on enforcement and 
more on prevention) and the local authority. Turning to TP3, this raised the idea that ASB 
policies in Southern City would reflect a preoccupation with ‘risk’ that has been observed 
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in criminal justice policy (and social policy more generally) such that it would become 
focused primarily on the cost effective management of unruly populations, rather than 
upon the punishment or rehabilitation of offenders (Feeley and Simon 1994). This TP 
also suggested that policy development may display a tendency to colonise other areas of 
social policy locally such that other policy areas – such as health and education - become 
configured around and driven by the issues of crime and ASB. The evidence from this 
chapter, supporting that of the previous chapter, was that although there was some 
manifestation of the ‘managerial’ approach to ASB that is sometimes seen as part of a 
risk based approach, local agencies still remained strongly wedded to the notion of 
tackling the fundamental causes of ASB rather than simply managing an intractable 
problem. There was little evidence of a colonisation of other local policy areas as 
suggested in theses about ‘governing through crime’ (Simon 2007) or ‘governing through 
ASB’ (Crawford 2009). Finally, TP4 suggested that ASB policy in Southern City would 
be shaped by policy networks of different kinds, including relatively stable and 
continuous ‘policy communities’, and ‘intergovernmental networks’ comprising 
participants from national and local government (Rhodes 1981, 1997). There was 
certainly evidence of the existence of such networks, although these could not really be 
described in Rhodes terms as a ‘policy community’. Rather, there was the manifestation 
of a more loosely-based ‘issue network’, but one which was dominated by a more simple 
duopoly of the police and local authority, who were able to dominate the local policy 
network largely by dint of their legal powers and financial resources, but also via their 
connections with central government.  
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to explore the extent and nature of national and local 
influences over the policymaking process with regard to anti-social behaviour (henceforth 
ASB) policy in a particular geo-historical context (‘Southern City’ 1998-2007). The study 
has concentrated specifically upon the activities of those who operated primarily at the 
local level within this process, and to a lesser extent the regional level. The issue of ASB 
became one of the most prominent, high profile features of the New Labour 
government’s national crime and disorder agenda, across the selected period of interest of 
1998 to 2007.  
 
In assessing the role of the ‘local’ within this process, the design of this research was also 
concerned with exploring the complexities of the ASB policy process at the local level. 
By increasing the need to secure the cooperation of those at the local level in tackling 
what had become a burgeoning policy area, those at the national level encouraged a 
growing number of local policy actors to also become involved in both the formulation of 
policy, and the direct tackling of issues of ASB. Correspondingly this led to a growth in 
local level policy networks, as these began to emerge in support of what had in some 
areas become an expanding local level ASB agenda and institutional infrastructure (in 
accord with Crawford (2008) and Hughes’ (2007) emphasis on the UK having one of the 
most developed and formalised institutional arrangements of a preventive nature across 
the Western world). It was in choosing to concentrate upon changes to local level 
working practices, and the assessment of a lived local experience, that this study has 
sought to refocus attention away from national policy elites toward the role of the ‘local’. 
In doing so, this study has sought to achieve a similar shift in the broader debate 
surrounding policy evolution, away from a previous concentration upon ‘grand narrative’ 
accounts of crime control policies in Garland (2001) and Simon (1992) and others.  
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In terms of policymaking being a process consisting of individual stages and involving 
different ‘dimensions’ of policy, these ‘grand’ accounts can suggest a rather 
straightforward translation from policy ‘talk’ to ‘decisions’ and ultimately ‘actions’. This 
underplays the uneven, messy and unpredictable nature of the public policy process.   
Throughout such accounts, the focus also tends to remain upon those acting at the 
national level, and in some instances upon the global changes to have occurred. These 
accounts also suggest a growing convergence between western industrial societies, and in 
particular the United Kingdom and USA, in terms of the nature and direction of their 
crime control policies and the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ (Crawford, 1997). Even 
though it is recognised that these broader structural patterns are an important part of a 
comprehensive account of policymaking, it is important also to take account of what 
Garland himself refers to as the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland 2001, p. vii) of 
policymaking as it pans out in specific localities.  
 
A study of this nature thus recognises the significance of the role of local level within the 
broader policymaking process. This recognition emerges with a view to gaining an 
enhanced understanding of the shaping and delivery of policy outcomes. The need to shift 
the debate away from the ‘grand narrative’ accounts of crime control has become more 
apparent in an effort to further explore the nuances and complexities of the policymaking 
process. Indeed it is only by assessing the cumulative impact of national level policy 
shifts upon local level working practices (and vice versa), and their contribution toward 
the emergence of key local level policy actors that a fuller and more accurate account of 
policymaking can be developed. This study has sought to highlight the role of various 
levels of the policy process, even though it is the sub-national level that has formed the 
primary focus of the empirical element of this research. The relationship between 
different levels of the process has primarily been identified and explored via the 
application of Pollitt’s conceptual framework of talk, decisions and action. It is also 
acknowledged that the factors influencing ASB policy have been little researched in the 
past. This is both within an academic context and also in the provision of evidence-based 
policy practice. There have been few detailed local level accounts as to how national 
level policy decisions have shaped (or not shaped) the work of policy actors at the local 
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level. The varied local approaches to ASB policy can be evidenced by the variety of local 
level ASB policy responses that have been formulated and subsequently implemented by 
practitioners.  Writers such as Burney (2005), Crawford (2009) and Hughes (2007), have 
highlighted similar gaps in existing studies, which they have attempted to fill with their 
own empirical research. However, even these studies have a broader focus, attempting to 
capture developments in different areas of England and Wales. In contrast, this study has 
adopted an in-depth empirical exploration of one local authority area in particular, rather 
than attempt broader accounts of legislative change and practitioner responses in the UK. 
The approaches of these writers further underpin the need to also consider the role of the 
‘local’ within accounts of the policymaking process, as well as the need for there to be 
more empirically based studies. These can offer a critical test of those accounts that seek 
to identify the emergence of broader structural patterns in relation to policymaking at the 
national level.  
 
This concluding chapter aims to provide an overview and discussion of the study’s key 
findings, and to assess critically the strengths and limitations of the research in the light 
of the broader conceptual debates addressed in the wider literature previously under 
review. The chapter is therefore divided into three main sections. The first explores in 
more depth the key findings of this study, revisiting some of the significant theoretical 
issues raised in the earlier chapters of the thesis. The second section of this chapter 
discusses the application of the ideas of ‘governance’ to the arena of ASB policymaking, 
assessing its impact upon broader policy developments. This is primarily concerned with 
the role of local level policy actors in this process. The third section of the chapter 
considers the merits of moving the broader debate about shifts in crime control away 
from ‘grand narrative’ accounts, and towards more specific, empirically-informed 
analyses of the policy process. The chapter concludes with a summary of reflections 
concerning the strengths and limitations of the study, and considers the potential 
improvements that could have been made, and the lessons for future research.  
 
 
Summary of the key research findings 
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The case study was focused upon a particular local authority area that has been referred 
to throughout this thesis as ‘Southern City’. It was designed to explore a set of research 
questions which sought to identify with the participants key elements of what, had in fact 
changed in Southern City, what were the main policy influences over the specific local 
developments, and how these came about. This resulted in the emergence of a number of 
important findings, a detailed analysis of which is provided in the earlier chapters of this 
thesis that are concerned with the case study element of this research (see Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six). In revisiting some of these significant points within this concluding 
discussion, it is anticipated that these will be contextualised against some of the key 
themes identified in the initial literature review that provided the theoretical framework 
for this study.  
 
The key research questions 
 
1) What were the key developments in policies relating to anti-social behaviour in 
Southern City, and when did these occur?  
 
Although a key aim of the study was to focus on the importance of local level 
developments in ASB policy, the evidence of this study also underlined the vital 
importance played by developments at the national level in setting the parameters of what 
was possible in terms of local policy and practice. Whilst there had been piecemeal and 
sporadic concern and action in relation to ASB in Southern City prior to the election of a 
New Labour government, there was no evidence of any significant local political 
discussion about this issue, or of any major initiatives to deal with it. It was clear that it 
was national political shifts that played a key role both in raising the local policy ‘talk’ 
about ASB, and in terms of the more concrete policy decisions and actions that followed. 
The national legislation that set out a range of specific statutory measures designed to 
equip a broader range of local level practitioners to tackle the issue of ASB was a key 
impetus to local developments. It is clear then that despite the focus on local 
developments in much of the thesis, the argument presented here does not downplay the 
 207 
 
 
vital importance of national level governmental decisions in this unfolding story. These 
measures were enacted with a view to moving the debate around responsibility for the 
tackling of this issue away from the confines of practitioners within the housing sector. 
At the same time it was recognised that nuisance behaviour in its new guise of ASB, 
affected a broader scope of people than had previously been acknowledged. This resulted 
in the introduction of a range of ASB related legislation, which offered practitioners the 
use of measures such as child curfews, closure orders, dispersal orders and perhaps most 
significantly Anti Social Behaviour Orders (henceforth ASBOs). These frameworks of 
legislation were cited by almost all local level practitioners as having been key to the 
shifts that were to develop at the local level. These included the establishment of the local 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (henceforth CDRP), the conducting of a local 
crime and disorder audit and publication of a reduction strategy (as required by law), and 
the growing focus on ASB in general. Key institutional developments, which occurred 
after the shifts at the national level, included the establishment of dedicated ASB units in 
both the local police force and the local authority. Unsurprisingly, a more coordinated 
approach to ASB began to emerge at the local level, as the core agencies in particular 
became the focus for delivering both the enforcement and preventive elements of the 
Government’s national level ASB agenda. The leadership of the local authority and the 
police within this particular policy area was seemingly cemented by these local shifts that 
were occurring in formulating a response to this particular issue. This would later see 
these teams growing in strength, as decisions were made nationally to support them 
through the provision of renewed funding opportunities.  
 
These developments resulted in the establishment of a structure that was reminiscent of 
Crawford’s (2009, p.824) thesis of the emergence of a ‘regulatory pyramid’ in the local 
governance of ASB, as practitioners sought to interpret ASB policy decisions and 
accompanying initiatives. At the same time, although national impetus was initially 
important, this also reflected Southern City’s move away from a nationally led approach 
for perhaps the first time, in a series of key developments to have occurred at the local 
level. This culminated in the introduction of a more balanced approach to the tackling of 
ASB. Increasingly, local policy actors and practitioners expressed unease with a 
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primarily enforcement approach, and sought to utilise a wider range of preventative 
interventions such as Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (henceforth ABCs) and warning 
letters (despite the ‘zealotry’ noted in some quarters around the high profile Streetwise 
initiative).   
 
In applying Pollitt’s (2001) distinctions within the policymaking process, it is evident that 
in the case of Southern City it is this point between policy decisions and action, where the 
gap between the stages in the policymaking process becomes more pronounced. There is 
a transition stage between the national and local levels within this process, as 
practitioners on the ground are tasked with the delivery of agreed policy outcomes, and 
acting as the point at which policy adaptations could be made. In the case of Southern 
City, it was achieved via a process of negotiation mainly amongst the representatives 
from the city’s core agencies, despite emerging sites of resistance, particularly from 
practitioners within the city’s youth sector. In their interpretation of the legislative 
changes that had been made, this became a process that was made easier by the apparent 
devolution of the Government’s ASB agenda to those at the local level. Nonetheless, the 
gap between decisions and actions continued to widen, enabling the illustration of 
Dunsire’s (1978) implementation gap, where ‘(T)here is always a space to be exploited 
between written and implemented policy’ (in Muncie 2004a, p. 175). This is a gap that 
can be filled by the interrelationships between practitioners at the local level. Within the 
context of ASB policy, they were charged with the delivery of a coordinated response to 
this particular issue. As could be seen in an emerging policy environment such as the one 
created in Southern City, this can allow for key policy actors to emerge and influence the 
manner in which issues such as ASB are prioritised locally.  
 
In Southern City this occurred against a background of growing partnership working at 
the local level, as this became a core element of the approach that was also being 
encouraged by those nationally in tackling ASB. Centralised policymakers also focused 
upon the evolution of a multi agency approach amongst practitioners at the local level, 
which became ideals fostered by broader policy decisions. This resulted in the passing of 
legislation that outlined the requirements of partnership working, with the emphasis 
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having been placed upon core partnership agencies having to work together in a 
coordinated manner, often for the first time. The effects of which in Southern City as 
already acknowledged had been a growth in duopoly, as the police and local authority 
became a focus for these activities. 
 
2) Who were the key individuals and organisations involved in the development of 
ASB policy in Southern City? 
 
It has been argued that the key local actors in the development of ASB policy in Southern 
City were the police and policy officers from specific areas of the local authority 
(particularly housing). These made up the duopoly in relation to which a number of 
potentially key actors were de facto excluded. As noted previously the latter included 
elected politicians, the Regional Government Office (henceforth RGOs), and youth 
services.  Local policy was driven and adapted by public servants rather than by elected 
political leadership or indeed ‘the community’. This finding is largely supportive of 
Garland’s (2001) arguments regarding the key role played by adaptive, problem-solving 
approaches in much contemporary crime control strategies, albeit sotto voce when 
compared to the noise of the countervailing tendency of the ‘politics of denial’.  
However, we also need to reaffirm the importance of the specific ‘special relationship’ 
forged between certain individual actors locally and those in national government and in 
particular the Home Office.  
 
As a result of the latter, Southern City’s practitioners were seemingly able to transcend 
the gap that normally exists between these two levels, and are mitigated under normal 
circumstances by regional government representatives, who act as a conduit in their 
provision of a link between these two elements of the process. The emergence of key 
personalities who were able to drive forward this particular working relationship centred 
upon a key policy actor from Southern City’s local authority and the civil servant Louise 
Casey at the national level. Both had carved prominent roles for themselves in the 
formulation and directing of ASB policy at their respective levels. For Casey, it was 
supported by the use of strong political rhetoric in relation to key policy developments, 
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and the encouragement of an enforcement-based stance by practitioners charged with the 
delivery of the Government’s policy actions, in connection with this particular element of 
their broader crime and disorder agenda. Locally, this particular actor had a key role to 
play in the formulation of a local level agenda, and the formulation of accompanying 
strategy. Whether the role of these two individuals is understood as supporting the role of 
‘charisma’ in the various ways in which policy is developed and unfolds, it is clear that 
particular actors and their dispositions matter in the policy process and how things ‘turn 
out’ in specific localities and contexts. 
 
The relationship between these two key policy actors had been fostered on the basis of 
the previous efforts of Southern City’s practitioners in the tackling of persistent and 
aggressive begging in the city, under the banner of the Streetwise Project. This had 
brought local practitioners into contact with key policymakers at the national level, as 
they received both support and recognition for their work in this field. It also provided the 
opportunity for the relationship between these two seemingly self-styled ASB activists or 
even ‘crusaders’ to begin to develop. It was following completion of this particular 
project at the local level, and perhaps more significantly the movement of Louise Casey 
into the Government’s Anti Social Behaviour Unit (henceforth ASBU), as this agenda 
began to gather momentum nationally that this relationship became of particular 
importance. As a result, Southern City was offered the opportunity to become a focus for 
the launch of the Government’s newly developed ‘Together’ campaign, as well as the 
local authority becoming a ‘Trailblazer’ authority for the tackling of ASB. It was in this 
way that the relationship between these two levels of the process was seemingly 
legitimised, as those local authorities that had gained recognition in this way were tasked 
to work alongside colleagues at the national level in an effort to replicate best practice in 
this field nationwide. This would in fact become an enduring feature of Southern City’s 
approach, as national level recognition of the work of practitioners in this particular 
policy area persisted across the various policy initiatives that were associated with the 
tackling of ASB across New Labour’s time in power. At the same time, this enabled local 
level practitioners to continue to influence the national element of the policymaking 
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process, as the close ties were maintained between the two, seemingly throughout the 
period of interest.  
 
As noted previously, the strength of this relationship did have a corresponding impact 
upon the relationship between the core agencies within Southern City and the broader 
reaches of the rest of the city’s partnership structure. The direct nature of these links had 
apparently resulted in other key partner agencies, locally and regionally, being sidelined 
as the relationship between the ASB specialists in the local authority and those at the 
national level became rather exclusive in its nature. This had prompted key personnel 
within the city’s CDRP to re-evaluate the local approach to ASB control in an effort to 
try to involve other local policy actors.  
 
3) What was the nature of the relationships between key players in the policy 
process locally?  
 
As noted above, the research demonstrated that the two most influential policy actors at 
the local level consisted of the ASB specialists in the local City Council, and the local 
police force. In effect, although responses to crime and disorder came under the remit of 
a wider multi-agency partnership, these two organisations operated what amounted to a 
duopoly of control. There were particularly close working relationships reported between 
the leaders of these dedicated ASB teams. Other research on ASB policy has 
demonstrated that this was not an unusual feature of CDRP practices locally, as local 
authorities and police forces became the focus for the delivery of policy outcomes and for 
also driving forward partner relations in a broader sense in other parts of the country 
(Hughes, 2007). The close working relationship was not always harmonious. It was also a 
relationship that could become strained, as conflicting organisational cultures at times 
resulted in clashes. Ironically, as Chapter Six showed, it was elements in the local 
authority that were at times more keen in promoting an enforcement agenda, with the 
official agency of law enforcement – the police operating as a moderating influence and 
promoting a more preventative, diversionary emphasis. It may have been the case that 
this key relationship was affected by some of the local authority’s leading personalities 
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asserting their style of approach, supported and somewhat strengthened by their relations 
with key personalities operating at the national level. 
 
This close working relationship that had developed between the local and the national 
levels of policymaking in the case of Southern City had been guided by strong 
personalities with considerable enthusiasm for this issue, as already noted above. 
However, other local level practitioners did not always support their combined approach 
toward the tackling of ASB. In fact, one participant referred to local developments in 
ASB policy to have been part of the wider surfacing of a range of ‘ASB zealots’ 
associated with this agenda. Even though they did acknowledge that the key policy actors 
operating at the local level in Southern City were more moderate, particularly in 
comparison to those in cities where a more heavily enforcement led approach had been 
embraced. The situation was tempered by the movement of both the national and local 
level actors within this particular relationship into alternative roles by the latter stages of 
the fieldwork. Even so, the personal style of engagement that now existed between the 
two levels of the process became a mantle that was passed to other colleagues at the local 
level, as these established links were maintained. 
 
The relationship between these two key levels (local and national governmental) was not 
always a positive one. It contributed to the fragmentation of not only broader local level 
relations, but it also caused issues with those operating at the regional level as well. The 
RGO, despite having a formal role in this area, increasingly found itself having been cut 
out of the loop of this interaction between the national and local levels of the 
policymaking process. However, it was an experience that was also replicated in the 
RGOs dealings with the ‘Respect’ Taskforce in particular, as they demonstrated a similar 
degree of autonomy in the evolution of the initial concept of ASB. This culminated in the 
RGO struggling to find a role within wider policy developments. This situation was 
further exacerbated by a decline in regional resources, particularly by the later stages of 
the fieldwork, ‘[i]t got less and less and less, less people, less money … We were just a 
satellite organisation out there, slowly displaced’ (Interview 026 RGO Drug Prevention 
Advisory Service). In the meantime, it had also become apparent that national and local 
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level interactions were also becoming a more common aspect of the policymaking 
process overall, as those in national government acknowledged the need for a more 
collaborative approach to be taken between themselves and those at the local level. This 
again left little room for regional actors within this process, as nationally policymakers 
became more accepting of the provision of direct feedback of practitioners about the key 
elements of policy delivery, and resulting in the growing realisation that not everything 
could be controlled from Westminster. 
 
These new sites of governance that had emerged in Southern City were strengthened by 
the renewed emphasis that had been placed upon partnership working at the local level, 
as these relations continued to grow across the period of interest. It was a process that 
was eased as an increased number of agencies seemingly ‘bought in’ to the concept of 
ASB, and the need for policies to be developed in support of tackling it. This continued to 
form the cornerstone of a more broadly preventative agenda, which enabled practitioners 
to distinguish between the key elements of the approach that had been developed locally. 
Previously some of these partners had been somewhat reluctant to engage with the 
enforcement aspect, as the initial focus had been upon delivering a response to this 
element of the Government’s broader ASB agenda. As the multi agency approach at the 
local level continued to grow, so the emphasis shifted onto achieving a collective 
responsibility for shared targets across partnership agencies at the local level. In 
broadening the scope of the agencies that were involved in tackling this issue, it also 
increased the opportunity for conflicts over approach to emerge.  In particular, there was 
evidence of periodic tension between the core agencies dealing with ASB and those 
operating within the city’s youth sector. By the latter stages of the fieldwork, it was 
apparent that relations between the two had seemingly improved, again as a result of a 
more integrated system having been put in place in order to deal with youth crime and 
ASB locally. These improvements came as a result of the attempts that had been made by 
the police in particular to try and resolve these apparent difficulties between the two, as 
they renewed their desire for the city to achieve engagement on this issue from all 
relevant partners, including those working in youth services. However, there were still 
gaps to be addressed with those working in the city’s voluntary organisations that also 
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had a youth focus. It was suggested that they continued to operate outside of the 
parameters of traditional partnership working, as they relied instead upon personal 
relationships in an effort to secure referrals of young people.  
 
Finally this research confirms much existing commentary on the problematic nature and 
status of ‘communities’ in the governmental processes associated with ASB management.  
Whilst appeals to community remain a key rhetorical device deployed by policy actors 
and politicians, the actual involvement and participation of community groups and 
‘representatives’ in the policy and practice of ASB management is largely ‘virtual’ and 
marginal in character. 
 
4) How was ASB policy resisted and/or re-shaped at the local level? 
 
In the case of the formulation of a targeted local level response to the tackling of ASB by 
those operating within Southern City, the ability to make policy adaptations was perhaps 
best illustrated by practitioners developing an approach that favoured the use of informal 
measures over that of more enforcement-oriented interventions such as the ASBO. It was 
apparent that although there had been a significant amount of time spent developing the 
mechanisms designed to deliver the Government’s enforcement led agenda, the use of a 
more balanced response was apparent amongst practitioners from an early stage in 
Southern City whilst co-existing for a limited period with the ‘zero-tolerance’ initiative of 
Streetwise. In particular there was the maturing of the local approach toward tackling this 
issue amongst Southern City’s practitioners, as their levels of expertise particularly in the 
core agencies, developed quite quickly and therefore enabled them to move away from a 
fully nationally led approach. It appeared that they were quick to take ownership of this 
issue, and in formulating a response that they believed was best suited to the needs of the 
surrounding communities. It was in fact this more preventative element of Southern 
City’s approach that would also be later favoured increasingly by those in central 
government. With a change in Prime Minister came a movement away from the 
previously ‘shrill tone’ of New Labour’s message in tackling ASB. This resulted in those 
at the local level being encouraged to consider options other than the use of formally 
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based measures in addressing this particular issue as other types of responses became 
accepted. This had seen the emergence and use of additional mechanisms in tackling 
ASB, which by the later stages of the period of interest included restorative justice 
initiatives. In terms of the overarching working practices for those operating at the local 
level in Southern City though these saw little change being made to the original operating 
framework that had been developed. This for some was testament to the strength of the 
systems that had been put in place, which had seen ASB becoming a fixed element of the 
local level policy agenda. 
 
This did not prevent pockets of resistance emerging to the response being developed 
amongst the core elements of Southern City’s practitioners. It was mainly linked to those 
involved in other sectors external to the city’s core partnership structure, predominantly 
from those working in the city’s youth and voluntary sector. These were elements of the 
city’s partnership structure where although there had been improvements made in their 
relations with actors from the core agencies in particular, as the later emphasis shifted 
toward the positive engagement of these elements of the process, there were still gaps 
that were evident in their role in influencing local level policy developments. This led 
some of the practitioners involved in this field to question whether the decisions that had 
been made locally as to how national level policy decisions surrounding the ASB agenda 
should be implemented, were not simply part of a broader momentum of change 
emanating from the national level. There appeared to be a lack of evidence-based practice 
to support the introduction and use of formal interventions in particular, as change 
occurred at a rapid pace with little opportunity offered to evaluate the work that had 
already been undertaken. It was a particular issue in respect of measuring the success of 
the use of interventions such as ASBOs and ABCs in securing effective changes in 
individual patterns of behaviour. The result appeared to be the implementation of a 
system of tackling ASB that had come to rely upon a large element of presumption. 
Those at the national level used ‘community satisfaction’ and the prioritisation of this 
issue as a barometer of the success of the measures brought in to tackle it, whilst locally 
practitioners also presumed success in those instances where individual offenders did not 
reappear on their radar, apparently failing to seek out the reasons for this, which could 
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have potentially been achieved through the utilisation of the mechanism of citywide 
partnership working. This suggests that Southern City had perhaps been unsuccessful in 
securing a movement away from the acknowledged ‘two man band’ style of response 
dominated by the city’s local authority and police force that had initially been cultivated 
in tackling the issue of ASB.  
 
Discussing the theoretical propositions of this study 
 
The development of ASB policy in Southern City demonstrates the growing importance 
of partnership working and in a sense provides a good example of the ‘responsibilisation’ 
policies highlighted by Garland (2001). The very existence of a local level multi-agency 
partnership with statutory responsibilities for crime and disorder control, and involving a 
range of statutory, community and commercial agencies suggests some support for the 
move away from the ‘Westminster’ model of government, and the emergence of a more 
decentralised polity characterised by shifting policy networks. However, against this, two 
points should be made. First, the ASB agenda remained in many ways centrally driven. 
Although national government policy was resisted and re-shaped to a degree, it 
nevertheless remains clear that it was national laws and initiatives that provided the 
fundamental impetus for developments at the local level. In doing so, this offers support 
to TP1, which suggests that local policy developments would largely follow a similar 
trajectory to that of key national policy milestones, as local policy actors were tasked 
with responding to issues of ASB management.  However, as has been discussed in the 
earlier empirical findings chapters, in the case of Southern City whilst significant 
developments could be mapped at both levels, this did not prevent key local policy actors 
from interacting with their counterparts nationally, and appearing to shape agendas at the 
national level. This was further supported by evidence from respondents of their ability to 
ensure that their views and experience of ASB policy were taken into account, a pattern 
that largely endured throughout the period of interest. It is important, therefore, not to 
overstate the devolution of policy control and suggest that the central state was anything 
other than a major player in policy development.  
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Second, there was very little evidence locally of ‘non-state’ involvement in policy 
development. Commercial and voluntary bodies, not to mention actually existing 
communities, remained somewhat sidelined in local CDRPs. There was evidence in 
Chapter Six that local voluntary bodies working with young people felt sidelined in the 
process of ASB policy formation. Even other state elements in the local authority, such as 
the social services, were rather marginalised in the policy process that was dominated by 
the ASB specialists in the City Council, and the police. Thus, whilst this research has 
helped to highlight the complexities that are involved in local policymaking, it must be 
remembered that key state institutions remain powerful players in local ASB policy 
networks. This offers support to TP4 and the ability of policy networks fitting the 
typologies of Rhodes’ (1997) ‘issue based’ networks, policy communities and 
professional networks (which included members of the youth and voluntary sector in 
particular) to be able to help shape policy developments locally, and in the case of 
Southern City, even nationally.  There was then limits to Garland’s claims for both ‘de-
monopolisation’ and ‘responsibilisation’ beyond state actors in the new preventive sector 
of late modern society (see Hughes, 2007, p. 73), as the key players locally remained 
throughout the period of study, members of the police and local authority. Their ability to 
influence national developments relied heavily upon the ‘special’ relationship that had 
been cultivated between these organisations and key members of the national ASB policy 
movement, and the ways in which these organisations were able to harness their 
resources and at times support each other by exchanging them. This also included 
movement vertically, as key local players transitioned into national level roles. 
 
The initial formulation of what Rhodes (1997) would describe as being an issue based 
policy network came as a result of the development of a local partnership structure, 
which was premised upon the issue of ASB. This consisted of key members including the 
community, CDRP, local authority and police. However, over time there developed a 
somewhat unequal distribution of power within this group as key policy actors began to 
emerge. This appeared to be consistent with the broader national picture that had 
developed in relation to local partnership relations, as the duopoly of control between the 
city’s local authority and the police in particular became a consistent trend (Hughes, 
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2007). In Southern City, this enabled key practitioners from these organisations to 
dominate the network, and the resulting coordination of a wider local level response to 
issues of ASB. At times this resulted in conflicts between these two key partnership 
agencies and other local partners as previously highlighted. These issues arose in relation 
to their local level positioning, and the style of response and the methods being advocated 
in the tackling of individual cases of ASB, as conflicts persisted as to the style of 
adaptive response to be utilised. 
 
These relations may well have also contributed to the evolution of this ‘issue-based 
network’ into a structure that increasingly reflected that of a ‘policy community’. 
According to Rhodes' definition, the membership of these communities is often more 
select, even though the common denominator tends to be the involvement of 
representatives from organisations that are able to harness the use of extensive resources. 
These are mainly used to support the development of public policy, which in the case of 
this study was focused upon local level efforts aimed at influencing ASB policy. This can 
be further facilitated by the exchange of resources between organisations at the local 
level within these types of communities. There were again examples of these activities 
amongst Southern City's core agencies, particularly as the local authority sought to retain 
key resource levels. This saw staff movement between the city's local authority and 
police, in addition to the upward transitions that were also being made amongst 
practitioners between the local and national levels. This enhanced the relationship 
between these two key levels of the process, as contacts were maintained and policy 
actors increasingly felt like they had the ‘ear’ of those in government. Having a once 
local level actor operating at this national level, who had an understanding of both the 
dynamics and the geo-political landscape of this particular area, no doubt facilitated this. 
In addition, practitioners had developed a proven track record in working alongside 
colleagues at the national level.  
Southern City’s apparent divergence from an enforcement-oriented national level 
approach demonstrates not only the apparent ‘schizoid’ tension that can exist between 
‘adaptive’ elements of policymaking on the one hand, driven by managerial concerns and 
the presence of more emotive, politicized ‘expressive’ elements on the other (Garland 
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2001) as discussed with the formulation of TP2, but also the existence of spaces that 
facilitate and enable these challenges to be made to the national level of the policymaking 
process in particular. This supports the suggestion that policymaking is not simply an 
unchanging, transitional process. It is instead representative of the outcome of a set of 
processes (Jones and Newburn 2004, p. 60), some of which are open to adaptation. The 
opportunity for this to occur is increased as more policy actors become involved in the 
formulation of policy, and as more policy talk and decisions around this agenda began to 
emerge.  
 
In and amongst this growing scope of actors there emerged a range of key policy actors, 
both nationally and locally, each of which had a role to play in driving forward the ASB 
agenda at both levels, with some appearing to have a stronger influence than others. In 
focusing upon the development of working practices in a single area such as Southern 
City in this manner, it was at this point during the transition that the distinguishing 
feature of the practitioner response in this City also became apparent. Those representing 
the city’s core agencies became able to exert more pressure in the formulation of a 
coordinated local level approach in tackling this issue, whilst also influencing the 
policymaking activities that were occurring at the national level. Their ability to do so 
illustrated the ways in which both individual and organisational politics can contribute to 
the shaping of local level policy delivery, as the mantra in Southern City continued to 
focus upon a more preventative approach being taken in relation to the tackling of ASB.  
It can also be a contributory factor in the apparent variations in approach that have 
emerged in this policy area despite the apparent consistencies in the policy decisions that 
have been taken by policymakers at the national level, and the legislative framework that 
has been put in place. In Southern City this saw local policy actors working against the 
prediction of TP3, which suggested that tackling ASB would become dominated by 
issues of risk management, as they instead focused upon the underlying causes of this 
behaviour and the need for this to be tackled. This meant lessening the emphasis placed 
upon formal actions such as ASBOs, and seeking to utilise more informally based 
measures such as warning letters. This was in an effort to not only be cost effective in 
their approach but also to ensure that all other routes were exhausted with the individual 
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prior to any formal action being applied. These became key elements of the policymaking 
process that it was anticipated would be best illustrated through the use of a case study 
approach designed to highlight the role of the ‘local’ within this progression between the 
initial stages of policy talk and decision making, to the subsequent delivery of targeted 
policy objectives, highlighting in this case how local level players were able to shape 
their responses in the face of an initial barrage of enforcement led approaches.  
 
Concluding remarks and implications for future research  
 
This research suggests that there are two key issues to have emerged in relation to those 
accounts of policymaking that have focused upon the provision of a grand narrative of 
developing crime control measures. The first is the inference of this being a 
straightforward process involving a smooth transition that renders policymaking to be a 
top down experience for practitioners. Secondly in presenting an account of a top down 
nature, it presumes compliance from those at the local level. It is suggested that what is 
required is more detailed empirical analysis of actual policy developments at the local 
level.  
 
This particular study into the governance of ASB suggests that it is a balanced approach 
taking into account the interplay and mutual influence of national and local actors and 
processes that is required in order to enhance the nature of the accounts of policymaking 
that are being offered academically. In testing national trends in this manner, a movement 
towards the incorporation of the delivery of policy actions by local practitioners and the 
ways in which they too can influence this process is advocated. Therefore one of the main 
aims of this study has been to emphasise the significance of understanding policymaking 
as a multi-directional process, often of negotiation between different elements of the 
process.  
It is argued that the application of a single case study approach has enabled these key 
elements of the ASB policymaking process to be identified and contextualised in some 
depth. In addition, it is anticipated that this is also an account of the transitions that have 
been made from government towards increased governance. Even though case study 
 221 
 
 
research does not enable generalisations to be made, it is suggested that some of the 
study’s key findings could be applied and tested within the context of other policy fields 
and localities. For example the suggestion that there are gaps within the policymaking 
process that can be exploited by practitioners, leading to more individualised 
interpretations of key policy decisions, whilst some at the local level are able to exert 
influence over national level policy shifts, are all indicative of policymaking being more 
than just a top down experience for practitioners. In the same way that partnership 
relations can add to the complexities that are involved, they can also provide a further 
dynamic to suggest the movement away from centralised control over key policy 
developments. This is important, both in terms of assessing national level centred 
accounts of policymaking, and the suggestion that there needs to be more studies 
undertaken in a similar vein to this.  
 
A study of this nature can also be used as a means of highlighting future research 
opportunities. This is both in relation to ASB policy and the policymaking process more 
generally. It is therefore suggested that the use of a similar methodological approach, 
which favours the formulation of an adaptive research framework could be applied to 
other research sites, both nationally and in the provision of comparisons between local 
areas in England, and between local authorities in the devolved polities of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Having cited a distinguishing feature to Southern City’s 
approach toward policymaking, it would be interesting to explore whether this also 
occurred in other areas where national level recognition for practitioner efforts were 
received and led to close local-central government relations. Or was this a case of 
individual personalities and ‘charisma’ which can become such a key factor in shaping 
policy outcomes both locally and indeed nationally. In terms of enhancing our 
understanding of the complexities involved in the policymaking process, it would also be 
interesting to present this account from a national level perspective downward. This 
could be achieved through the application of a similar style of methodological approach, 
only utilised within a national level context, before being applied to colleagues at the 
local level. This particular study had to rely upon supporting policy documentation in an 
effort to explore this (national) element of the process given that the focus remained upon 
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the gaining a detailed account of the local experience of policymaking. As was also 
acknowledged in this study, there has been a change of policy talk in this particular 
policy area in more recent times. This had its origins in a change in Prime Minister and 
the key personnel who had supported Blair’s approach to targeting this issue across local 
communities, and also the simple fact that tackling ASB had become an embedded part 
of local level working practices. In recalling the dominance of this issue throughout the 
period of the research, it would be interesting to contrast this account of policymaking 
with one set in more recent times. This is especially interesting, as ASB remains an 
enduring feature of late modern society and its preoccupations with risk, insecurity and 
tolerance.  
 
This study was restricted necessarily by the imposition of a specific timescale required 
for data collection, which at times also limited the institutional memory that was 
available, owing to this being reliant upon the ongoing transition of shared experiences 
and know-how between old and new members of organisations. Also this research was 
conducted during a period in which ASB policy was also evolving as a policy area. This 
meant that a significant amount of ASB literature both locally and nationally became 
available. However, its initial evolution also at times hindered the production of a study 
that sought to offer a snapshot of a local experience. It was also a difficulty that was 
experienced in relation to the local level practitioners who were available to participate in 
the fieldwork given that some of these identified key local level actors changed roles over 
the course of the case study, and were therefore no longer in a position to be interviewed 
as part of this study. In these instances, the accounts of alternative practitioners have had 
to be relied upon, some of who had direct knowledge of these actors, whilst others had 
taken their place. There was also a high success rate achieved in the number of interviews 
that were secured.  
 
Overall, the methodological approach adopted and the resulting accounts that were 
gained from practitioners who were involved in the administering of ASB policy within a 
local context, have helped this study meet its key aims, despite the acknowledged 
limitations of a single case study approach and at times the lack of institutional memory 
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concerned with the selected period of interest. It is anticipated that this study has 
successfully highlighted the complexities that are involved in the policymaking process. 
It has also provided a site in which other academic theories regarding policymaking could 
be tested and applied, largely in an effort to enhance our understanding of the effects that 
broader policy change can have upon local level working practices, and of course the 
consequences of the local developments in turn for the national level of policy and 
practice.  
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Appendix II: Example Topic Guide 
 
Interview themes 
 
Ask permission to tape. No individual will be named or identified in the final thesis. 
I’m happy to turn tape off at any point if there is something you’d rather not have 
on tape.  
1. Candidate’s role 
 
Could I begin by asking you some general questions about your job here and what it 
involves? 
 
Explain that the timescale of my research is the period between 1998 and 2007 and 
therefore will be asking the candidate to think back over this time when answering 
questions.  
 
§ Ask candidate to provide details of role and functions and the duration for which 
they have been in post and what portion of the 1998-2007 timescale is covered. 
§ What are your main responsibilities and when was your post first established  
(contact for predecessor if appropriate)? If post is a recent creation is the 
candidate aware of any work being undertaken prior to this in respect of ASB? 
§ How prominent an issue has ASB been during the time that you have worked in 
this organisation? 
§ How much emphasis do you think your organisation and your other partners have 
placed upon tackling ASB in Southern City? 
§ In terms of ASB policy, what degree of involvement did you have in its 
formulation given your role within the organisation? 
§ In your opinion how much influence does the local Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership have upon the way in which ASB has been tackled in Southern City to 
date? 
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§ If the candidate has been involved in tackling ASB through both the Community 
Safety Partnership and the Local Strategic Partnership, have they noticed any 
differences in the way that this is being done or the influence that either of these 
Partnerships have upon the way in which ASB policy is implemented locally? 
§ Are there any differences in the ways in which each of these Partnerships have 
been interacting with central government? 
 
2. Influences over Anti Social Behaviour Policy 
 
I’m interested in the various local, regional and national influences over the 
development of ASB policy, so would like to spend a little time on this. 
 
§ Given the period of time that I am interested in, how new do you consider all of 
this to be? Was concern with ASB something that emerged at a national level 
from central government in the late 1990s, or is this based on a longer history of 
community concern regarding the management of ASB in Southern City?  
§ What do you consider to have been the main national influences over the 
development of ASB policy at the local level between 1998 and 2007? In addition 
to considering what the key developments have been in regards to legislation 
specifically? (Probe: Crime and Disorder Act, Anti Social Behaviour Act etc). 
§ How do the national influences pan down to local authority level? (E.g. meetings 
with the Home Office, ASB Unit, etc – names of key national people if possible). 
§ How does central government know what you are doing locally to tackle ASB, do 
you have to report back to the national level via the local Community Safety 
Partnership? And if so, how? 
§ In your opinion, what influence do you think your partners have exercised over 
the development of ASB policy at the local level and who are the main 
stakeholders driving forward ASB management locally (e.g. Regional 
Government Office, partnership agencies)? 
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§ What do you consider to have been the key developments in the evolution of 
Southern City’s ASB strategy and what do you think have been the main issues 
faced by the Partnership in tackling this issue? 
§ Do you think that the emphasis placed upon ASB by the Government has been 
maintained between 1998 and 2007 or have you noticed any significant changes? 
(Including the transition from to Home Office ASBU to the creation of the 
‘Respect’ Taskforce)  
§ In what way does the Regional Government Office shape policy – e.g. is it just a 
forum for the exchange of ideas for professionals/practitioners in the region; does 
it promote a particular ‘regional’ approach towards ASB policy; does it act as an 
intermediary between the national and local levels?  
§ Would you consider there to be a significant bottom up influence on policy 
development, feeding up from local community groups? 
3. Partnership working at the local level 
 
§ Which organizations do you see as being your key local partners in managing 
ASB? (E.g. police, local authority housing, health authority, others?) 
§ Did you see many differences in the approaches emerging between the various 
partners in regard to ASB policy? (E.g. are there different approaches in partners’ 
views about the ways in which (and frequency with which) ASBOs should be 
used?) How were these differences resolved?  
§ In your view were there any noticeable differences in what you were asked to 
achieve by central government and the ASB policy that has been developed and 
implemented locally? And is there anything to suggest that national policies are 
being reshaped at the local level to assist in tackling ASB issues that are specific 
to the local environment e.g. variations in ASBO usage? 
§ What is your experience of the ASB management tools that have been made 
available to practitioners, and what is your reaction to some of the criticisms that 
have been levelled at them, e.g. that ASBOs are exclusionary?  
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§ In your experience has there been any evidence of significant local opposition to 
ASB policy developments (and if so, who was involved and what did they do to 
oppose things?) 
 
4. Other 
 
§ Is there anybody else at all that you think I should speak to in connection with my 
study? 
§ Are there any documents or statistics available that I could see? (other than what I 
already have access to) 
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Appendix III: Example Access Letter 
 
 
Recipient Address       Return Address 
 
 
 
          Date 
 
Dear …… 
 
Re: Researching influences over anti-social behaviour policy in Southern City8 
 
I am a doctoral research student at Cardiff University School of Social Sciences. My 
chosen area of research for my thesis is the governance of anti-social behaviour, and the 
study is specifically exploring the relationship between local, regional and national 
influences on the development of anti-social behaviour policies between 1998 and 2007. 
Part of this research involves a case study of policy developments in Southern City 
during this period.  
 
The purpose of this letter is to ask if you would be willing to undertake a short interview 
(of 30-60 minutes) as part of the fieldwork stage of my research, with the aim of enabling 
me to gain an understanding of the role and impact of your organisation in the 
development and implementation of anti-social behaviour policy locally. I am also keen 
to learn more about your relationships with any other key partners in Southern City. 
  
With your consent, the interview will be tape recorded and transcribed. However, neither 
the city selected for the case study, nor the individuals interviewed as part of this, will be 
identified in the final research. 
 
I am grateful for your consideration of my request, which is supported by my university 
supervisors Trevor Jones and Gordon Hughes. Should you have any queries regarding 
this matter please do not hesitate to contact either myself on [mobile number] or Trevor 
on [office telephone number], and we will provide you with any further details that you 
might require.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Victoria Chessell-Edgar  
 
                                                 
8 This is a pseudonym 
